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Abstract 
This thesis examines the system of food provision in Latin America in the context of hunger 
and environmental crises which have been brought about through capital accumulation. In 
analysing this crisis, I focus on the role of capital represented by agribusiness and the Latin 
American campesino. I ground my conceptual understanding of the food system through a 
Marxist approach that considers critical knowledge and practice specific to Latin America. 
My conceptual framework derives from a critical understanding of Harvey’s concept of 
accumulation by dispossession, and the mode of production approach. Accumulation by 
dispossession accounts for a dual character of capital accumulation prevalent in the food 
system. The first characteristic consists of the systemic features of ‘extra economic’ surplus 
extraction and the second characteristic considers the resistance to capital penetration and 
experiences of non-capitalist food provision. The mode of production approach links the 
systemic features of dispossession to the coexistence of capitalist and non-capitalist modes 
of production in capitalism. The concept of modes of production is combined with the 
metabolic rift perspective to account for the interaction of human and extra-human nature. 
This thesis demonstrates that the food system is a contested space between agribusiness and 
the campesino. I analyse how this contested dynamic has destructive consequences for human 
nature through the persistence of hunger, and on extra-human nature through the deepening 
of the metabolic rift. The thesis establishes that capital accumulation is destroying the social 
and natural foundation of production and reproduction. In this context, I argue that the 
campesino economy encompasses alternatives to the capital dominated food system, which 
has the potential to simultaneously feed the population and mitigate the degradation of nature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Feeding capital 
The concern about the future of global food security – linked to an ecologically sustainable 
system of food provision – has become central to the focus of key international organisations 
and national governments. Two widely opposing views have emerged as the strategies for 
global food security – the first perspective is driven by large agribusiness advocating for 
increased trade liberalisation and industrial agriculture, while the second is focused on small 
scale farming and traditional local knowledge. Examples of the first perspective include the 
UK Government’s (2010) Food 2030 strategy, the OECD’s (2016) Alternative Futures for 
Global Food and Agriculture and the World Economic Forum’s (2012) Achieving the New 
Vision for Agriculture: New Models for Action led by 28 global companies.1 Although 
expressed with varying emphasises, these documents claim to defend strategies for feeding 
more people globally without further damaging the environment. These strategies include the 
                                                 
1 AGCO Corporation, A.P. Møller-Maersk A/S, BASF SE, Bayer CropScience AG, Bunge Limited, Cargill 
Inc, CF Industries Holdings Inc., The Coca-Cola Company, Diageo Plc, DuPont, General Mills Inc., Heineken, 
METRO AG, Mondelez International Inc., Monsanto Company, The Mosaic Company, Nestlé SA, Novozymes 
A/S, PepsiCo Inc., Rabobank International, Royal DSM NV, SABMiller Plc, Sinar Mas Agribusiness & Food, 
Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd, Syngenta International AG, Unilever, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Yara 
International ASA.  
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expansion of international trade and increased yields, which include genetic modified crops 
– both of which are driven by large agribusiness.  
 
A large capital-driven food system is in stark contrast to the second perspective in evaluations 
coming from the intergovernmental reports of the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) (2009), the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) and the International Panel of 
Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES) (2016). Underlying both assessments is a dual 
critique. On the one hand, the ecological destruction as a result of food provision driven by 
large capital is beginning to reach its limits, as reflected in the phenomena of climate change 
and the erosion of biodiversity. On the other hand, an ecologically sustainable system of food 
provision that meets food security is critically linked to small-scale farming and the 
valorisation of traditional and local knowledge.   
 
These two starkly opposing views – of the UK Government, the OECD, and the World 
Economic Forum on the one hand, and the views of the IAASTD, IPCC and IPES on the 
other – reveal the object of food provision to be a useful lens to expose particular 
contradictions within the logic of capital accumulation. Two primary contradictions within 
the logic of capital accumulation are: the destruction of human nature, including the ability 
to secure food for nourishment; and ecological destruction. It also places doubts about the 
potential role of ‘small-scale farmers’ in food provision and the degradation of nature. Food 
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as an object for study expresses this unique interconnected biological relationship through 
the human requirement for food intake and the ecological condition of food.2   
 
Historically, food has marked the transition of humanity from hunter-gatherers to subsistence 
agricultural production, so called ‘modern’ agriculture, and industrial agriculture. While 
‘modern agriculture’ was based on the mechanization of animal-drawn cultivation and 
harvest processing, industrial agriculture is characterised by highly intensive use of fossil 
fuels and chemical inputs. This process has been accompanied by significant re-structuring 
of social, political and economic arrangements. It included transformations in cultures, 
religions, medicines, status and wealth with distinct food links (Anderson, 2005), but was 
also expressed in the rise and fall of great civilization and cities founded around specific 
crops, on the exchange of food surpluses and ever increasing new trade routes (Diamond, 
2006; Rimas & Fraser, 2010). In England, the emerging capitalist mode of production 
radically transformed rural areas. In particular, the rise of manufacturing required increasing 
extraction of natural resources to be processed and sold on the expanding capitalist world 
market. The capitalist mode of production in England required cheap food imports at home 
to assure low wages and guarantee higher profits. In this way, food became instrumental in 
the colonisation of the world periphery. Latin America was no exception in this new 
international division of labour.  
                                                 
2 For the present purpose, the terms of food and agriculture are used in an interchangeable manner, referring to 
cultivation of crops and animal husbandry and any substance that people eat or drink. Although previously 
secured through hunting and gathering, today most of food is produced through agriculture. Fisheries are not 
the focus of this research, for the control and appropriation of water raises to some extent different problems. I 
will be explicit when referring to forestry, development of water resources, fibre, and animal feed.  
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Consumption and production patterns today can be traced back to the period of colonisation 
and Western European industrialisation. On the one hand, there are the examples of tea in 
England, chocolate in Switzerland, coffee in Italy, potatoes in several European countries, or 
‘recently’ discovered ‘super-foods’ such as millets or quinoa all sourced from the Global 
South. On the other hand, large territories and whole countries were transformed into mono-
producing areas, such as: sugar (e.g. Mexico, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Colombia), 
wheat (e.g. Argentina) and bananas (several of today’s Central American countries). This 
transition to the dominance of capitalist food provision entailed significant socio-ecological 
transformations. These are the historical conditions that enabled the continuous expansion of 
capital, which today is facilitated by increased liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation 
policies.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the system of food provision in Latin America from 
a Marxist tradition. This will be undertaken by looking at the role of capital –– represented 
by agribusiness, examined through its dominating form of corporations, and the Latin 
American campesino.3 Capital as a social relation is defined by processes linked to the circuit 
of capital (M-C-M')4 and is capable of taking different forms such as money, production 
inputs and output of goods (Shaikh, 2016). As such, capital can be represented by the form 
                                                 
3 Although in Spanish the singular feminine form is campesina, I will use campesino or the plural campesinos 
as a ‘neutral’ term for both men and women.    
4 In Marx, the circuit of capital (M-C-M') refers to the transformation of money (M) into commodities (C), and 
the change of commodities back into money (M') of modified value.   
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of corporations. The use of the Spanish term campesino in this thesis is to distinguish the 
Latin American experience from the English understanding of the ‘peasant’ whose 
experience is generally restricted to pre-capitalist modes of production in Western Europe. 
This brings me to study two fundamental contradictions that have emerged under capital 
dominated food provision and that highlight the interconnected crisis of hunger and 
ecological destruction – expressed in other words, the destruction of the conditions of 
reproduction. These two primary contradictions are even more pronounced today. This is 
illustrated by the fact that, despite overall abundance of food, some 800 million people still 
remain undernourished worldwide (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012; FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 
2015),5 and the prominent role of capital-driven food production in accelerating the 
degradation of nature (FAO, 2016a; IAASTD, 2009; IPCC, 2014). Consequently, the thesis 
delivers on its purpose by answering the following research question: to what extent, and 
how, these contradictions are linked to the expansion of capital, and whether the campesino 
still has any role to play in the food system. 
 
Approach and considerations 
The conceptual approach of this research builds upon the concepts of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (ABD) developed by David Harvey (2003) and ‘modes of production’ (MOP) 
drawn from the Latin American debate on modes of production in the 1960s and 70s (e.g., 
                                                 
5 This is the commonly used official FAO estimate for calories needed for a sedentary life. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 6, this figure is highly disputed. Setting the caloric threshold at a higher level, corresponding to 
normal and intense activity, more likely for poor people, this would means that between 1.5 and 2.6 billion are 
hungry (FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2012, p. 55).       
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Assadourian, Cardoso, Ciafardini, Garavaglia, & Laclau, 2005; Cueva, 1975; Frank, 1965; 
Vitale, 1966). Whereas in this section I outline the main characteristics of these concepts, a 
more detailed discussion is provided in the next chapter. Firstly, ABD characterises two 
important systemic features when capital advances in food provision. On the one hand, it 
considers mechanisms of capital accumulation based on ‘extra-economic’ surplus extraction, 
through forced displacement of campesinos, privatisation of collective means of production 
such as land, seeds and appropriation of traditional knowledge. On the other, it accounts for 
resistance to capital penetration and experiences of non-capitalist food provision. The 
distinction here is of ‘capital’ as a process, open to resistance, and ‘capitalism’ as ‘any social 
formation in which processes of capital circulation and accumulation are hegemonic and 
dominant in providing and shaping the material, social and intellectual basis for social life’ 
(Harvey, 2015, p. 7).  
 
Secondly, the concept of MOP links the systemic feature of dispossession to an 
understanding of the specific dynamics of food provision in the Latin American context.  This 
is relevant as capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production have continued to co-exist 
simultaneously despite the transition to a predominantly capitalist mode of production in 
Latin America. As I explain in more detail in the theoretical chapter, the concept of MOP is 
extended to include the interaction between human and extra-human nature. This is 
undertaken through Marx’s concept of the ‘metabolic rift’ that accounts for the social-natural 
relations and the degradation of nature. The modes of production are understood as the 
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interrelation between forces of production and social relations of production. Nature figures 
as an important dimension in both, the forces and relations of production.  
 
Critical for the development of this thesis, within the MOP approach I argue that the 
campesino is conceptualised as a secondary mode of production. This means, the campesino 
is articulated in complex ways with the fundamental modes of production that determine a 
social formation (e.g., communal, slave, feudal and capitalist), but retains its own distinctive 
features. From this perspective, it is possible to locate the campesino at the dynamic 
intersection of capitalist and non-capitalist spaces. More specifically, the campesino is 
centred on direct food production, which means the campesino and his or her relatives 
provide most of the permanent labour for the production of food, but may also include 
complementary activities such as occasional wage labour or selling of crafts (A. Bartra, 
2006). The non-capitalist, in terms of a more emancipatory view, refers to food provision 
that circumvents labour exploitation and the capitalist market as central means of social and 
economic coordination. It is grounded on the view that not all aspects of production and 
social reproduction are commodified. This relates to the campesino economy with strong 
linkages to communal and ecological aspects.        
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The epistemological dimension 
My conceptual framework is placed within the Marxist tradition. However, I do not 
understand this decision as aiming to place this dissertation within a closed ‘grand theory’. 
On the contrary, as part of the strength of my framework, there is an epistemological 
openness for considerations of critical knowledge and practice that originate from Latin 
America. This is expressed, on the one hand, by conceptual contributions arising from Latin 
America within the Marxist debates, and on the other, by the attempt to include and recognise 
indigenous and local knowledge. The latter is considered particularly relevant for 
understanding the campesino economy.   
 
 
The scope and limits of Latin America 
This dissertation focuses on patterns of capital circulation and accumulation in food provision 
in Latin America – where Spanish or Portuguese are official languages today – in order to 
study the contradictions arising from capital’s expansion in the food system. Rather than take 
Latin America as a whole as the object of study, this research focuses on particular examples 
from the continent to support the analytical development. Even though the scope of study is 
limited to Latin America, the conceptual tools developed in this thesis also consider extra-
regional capital accumulation dynamics that might have wider implications for understanding 
global and local asymmetrical power relations reflected in economic, social and political 
arrangements for capital-driven food provision. 
 
9 
 
Despite significant differences in climatic variations and biodiversity between and within 
countries, the region shares many socio-ecological characteristics. On the surface, this is 
expressed through Indigenous peoples6 stretching over contemporary national borders, 
sharing ecosystems such as the Amazons, the Andean mountains, river basins and, of course, 
types of food. In this sense, ‘agroecological’7 territories belonging to different countries are 
often affected by the expansion of capital in similar ways, in terms of ecological and socio-
economic restructuring. The tendency for the centralization of capital, as reflected in the 
increasing private appropriation of socio-ecological spaces that were previously collective, 
is a development that began in colonial times and continues today. Key characteristics of this 
tendency is the intensification of social inequalities, particularly in terms of discrimination 
on the basis of race and gender, and control over access to extraction of natural resources 
including land for food production.   
 
Chapter contents 
The thesis comprises of nine chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the broad hypothesis and 
conceptual themes employed in this thesis. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine the fundamentals of 
the current food system by drawing on the historical rise of the capitalist mode of production 
in rural areas and the persistence of the campesino economy, before constructing an analysis 
of contemporary agribusiness and reasons for why the campesino has contemporary 
                                                 
6 Throughout this thesis I have preferred the use of Indigenous peoples as an imperfect translation for pueblos 
originarios (original peoples). 
7 Klaas Beek in a preliminary document elaborated for CEPAL/FAO in 1978 recognized 67 different 
agroecological areas within Latin America. Reported in Ortega (1982, p. 81)  
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relevance. Chapters 6 and 7 consider the social and ecological implications, before 
considering a more open ended and emancipatory path for food provision in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation by highlighting the contribution and the possibilities 
for further research. I will briefly introduce the basic premise of each chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual and methodological approach of the whole thesis. It 
proposes two main concepts utilised in Marxist critiques of capitalism: ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (ABD) (Harvey, 2003) and ‘modes of production’ (MOP) drawn from debates 
in Latin American in the 1960s and 70s (e.g., Assadourian, Cardoso, Ciafardini, Garavaglia, 
& Laclau, 2005; Cueva, 1975; Frank, 1965; Vitale, 1966). ABD allows the study of two 
dimensions when capital expands. The first dimension refers to the systemic feature of 
dispossession, such as the appropriation of ancestral knowledge or expulsion of campesinos 
from collective land. The second dimension refers to the dynamics when capital penetrates 
non-capitalist socio-ecological spaces.  
 
The MOP perspective, grounded in forces and social relations of production, which include 
social-natural relations, specifies how this process has unfolded historically in the provision 
of food today. This perspective explains the transition from one mode of production to 
another and how they articulate in this process. The corresponding relationship between ABD 
and MOP becomes visible in the overlapping space between modes. The campesino 
conceptualised as a secondary mode of production does not exist in isolation from the 
primary modes that determine the social formation, but are also not specific to the dominant 
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process of capital circulation and accumulation today. They are specifically distinct from the 
European Marxist understanding of the term ‘peasant’, which is specifically associated with 
the feudal mode of production. Unlike the ‘peasant’ from the Western European experience, 
the campesino continues to exist at the intersection of capitalist and non-capitalist spaces, 
which is linked to non-commodified aspects of production and social reproduction. The latter 
reveals that the campesino economy has strong linkages with communal and ecological 
dimensions. Within the food system, capitalist food production driven by agribusiness and 
characterised fundamentally by industrial food provision is considered the dominant form of 
provision. The food system is therefore interpreted through the role of capital and the 
campesino.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the historical rise of capitalist food production in Latin America. It 
studies changing social relations in the food system within the uneven development of 
coexisting modes of production. For this purpose, the national level and its dialectical 
articulation with the world market are considered. The chapter emphasises the adjusting and 
contradictory location of the campesinos and seeks towards an understanding of the 
conflicting dynamics of the contemporary food system, which are constituted mainly of the 
campesino and agribusiness.   
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 build upon the previous historical analysis and specifies the 
fundamentals of the actual provision of food. Chapter 4 evaluates capitalist food provision 
which has been shaped by transnational corporations and its tendency to globally organise 
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and concentrate value chains. With this aim, it proceeds to examine three interrelated aspects 
of the corporate agribusiness driven food system by: (1) mapping the concentration of 
agribusiness throughout the food chain; (2) exposing the ideological argument behind ‘free 
trade’ and; (3) studying the international arrangements for the advance of capital illustrated 
through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).   
 
Chapter 5 explores the role of the campesino as contemporary food provider in Latin 
America. It does so by contrasting the initially proposed conceptualisation of the campesino 
with: (1) classical Marxist debates in Latin America on the future of peasantry in capitalism; 
(2) the historical constitution of the campesino through struggles over land; and (3) empirical 
contemporary surveys to validate the campesino presence.  
 
After tracing the historical rise of capitalist food provision and the contested contemporary 
food system, Chapters 6 and 7 study the contradiction that emerges when capital expands 
over new rural areas for accumulation by looking at the implications for human and extra-
human nature respectively. Chapter 6 focuses on hunger as the expression of human 
destruction produced by capital accumulation in the food system. It looks specifically at the 
adapting and conflicting dynamics between capital and the campesino in this process. The 
chapter proceeds by discussing hunger as food access deprivation, based on political and 
economic reasons, contrasted with the notion of scarcity, food security and food sovereignty. 
It then examines the 2007-2008 food crisis as a condensed moment of a systemic 
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contradiction, and the role of the state in trying to balance the advance of capital while 
simultaneously addressing food insecurity.  
 
Chapter 7 examines to what extent and how the capital dominated system of food provision 
tends to produce and be conditioned by the degradation of nature. It explores this dynamic in 
the Latin American context by reasserting distinctive ecological arguments and the 
biophysical conditions as contested spaces. It analyses capital’s expansion in nature through 
agrarian frontier dynamics and processes of intensification in food production. The chapter 
then examines how these constraints further capital expansion. It illustrates how capital 
threatens to disrupt the continual ability for capital accumulation by deepening the rupture in 
the social and ecological exchange. 
 
Chapter 8 builds on and complements the findings of the previous chapters through 
discussing the possibilities for a more open ended and emancipatory food system.  With that 
aim, it analyses the economic cycle which is divided by four moments – production, 
exchange, distribution and consumption. It focuses on concrete campesino centred 
experiences and practices which might be considered a contribution to non-capitalist food 
provision and resistance to the dominant capitalist form.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation by discussing the contribution that this study has made 
and points out necessities for further research. It highlights the different epistemological 
aspects and its ontological implications for understanding resistance to and expansion of 
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capital in Latin America. This dissertation ends with comments on the limits of this study 
and possibilities for further research with a focus on more detailed analysis of: differentiated 
campesino livelihood strategies; the varying socio-ecological impacts of capital as connected 
through food; the identification of the different origins and forms of capital; and the role of 
the state institutions in the food system in Latin America.       
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2. Dispossession and coexistence of modes of 
production in the food system 
 
Introduction 
This chapter advances the conceptual approach that will be used to study the expansion of 
capital in the provision of food. The process of valorisation and accumulation of capital raises 
key questions related to the contradictions within the capitalist provision of food. These 
contradictions include the presence of food insecurity in the midst of ample food supply, the 
destruction of nature that sustain capital’s own reproduction, and the contradictory roles of 
campesinos and agribusiness in food supply. The proposed approach is also considered to 
have explanatory power for the examination of possible alternatives to the dominating way 
of food provision.   
 
With this aim the concepts of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (ABD) (Harvey, 2003) and 
‘mode of production’ (MOP) are introduced. Whereas this section briefly presents both 
concepts, a more detailed discussion is provided in the remainder of this chapter. Harvey 
developed ABD based on the understanding of what Marx termed as primitive accumulation 
to explain the violent origin of capitalist accumulation, which continues to be an ongoing 
process today. Harvey links ABD to Rosa Luxemburg’s emphasis on the necessity to 
integrate ‘pre-capitalist’ social formations in the space of capital accumulation in order to 
stabilise the system. For the development of my argument, ABD has a twofold importance. 
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On the one hand, it accounts for the extraction of surplus work by ‘extra-economic’ means. 
This has been exemplified by Wood (2002, p. 2) as ‘military, political, and judicial powers’, 
such as forced displacement of people from their land, appropriation of ancestral knowledge 
and privatisation of seeds. On the other hand, the concept is relevant in examining resistance 
to capitalist food provision and non-capitalist experiences. Regarding the latter, a distinction 
has to be made between ‘capital’ as a process and ‘capitalism’ as a social formation. While 
‘capital’ as a process of circulation and accumulation is open to resistance and non-capitalist 
practices, ‘capitalism’ refers to ‘any social formation in which processes of capital circulation 
and accumulation are hegemonic and dominant in providing and shaping the material, social 
and intellectual basis for social life’ (Harvey, 2015, p. 7).  
 
The preceding point emphasises the distinction between the dynamic and open-ended 
character of capital as a process, in contrast with capitalism referring to the whole system 
where capital is already dominant. This does not ignore the fact that capital is a social relation 
that exists ‘within’ the process of circulation and accumulation. Capital as a social relation is 
mostly concerned with the making of profit within this process of circulation and 
accumulation. Therefore, in capitalism as a social formation, that capital circulation and 
accumulation are dominant always means that capital is the dominant social relation.       
 
While ABD highlights critical systemic features of capital accumulation, the mode of 
production is conceptualised as the economic arrangement grounded in social relations and 
the interaction between human and extra-human nature. It recognises the articulation and 
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coexistence of modes of production and acknowledges the possibility of several ways of food 
provision. To develop my understanding of the mode of production, I draw on Marxist 
debates in Latin America and update the MOP approach by explicitly including the 
interaction between human and extra-human nature. This is undertaken through the 
‘metabolic rift’ perspective that accounts for social-natural relations, and includes the 
degradation of nature under capitalism (Foster & Burkett, 2016). More concretely, an 
approach from the perspective of the mode of production is regarded as especially important 
for this thesis as it facilitates: 1) a better understanding of how capitalism in Latin America 
was constituted in a different manner to Europe, namely through the articulation and 
coexistence of different modes of production, such as the communal, slave, feudal and the 
capitalist mode; and related to the first point, 2) the conceptualisation of the campesino as a 
secondary mode of production; and 3) the comprehension of the continuation of non-
capitalist dimensions in capitalism. All three aspects will be discussed in greater detail in this 
chapter.  
 
Given the centrality of the campesino to the main argument of this dissertation, I will briefly 
re-iterate my understanding of the campesino. Firstly, following the definition of Bartra 
(2006), the campesino is centred on direct food production but may also extend to other 
complementary work activities such as occasional wage labour, selling of crafts. The 
campesino might also been involved in other forms of appropriation of nature as fishing, 
logging, and artisanal mining. Secondly, the campesino is conceptualised as a secondary 
mode. It has retained distinctive features over time and cannot exist in isolation of, but is also 
not specific to, any of the primary modes (e.g., communal, feudal, slave and capitalist) that 
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determine a social formation. The campesino, understood as a secondary mode of production, 
facilitates an understanding of its historical and contemporary role as a food producer, 
distinctive to European Marxist use of ‘peasant’ which is considered mostly redundant or 
non-existent in contemporary Western European capitalism.  
 
Conceived as a secondary mode of production, the campesino is not inherently opposed to 
capitalism nor is the campesino intrinsically bound to capitalism. The ‘real’ campesino 
economy is mostly located within ‘mixed modes of production’ – neither in a purely capitalist 
nor non-capitalist space. Capital-based food provision is characterised through the 
exploitation of labour and the use of the capitalist market as the main mechanism for socio-
economic coordination. It is represented by agribusiness in the form of corporations and 
smaller entrepreneurial farming. In terms of a more emancipatory perspective and in contrast 
to capital, my understanding of a non-capital-driven food provision is defined by food 
provision that circumvents exploitation, and the capitalist market as the central mechanism 
of socio-economic coordination. Ideally, it comprises collective and democratic control over 
production, distribution and appropriation of the surplus. The exact boundaries between the 
capitalist and the non-capitalist are subject to ongoing struggles. Examined from this 
approach, the food system is considered as a social relation, conditioned by nature and 
constituted by two main forms: the campesino and capital.  
 
Both concepts, ABD and MOP, are considered to work in tandem. An exclusive reliance on 
one would lead to a weaker framework of analysis. While ABD accounts for a systemic 
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feature of capital accumulation, the MOP considers this feature as inherent to the structures 
and dynamics in food provision. The separation between the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-
economic’ dimension is purely for analytical purposes as both have to be understood in their 
interrelation and by reference to the whole system. In what follows, I first explain the 
dynamic of capital accumulation related to dispossession in the provision of food. 
Subsequently, I explain the mode of production approach as an economic arrangement 
anchored in social and natural relations, where the campesino is conceptualised as a 
secondary mode of production.   
 
Hungry for dispossession  
Harvey’s (2003) concept of ABD is interpreted as holding appropriate analytical meaning to 
account for a twofold dynamic in capital accumulation. On the one hand, dispossession 
features as a predominant mechanism in the extraction of natural resources in Latin America. 
It is intrinsically connected to the logic of capital expansion in the provision of food. On the 
other hand, ABD is also relevant to study experiences of resistance to the capitalist provision 
of food and non-capitalist practices. Regarding the first point, ABD as a conceptual tool can 
examine how production and exchange of food has been integrated into the capitalist market 
system. This is distinct from expanded reproduction through the exploitation of labour by 
capital. Examples of ABD include the appropriation of ancestral knowledge, forceful 
separation of people from their land, privatisation, and robbery.  
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ABD is also reflected in the institutional arrangement which governs social relations and 
impact the socio-ecological interaction in Latin America. Examples include specific laws to 
privatise seeds, government subsidies which exclude common or collective property rights, 
large energy projects which expel campesinos or indigenous communities, so called greater 
labour ‘flexibility’ through short-term contracts during harvest periods or changes in 
migration legislations to meet domestic demand for ‘cheap’ agricultural workers. All of these 
dimensions include features of political, legal or state supported violence for the extraction 
of surplus work. ABD is consequently a useful tool for researching the systemic 
contradictions that emerge when capital seeks to extract additional value from food provision 
through the destruction of humans and the biophysical environment.  
 
Harvey based his concept of ABD on Marx’s primitive accumulation.8 Marx used the term 
primitive accumulation in Chapter 26 of Capital Vol.1 to establish the violent origin of 
capitalist accumulation. There, Marx (2010, p. 500) asserted that primitive accumulation is 
‘not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point’. This process was 
characterised by the coercive transformation of English peasants into wage labour by 
separating direct producers from the means of production and the conversion of its means of 
                                                 
8 An imperfect translation from German, with a rather pejorative connotation, of Marx’s concept of 
Ursprüngliche Akkumulation which means literally initial, first or original accumulation. 
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subsistence into capital. Inherently linked to this process was the formalisation and 
enforcement of property rights (Perelman, 2007).9 
 
Harvey developed his concept based on the understanding of primitive accumulation as the 
original commencement of capital accumulation, but also as an ongoing process. In this 
respect, Harvey (2003, p. 145) argues that, ‘[a]ll the features of primitive accumulation that 
Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within capitalism’s historical geography 
up until today’. However, he understands that the procedures of primitive accumulation have 
been updated and sped up specifically in times of over-accumulation. In this sense, the 
analytical content of primitive accumulation does not account for the new processes 
observable today. Consequently, he formulates a new concept that expands the scope of 
primitive accumulation taking into consideration of these changes.  
 
Harvey calls ABD a process which includes ‘fine-tuned’ developments of primitive 
accumulation and new procedures of accumulation by dispossession. Examples include the 
intensification of the credit system; new forms of enclosing the commons like bio-piracy 
through intellectual property rights; the expansion in the commodification of nature such as 
                                                 
9 It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a detailed review of debates surrounding primitive accumulation. 
There are different understandings of primitive accumulation with diverse implications for its link with 
expanded reproduction, the boundaries of capitalism and the struggles over primitive accumulation. Critical 
views of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation include its Eurocentrism (Amin, 1974) and the absence of 
women (Mies, 2014). For a reinterpretation that includes an account of primitive accumulation with a view of 
the social position of women and the production of labour-power, see Federici (2004). For an examination of 
the relation between the historical and contemporary relevance of primitive accumulation and its implications 
for political struggles today, see De Angelis (2001). For an innovative expansion of the concept to the 
environmental politics of neoliberal trade agreements, see McCarthy (2004). For two studies that review 
different conceptions of primitive accumulation, see Hall (2012) and Glassman (2006).  
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land, water and air, and cultural forms; and the corporatisation of public assets such as 
universities and the health system (Harvey, 2003, pp. 147–148). The accumulation concept 
goes even further including mechanisms as International Monetary Fund (IMF) backed 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and contemporary finance. However, Harvey 
recognises that the process of ABD holds a ‘contingent and haphazard’ character which 
features a distinctive role for the state (Harvey, 2003, p. 149).  
 
The second reason that ABD is important for the present research is that it facilitates a 
conceptual space for experiences of resistance to the dominant ways for circulation and 
accumulation. This conceptual space is important in constructing the analytical tools for 
understanding non-capitalist forms of food provision and, its implications for what 
exploitation and resistance to capitalism entail. In order to understand the ‘non-capitalist’ 
dimension, which includes an anti-capitalist alternative, three important interrelated 
clarifications are needed. Firstly, I distinguish between capital and capitalism as many other 
Marxist writers have also done so (De Angelis, 2007; N. Fraser, 2014; Harvey, 2015; Parenti, 
2014). Repeating the earlier definition, while capital is conceived as a process of circulation 
and accumulation open to resistance and non-capitalist practices, capitalism is seen as ‘any 
social formation in which processes of capital circulation and accumulation are hegemonic 
and dominant in providing and shaping the material, social and intellectual bases for social 
life’ (Harvey, 2015, p. 7). Secondly, although ABD accounts for new processes of 
commodification of nature and cultural forms, as Fraser (2014, p. 59) argues, capitalism does 
not lead to a ‘totally commodified world’, it rather depends on ‘non-commodified’ aspects. 
This is especially highlighted through aspects of social reproduction and nature. Thirdly, 
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capital never defines the ‘other’, that is, the non-commodified aspects, completely, 
boundaries are more complex and fluid than an outside-inside dichotomy suggests. This is 
the main reason that capitalist social relationships need to be created and reproduced because 
people are constantly in struggle. Together all three points allow for a critique from within 
capitalism, but without falling into the romanticised view of the ‘other’ as outside the system. 
In this regard, from the perspective of capital as a process, the non-capitalist – in terms of an 
anti-capitalist definition – is understood to favour the collective control of production, 
distribution and appropriation of the surplus. It also entails the avoidance of exploitation and 
the capitalist market as central mechanism for economic coordination. I will return to this 
point later when I clarify to what extent the campesino can be considered capitalist or non-
capitalist.  
 
According to Harvey, the non-capitalist may serve capital to solve problems of over-
accumulation. Harvey departs here from Luxemburg’s account of capitalism’s crises based 
on under-consumption. He agrees with the dialectical core of Luxemburg’s argument, but 
replaces capitalist’s crisis tendency towards under-consumption with the idea of over-
accumulation. For the latter, the absence of profitable investment prospects is the crucial 
problem which is solved through capitalism seeking opportunities for cheaper inputs and by 
expansion into so-called ‘external’ non-capitalist territories, including its socio-economic 
dimension, thus widening markets (Harvey, 2003, pp. 138–139). 
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As part of its inherent drive to expand, when capital accumulation permeates into new 
domains, it may encounter conflicting forms of production. At this point, Harvey specifically 
rescues Luxemburg’s reference to the necessity of integrating pre-capitalist formations in the 
area of capitalist accumulation in order to stabilise the system. It is important to clarify that, 
although Luxemburg (2003, p. 346) emphasised the important role of the periphery for 
further capital accumulation, she shifted from using the term ‘non-capitalist’ and ‘pre-
capitalist production’. Yet, areas considered pre-capitalist did not necessarily exist just prior 
to the capitalist mode of production, nor were they purely functional for capital accumulation. 
Instead, they have been important forms of surplus extraction and resistance within an 
already capitalist social formation. For that reason, I prefer to use the term non-capitalist. 
Harvey (Harvey, 2003, pp. 140–141) explains the underlying logic for the use of the non-
capitalist through reference to Hegel’s ‘inner dialectic of capitalism forcing it to seek 
solutions external to itself’. However, in contrast to Hegel, the ‘external’ is understood by 
Harvey (2003, p. 141) as manufactured because ‘capitalism necessarily and always creates 
its own “other”’. This is particularly relevant later on in addressing the exploitation and 
resistance of campesinos located at the so-called ‘boundaries of capitalism’.  
 
In summary, for the present research, the concept of ABD has a twofold importance. On the 
one hand, it acknowledges important systemic features of the food provision dynamic. On 
the other hand, it addresses the ‘lacunae in Marx’s account of primitive accumulation’ and 
‘the creative potential that resides in what some regard dismissively as “traditional” and non-
capitalist social relations and systems of production’ (Harvey, 2003, p. 179). The first 
argument helps to limit the focus on the contradiction of capital’s tendency to commodify 
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and reproduce a homogenous standard, and how that notion conflicts with the inherent 
diversity that constitutes human and extra-human nature. The second argument facilitates the 
exploration of the gap in Marx’s development of primitive accumulation. It also opens up an 
avenue of inquiry for non-capitalist food provision and differing forms of resistance not just 
limited to struggles over surplus value, but linked to the survival of nature. 
 
 
The limits of Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD) 
Despite the relevance of ABD in explaining certain systemic features of capital accumulation, 
I need to point out some key problems with ABD before proceeding further. Firstly, a major 
shortcoming for the examination of food provision through ABD is its inclusiveness. The 
conflation of different forms of dispossession under the same concept entails problems with 
consistency. This is specifically the case when applied to different ‘extra-economic’ means 
of surplus extraction, under the broad category of ABD in cases such as displacement of 
small-farmers by large agribusiness, privatisation of state industries, business mergers and 
acquisition or intensification of the credit system. Two key related problems arise out of the 
expansive meaning of ABD: 1) a clear distinction of outcomes with respect to dynamics of 
expanded reproduction; and 2) the question for whom is dispossession carried out?  
 
Regarding the first point, the logic behind which mechanism of surplus extraction to use is 
dependent on whether it is internal to the process of expanded reproduction or to ABD. Both 
constitute different moments in the process of the valorisation of capital. As value in 
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capitalism is created by labour power, to assert the relative domination between dispossession 
and exploitation in the process of capital accumulation is problematic. Rather, ABD has to 
be understood in a dialectical relation with expanded reproduction (Bonefeld, 2011, p. 382) 
for dispossession tends to feature as a pre-requisite for exploitation to occur. Thus, Harvey 
(2003, p. 153) is mistaken when he concludes that ABD is able ‘to become the dominant 
form of accumulation relative to expanded reproduction’.  
 
This is why some of the processes recognised by Harvey as ABD can also be interpreted as 
similar to surplus extraction through expanded reproduction. Some examples illustrate this 
point: the displacement of small-scale family farming through agribusiness, when the former 
has been operating already under capitalist market logic; financial speculation; the 
intensification of working conditions to maximise surplus value; transfer of assets from one 
capital to another through mergers or acquisition; and the reorientation of state policies to 
further facilitate capitalist expansion (Brenner, 2006).   
 
The second point refers to the question: for what purpose is dispossession carried out? On 
the surface, the answer appears to be purely for the purpose of capital accumulation but, on 
a deeper level, the answer is not as straightforward. When dispossession is carried out by the 
state, from a Poulantzian (2014) perspective, there is not always immediate clarity since the 
state is understood as a relational space of class struggle. The state through ruling factions of 
capital may oppose dispossession when fearing consequences of social instability in order to 
preserve cheap labour or when capital is the target (D. Hall, 2012, pp. 1196–1197). For 
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instance, several programs of land reform during the 1960s in Latin America can be 
interpreted as attempts for avoiding ‘social instability’ by ceding to organised campesino 
movements, or as representing the interest of urban capital against the landed oligarchy.  
 
In line with the argument that under capitalism understood as a system where not all spheres 
of production and reproduction are commodified, capital might also be interested in 
preserving non-capitalist social reproduction and production. Take another example from the 
process of food provision. From a purely functionalist reading, it does not make sense for 
capital to eliminate the campesino, since campesinos support the export-driven food 
production of agribusiness by critically contributing to domestic food supply and providing 
cheap short-term reserve labour during harvest time. I will examine this argument in more 
detail throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
The previous arguments, the dialectical view of ABD and expanded reproduction, the role of 
the state and capital’s interest to preserve non-commodified areas, illustrate accumulation 
strategies that do not coincide with a too expansive interpretation of ABD. A too expansive 
understanding of ABD does not necessarily capture all the complicated processes of surplus 
extraction which are mediated by conflicting class interests, ambiguities, and tensions linked 
to issues such as gender, race or ecological limits. Consequently, a balanced view of the 
mechanism of dispossession in the accumulation of capital, demands an account of the 
specific role of the state, labour and capital in the process.  
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In spite of the problems outlined, the explanatory value of ABD is still useful for examining 
fundamental features of the overall dynamic of capital accumulation in relation to food 
provision. This is the case as the capitalist provision of food is linked to diverse ‘extra 
economic’ mechanisms of surplus extraction such as the enforcements of trade agreements, 
corporatisation of seeds and water privatisation. In addition, many of these forms of 
dispossession tend to relate to dimensions of nature, campesino, Indigenous people and non-
capitalist forms of production and circulation. Regarding the latter, ongoing ABD 
importantly reminds us of the penetration of capital into non-capitalist areas. It refers to the 
tension that arises between the destruction of these non-capitalist conditions and 
simultaneous dependence for further accumulation. In this sense, the concept of ABD is a 
useful tool to explore the twin systemic contradictions of the prevalence of food insecurity 
and the degradation of nature in the context of Latin America. This is particularly relevant 
since Latin America is the world’s largest food producing region (FAO, 2016d) and is 
experiencing the concurrent destruction of nature in the world’s most biodiverse continent 
(see UNEP, 2012). Both these issues are connected to the adapting and conflicting relation 
between the campesino economy and agribusiness.  
 
Although the concept of ABD serves as a point of departure for understanding the increasing 
integration of food provision in the dynamics of capitalist food production and circulation, 
this conceptual tool only makes sense in relation to MOP (modes of production). In this 
regard, the MOP and the campesino as a secondary mode of production are conceptualised 
as a more specific complementary dimension.  
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The mode of production approach (MOP) 
This section is comprised of seven subheadings. The first introduces the debate on mode of 
production as it happened in Latin America from the 1960s on and presents my main 
argument. This is an understanding of changing social formation through the transition and 
articulation of different modes of production. The following three subheadings elaborate a 
more detailed understanding of modes of production based on a clarification of forces and 
social relations of production, the ecological dimension, and finally the coexistence of modes 
of production. The next three subheadings address the concept of the campesino in more 
detail. First, the campesino is highlighted as a secondary mode of production, second, its 
distinctiveness to the European peasant is outlined, and third, it is clarified to what extend 
the campesino can be considered capitalist or non-capitalist. This section ends with an 
argument in favour of an understanding of agribusiness as capitalist food provision.      
 
 
Rescuing a concept 
I propose an approach from a perspective based on the Latin American debates that enables 
changing social formations through the transition and articulation of different modes of 
production. In this regard, Marx asserted that the essential features of an economic system 
were to be established by its mode of production. Although Marx frequently used the term 
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modes of production, he did not develop it theoretically. He employed the term in two 
different ways. On the one hand, he referred to specific historical stages of social 
development – Communal, Asian, Feudal and Capitalist. On the other hand, Marx referred 
to mode of production as the concrete technical and social conditions of the production 
process. While the historical understanding of MOP has an analytical content, the 
understanding of MOP as merely social conditions of the production process is rather 
descriptive (Banaji, 1977, pp. 4–5; Harnecker, 1976, p. 94). I will use the term in the first 
sense, but in a non-lineal and non-deterministic way that allows precisely for the coexistence 
of different modes of production. This is an interpretation in line with Marx’s ethnographical 
notebooks, where he denies any totalising capitalist worldview and general theory about 
historic development (see García Linera, 2015).10 It is this perspective that allows for a variety 
of social forms to precede the capitalist system and for this transition between modes of 
production and its articulation to take place. During the rise of capitalism, capital 
accumulation through mechanism of dispossession operated as a systemic link between those 
modes.  
 
I draw particularly on historical debates on modes of production within Marxist literature in 
Latin America that tried to explain the rise of capitalist development in the continent (see 
Assadourian, Cardoso, Ciafardini, Garavaglia, & Laclau, 2005; Cueva, 1975; Frank, 1965; 
                                                 
10 García Linera’s article is part of the large book Karl Marx: Escritos sobre la Comunidad Ancestral (2015). 
It includes several of Marx’s writing concerning his studies of pre-capitalist social formations. These include 
Marx’s ethnological notebooks.   
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Vitale, 1966).1112 The mode of production debate in Latin America was fundamentally related 
to the capitalist or feudal character of colonial Latin America. Political adherence and 
strategies in how to transcend capitalism strongly influenced the debate. In a nut shell, 
starting from Frank’s (1965) book Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, the 
debate can be conveniently divided into two positions. The first position was advanced 
notably by Frank, but also Vitale, who argued in favour of a capitalist conception from 
colonisation (Vitale, 1969). Although offering a detailed account, Vitale has been particularly 
neglected by the English speaking audience (e.g., Henfrey, 1981; Sternberg, 1974; Weeks & 
Dore, 1979). This view emphasised circulation and prioritised integration with the world 
market. Politically, this position served to support armed struggles to transcend capitalism 
without going through a bourgeois-democratic revolution which required an alliance with the 
liberal bourgeoisie. The bourgeois-democratic revolution was mainly promoted by the 
communist parties in the region. Implicit in this position was the feudal character of colonial 
Latin America. The second position criticised Frank’s approach. Within this strand, differing 
positions existed; see Assadourian et al (2005) or Cueva (1975). The reaction to Frank served 
to overcome the previous simplistic dualist reading of the colonial formation. For example, 
Ciro Cardoso (2005, pp. 135–160) argued for the existence of several singular modes of 
                                                 
11 Atlhusser’s influence on the Latin American debate on mode of production arrived mainly through Marta 
Harnecker’s book Los conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico (The Basic Concepts of Historical 
Materialism in English) published for the first time in 1976. Following Althusser, she emphasized that mode of 
production refers to an abstract, ‘ideal’, social totality that includes economic, political-legal and ideological 
structures. In contrast, the social formation is understood as the concrete social totality. In this reading, 
therefore, the social formation cannot be expressed through a combination or articulation of modes of 
production. As I discuss in this section, this is not my understanding for I place the mode of production at the 
level of the concrete and allow for changing social formations through the transition and articulation of different 
modes of production.        
12 A recent review of the mode of production debate and its relation with the agrarian question can be found in 
Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2016). The authors focus, however, on the Indian and European literature.  
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production (based on indigenous exploitation, slave and of small autonomous producers). 
Laclau (2005) pointed to Frank’s conceptual confusions and argued for the existence of 
various forms of servitude. I mainly draw on and extend Cueva’s (1975, 1987) view. He 
argued for the existence of the articulation of various modes of production up to the 
nineteenth century. Cueva also asserted the need to understand the uneven capitalist 
development in Latin America from the dissolution of the pre-capitalist bases and to avoid 
the conceptual confusion of conflating particularity with irreducible or absolute singularity 
(e.g., Ciro Cardoso above). 
 
In my interpretation, under capitalism, the capitalist mode of production is considered the 
dominant mode within the system which co-exists alongside other modes of production. This 
means that the capitalist mode, comprised of its forces and relations of production, shapes 
the other modes of production. The capitalist mode of production is characterised by 
processes of capital circulation and accumulation. Wage labour becomes the central means 
for surplus extraction while the capitalist market is the central mechanism of economic 
coordination for the buying and selling of commodities. However, this does not mean that 
surplus value can only be extracted through waged labour. Various types of unfree labour 
associated with ‘pre-capitalist’ modes of production continue to exist (e.g. paid prison labour) 
and many people continue to live on non-wage incomes. It also does not mean that all 
economic relations are determined by the capitalist market. As already asserted, many aspects 
of production and reproduction are not commodified. Therefore, in capitalism, the capitalist 
mode is dominant but is not the only mode of production.  
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Consequently, in contrast to Banaji’s argument (1977, 2012) that there has never existed 
articulation of different modes of production, I argue that this concept is still analytically 
useful to inform an understanding of the historical rise of capitalist productive relations in 
Latin America. It is particularly relevant in accounting for the slow penetration of capital in 
agrarian production and circulation where communal life forms and feudal type of ties 
persisted over long periods, but as well for the development of possible alternatives today. 
Again, this view fits well with the distinction between capital as a process and capitalism as 
a system introduced earlier. 
 
In order to ‘rescue’ the concept from its theoretical oblivion, and in contrast to Banaji, I 
propose to ‘downgrade’ its theoretical level of abstraction. As a consequence, instead of 
locating the concept at the level of totality or as the ‘historical laws of motions’ as Banaji (p. 
10) does, I opt to situate it at a ‘lower level’ and allow for the coexistence of modes of 
production within one social formation. Somehow Banaji (1977, p. 11) actually concedes to 
the coexistence of different modes of production by asserting that ‘colonial “social 
formations” typically “combined” a number of “modes of production” (which was true, of 
course, but not at this level of abstraction)’. Therefore, instead of understanding the mode of 
production as a ‘definite totality of historical laws of motion’ of which the relation of 
production is just a function (Banaji 1977, p. 10), I argue that the capitalist system in Latin 
America developed into a predominant capitalist mode of production from a process of 
transition and articulation of different modes of production, through an uneven and combined 
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development (Trotsky, 2008, pp. 7–8). The coexistence of mode of production is therefore 
not comprehended at the level of totality but particularly as the constitution of the economic 
structure. An immediate impact is to allow for the possibility of class analysis. The latter is 
critically absent in Banaji’s account. Formulated in these more specific terms, the modes of 
production are comprehended as the dialectical interrelation between forces of production 
and social relation of production (Cueva, 1987).  
 
Forces and social relations of production 
The forces of production are generally comprised of the means of production, labour power 
and technology (Stilwell, 2012, p. 109). However, as the means of production and technology 
are nothing more than nature transformed by the fruits of labour, I focus mostly on the 
relationship between labour power and nature in my discussion of the forces of production. 
More concretely, the means of production and technology refer to the appropriation and 
control of nature, such as soil, flora, fauna and climate (Vitale, 1992, Chapter IV). In the 
process of production, labour power and nature interact in a metabolic process. Hence, how 
the productive forces are arranged for the provision of food also determines the interaction 
between humans and nature in the process. The human need to eat in order to live is a constant 
reminder that socio-ecological relations are integral to the ecosystem. The process of food 
production links labour power to nature in a special way, since labour power is in itself a 
force of nature which requires energy provided by food in order to have the capacity to work.  
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In terms of the social relations of production, it comprises of the relationship between 
organisation of work and class relationships. Under capitalist relations of production, the 
organisation of work and class relationships are defined through property relations. In turn, 
these relationships define ownership and control over natural resources utilised in the 
production process (Marx, 1977). In terms of the provision of food, social relations of 
production legally define the access, use and direct ownership of natural resources. In this 
way, the social relations of production also define the position of people within the economic 
structure, the distribution of resources and class position. Thus the social relations of 
production cannot be reduced to a narrow sense of exploitation (i.e., confined to the existence 
of wage workers), but rather how surplus value can be extracted in more general terms 
(Cueva, 1975). In addition, it refers to how and by whom the conditions of production are 
controlled. This is especially important when addressing food production which is often 
characterised by a variety of work relations.  
 
The forces of production and the social relations of production are defined in different ways 
depending on the mode of production. Each mode is a synthesis that covers a variety of 
concrete social organisation for the reproduction of material life with a common 
denominator. It is thus an abstraction for the purpose of analysis. For instance, the communal 
mode of production is characterised by some sort of collective control and appropriation of 
the means of production such as land. In regards to the Asian mode of production used by 
Marx when referring specially to India, I follow the suggestion of Banaji who prefers the 
term tributary mode (2014, pp. 129–130). The term tributary mode is a more specific and 
accurate category in the context of Latin America. The Asian mode is already an analytically 
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laden term, at least from its geographic conception. Hereby, Marx characterised a state and 
social caste system based on communal production linked to the planning and construction 
of irrigation systems centralised by the state. Yet the extension of the concept over all 
societies and developments neglects important historical specificities (Mandel, 1968/2014, 
Chapter VIII). Concurring with Vitale (1992, Chapter IV), I argue instead that, rather than 
highlighting the planning role of the state, the emphasis in Latin America should be placed 
on the form of appropriation and production. The focus shifts to the appropriation of tributes 
anchored in the communal mode of production. In this regard, the two most notable 
experiences in the continent were the Incas and Aztecs in the fifteenth century. Both show 
evidence of some sort of a centralised state and the existence of a social elite that appropriated 
surplus through the imposition of tributes on the communal mode of production. This point 
is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
As already indicated, in contrast to Banaji’s linear use of the concept of mode of production, 
my interpretation allows for the consideration of class relations. Different modes of 
production entail distinct social relation of production and social stratification. In this regard, 
important for the formation of class contradictions is the control of the means of production 
and the appropriation of surplus. For instance, whereas in the communal mode the 
appropriation of resources (e.g., land and knowledge) is collective, in the feudal, slave or 
capitalist mode of production the social relations are based on antagonistic classes 
characterised by forms of domination and exploitation linked to exclusive property relations.    
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The ecological dimension  
Despite the fact that nature figures as an important dimension in both, the forces and relations 
of production, it was taken as given and therefore not conceptualised within the MOP 
debates. I argue that a MOP approach needs to explicitly include the interaction between 
humanity and nature within its conceptual framework. The expansion of capital over non-
capitalist agrarian production cannot be properly understood without considering the rupture 
in the interaction between social life and nature within capitalist production. With that aim, 
the MOP should conceptually prioritise the role of nature. In other words, a social formation 
is always a social-ecological formation.  
 
Drawing on Moore (2011), I argue that any mode of food production impacts nature and that 
nature is also constitutive of productive forces and social relations of production in a dynamic 
and interdependent form. For instance, in ‘pre-capitalist’ Latin America dominated by the 
communal production mode, humans and nature interact in the production of use value for 
the satisfaction of social needs. In this case, the socio-ecological metabolism, that is the 
‘labour process as the metabolic relation between humans and nature’ (Foster & Burkett, 
2016, p. vii), is still regarded as concrete and not abstracted. However, with primitive 
accumulation of capital, the unity between humans and nature breaks down. Labour is now 
abstracted, alienated from the means of production and their fruits of labour, and sell their 
labour power to obtain money to buy the means of subsistence from the capitalist market 
place. This process does not only alienate labour, but also nature. The rise of capital reduces 
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nature hereby to a separate condition and input for the production of surplus value, in short: 
the metabolic rift in the relation between humans and nature (Burkett, 2006).13  
 
At the same time, the notion of the metabolic rift is not just considered important for updating 
the approach of MOP. I argue that in order to understand the importance of dispossession in 
the accumulation process today, the role of capital in deepening the metabolic rift has to be 
accounted for.  
 
 
Coexistence between modes of production 
As flagged earlier, different modes of production can coexist at the same time and interact in 
complex ways to constitute the material basis of a social formation. Cueva (1987, pp. 13–14) 
defines three key characteristics in how this takes place. Firstly, the modes of production 
combine under one dominant mode that imposes its main character on the social formation 
and define the subordinated condition of the other modes. The functioning and development 
                                                 
13 Without going into a detailed discussion, currently there is an unfolding debate between supporters of the 
world-ecology perspective, for a unified theory of historical capitalism and historical nature, advanced by 
Moore (2015a) and those who endorse the metabolic rift perspective promoted notably by John Bellamy Foster 
(e.g., Foster, 2000; Foster & Burkett, 2016). Moore criticises previous insights from ecological Marxism to rely 
on Cartesian dualism. In his view, this binary of Nature/Society has been fundamental for the rise of capitalism. 
Instead, he emphasis the level of relations between ‘nature’ and ‘society’ as the priority of analysis. Foster and 
Clark (2016) have recently counterattacked; they accused Moore of basically legitimising ‘green capitalism’ 
and abandoning the metabolic rift perspective altogether. The authors argue that from a materialist-dialectical 
approach, the isolation of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ is necessary for studying one specific ‘moment’. This does not 
however mean to completely subsume society or nature within the other. In Chapter 7 I use some of Moore’s 
arguments without following his ambitious world-ecology perspective. In this vein, it is considered not 
necessary to take a final position with respect to the unfolding debate.  
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of the subordinated modes of production are constrained by the dominant one. However, 
within this dialectical process the subordinated mode is capable to impress some specific 
features upon the dominating mode of production. Importantly, within a historical process 
the subordinated mode can eventually become the dominant mode. Although Cueva argues 
in this part that the outcome of the latter process would be determined by the mode with the 
more developed productive forces, I do not agree in this point. Marx alternated between two 
interpretations of historical change based on the primacy of productive forces or class 
struggle to account for the historical development of capitalism. Despite explicitly conveying 
the explanatory primacy of the forces of production, in his actual historical analysis he 
conceptually prioritises class struggle (Katz, 1989, pp. 3, 177). Therefore, in this question I 
coincide with Banaji’s (1977, p. 2) interpretation that the relative dominance between 
productive forces and social relation of production for defining the historical development is 
open to investigation. 
 
Secondly, Cueva explains that the articulation of different modes does not just define the 
material base of a social formation, but also have concrete expressions in specific economic 
units, political institutions and ideological systems. This is particularly the case during 
periods of transitions between dominating modes. In this regard, the historical development 
of capitalism in Latin Americas shows the prevalence of types of different forms of forced 
labour combined with wage labour within the same agrarian production site until at least the 
late 1960s. The significance of ideological considerations and political decision making is 
further discussed in Chapter 4 on ‘free trade’ theory and the international food system, and 
in Chapter 6 on food security.  
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The third point is of particular conceptual relevance for this dissertation as it establishes the 
existence of a secondary mode of production. Unlike primary modes of production which are 
able to determine the character of a social formation (early communitarianism, slave, feudal 
and capitalist), the secondary mode cannot exist in isolation. It nevertheless retains distinctive 
features in regard to the productive forces and relations of production throughout the different 
primary modes. Cueva places at this level the simple commodity production of artisan and 
direct food producers. It is at this level where I conceptually locate the campesino. 
 
In the next three sections I further define my understanding of the campesino. I firstly locate 
the campesino within the mode of production approach, I then contrast the campesino with 
the Marxist European notion of peasant and finish in the third section by locating the 
campesino in how they relate to the non-capitalist configuration.   
 
 
The campesino as a secondary mode of production 
I follow Armando Bartra in his definition of the campesino (2006) and place his 
characterisation within the mode of production approach. Firstly, the campesino includes a 
number of complementary work activities centred on direct food production but may also 
include occasional wage labour, selling of crafts and other forms of appropriation of nature 
as fishing, logging, and artisanal mining. Second, as a secondary mode, the campesino cannot 
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exist in isolation from the primary modes of production (communal, feudal, capitalist) that 
determine a social formation.  
 
This definition leads me to two interrelated conclusions. Firstly, the campesino is subject to 
the fundamental modes of production, its historical transition and complex articulation. It is 
therefore not an unchangeable category throughout all social formations. However, the 
campesino as direct food producer retains distinctive features reflected in the forces and 
relations of production. The specificity of these features are not identical for all campesinos, 
but can be summarised and expressed in what Rosset (1999) claims as the multifunctionality 
of ‘small-scale family farming’. It highlights the distinct and many functions of farming 
which are strongly related to, but not reducible, to its economic role. The multifunctionality 
of campesinos relates to the social and ecological linkages and benefits, such as potential 
stronger local communities and the protection of nature. Although the concrete campesino 
economy varies depending on different geographical, cultural and social contexts, my 
classification aims to meet Mintz’s (1973, p. 102) claim that the definition and typology 
should be able to grasp comparisons over time and space and also account for local 
differences.   
 
It is here that I derive my second conclusion that is one also shared by Bartra: the campesino 
is not a semi-proletarian that can be understood as purely functional to capital accumulation 
in an incomplete or transitory form. It is therefore neither a remnant of previous modes of 
production nor a pre-capitalist MOP. In this regard, although the campesino might be subject 
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of exploitation by capital, the campesino is not specific to the dominant processes of capital 
circulation and accumulation.  
 
 
The campesino: distinct to the European peasant 
To what extent is the campesino distinct from the European Marxist use of the term 
‘peasant’? In what follows, I briefly explain why by using the term campesino to account for 
changes in historical and contemporary food provision in Latin America, I avoid problematic 
associations and predictions linked to the European peasant in both the historical and 
theoretical sense. Although there is a fuller discussion in this regard in Chapter 5 
‘Campesinos: continuity and interruption in food provision’, the explanatory importance of 
the campesino for the development of the overall argument of this thesis requires an earlier 
clarification.  
 
In European Marxist debates regarding the future of peasantry in capitalist development, the 
orthodox interpretation, as exemplified today notably Bernstein (2010, pp. 3–4), claims that 
‘the term “peasant” and “peasantry”’ should be limited to ‘pre-capitalist societies, populated 
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by mostly small-scale family farmers … and processes of transition to capitalism’.14 In this 
reading, it is argued that in the European case, with the end of feudalism and rise of 
capitalism, the peasantry was subsumed into the classes of capitalism, namely the economic 
class relationship of proletariat and capitalist. Thus, as most former peasants became 
proletarian wage-labour, the peasantry disappeared.  
 
I argue, however, that this historical understanding of the peasantry derived from the Western 
European experience cannot be applied to the Latin American context. Firstly, underwriting 
this is the understanding of historical processes as simply a linear transition from the slave 
mode of production to the feudal mode and then to the capitalist mode of production. Yet, as 
I have argued above, it is more accurate to understand the historical transition to capitalism 
in Latin America from a view of combined and complex articulation of different modes of 
production. This permits the understanding that, different from the European experience, the 
Latin American transition was fundamentally characterised by an external force. This is the 
case due to the colonial conquest and a combination of production relations that included 
‘pre-capitalist’ forms at least until the late 1960s. During this period, despite still presenting 
                                                 
14 Although my aim is to contrast my conception of the campesino with the mainstream interpretation in 
European Marxist debates, a relatively recent dissonant view comes from Van der Ploeg (2012). In his book he 
highlights a ‘repeasantization’ process occurring in Latin America and Europe. Without going into detail, while 
he emphasises repeasantization, I draw attention to the continuity of the campesino. Although both conceptions 
share some features, such as a struggle for greater autonomy from the market, that peasant numbers might be 
increasing does not mean that ‘peasants’ in Latin America and Europe are the same. There are at least four 
reasons why his understanding of the peasant differs from my conception of the campesino. First, his definition 
of the peasant is very broad and does not account for socioeconomic differentiation in peasantry observable 
between the two continents, such as the higher average capitalization of farms in Europe or the presence of 
landless workers in Latin America. Second, in his account there is limited reference to the economic relations 
between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, and the ecologically-laden, unequal exchange in commodities. 
Third, the specific historical and contemporary transformations in the countryside are different in both 
continents, and fourth, agency and the patterns and dynamics of rural class relations are different.   
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feudal type of tenure arrangements including for example in Chile the inquillino, in Ecuador 
the huasipungo and in Peru the yanacona, Latin America was already a capitalist society. 
Therefore, as a secondary mode of production, the campesino may be located at the 
intersection of different primary modes of production in Latin America. It is hereby distinct 
to the European Marxist use of the term ‘peasant’, which instead vanished with the 
consolidation of capitalism. 
     
Secondly, and related to the previous point, my conceptualisation of the campesino as a 
secondary mode of productions allows for a different set of labour relations which cannot be 
defined purely by the primary capitalist mode of production. In this regard, as distinct to the 
European peasant, the campesino condition is not restricted to the non-existence of a wage. 
Rather, as defined above, the campesino is characterised by a bundle of activities centred on 
the work of the land. This can consist of owners, as occasional wage labourers, landless 
workers, renting or even contracting labour in harvest time. All these labour forms are 
intrinsic to livelihood strategies where land access is core. At the same time, although the 
campesino tends to be restricted to small-scale farming, the scale should not be regarded as 
the essential facet, but as an outcome of historical processes of social struggles over land 
access. More importantly is its relational meaning. With the advance of capital, increasing 
differentiation has certainly occurred, but to characterise all campesinos as proletarian or 
semi-proletarian is reductionist and functionalist. It relegates the constitutive heterogeneity 
of the campesino we should aim to understand.   
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Thirdly, my definition also allows for various types of land tenure arrangements. This is of 
particular relevance, and again distinct to European agrarian reform. In Latin America, many 
campesinos are also Indigenous people. It helps, in this way, to differentiate land rights from 
ownership and to account for traditions of customary tenure. The latter proves especially 
important when analysing the penetration of capital in non-capitalist spaces often inhabited 
by campesinos who are themselves also Indigenous people. For instance, as a case study for 
various Mesoamerican countries has demonstrated, Indigenous people that inhabit forested 
areas still tend to use and own the natural space they inhabit in collective and communal 
ways (Herrera Garibay, & Edouard, 2012). Therefore, it also helps to inform historical and 
contemporary struggles over land, which are often characterised by social and environmental 
conflicts in indigenous territories. However, as I will discuss next, this does not mean that 
the campesino economy is intrinsically non-capitalist.  
 
 
The campesino: capitalist or non-capitalist? 
Before I clarify to what extent the campesino can be considered capitalist or a non-capitalist, 
some important explanations are considered necessary. Firstly, my aim is not to outline a 
detailed concept of an alternative to capitalism or post-capitalist society. As Hudis’ (2012) 
‘archaeology’ of Marx’s writing has shown, although it is possible to trace some consistent 
ideas in his work over time, Marx subordinated a detailed theoretical elaboration of an 
alternative to capitalism to the concrete struggles of the proletariat. Therefore, any detailed 
concept of a post-capitalist society is considered secondary to the concrete struggles of social 
46 
 
movements. Secondly, the campesino, conceptualised as a secondary mode of production, is 
not intrinsically bound to capitalism. This means that the campesino can be regarded as a 
possible source of critique. However, thirdly, today the campesino is part of the capitalist 
system. Therefore, the campesino is not inherently opposed to capitalism nor an intrinsic 
bearer of post-capitalist principles. In this regard, my aim is to examine the campesino 
economy from a balanced view, as possible source of critique, and part of the capitalist 
system.  
 
As already stated in the section on ABD (accumulation by dispossession), a crucial 
distinction has to be made between ‘capital’ as a process and ‘capitalism’ as ‘any social 
formation in which processes of capital circulation and accumulation are hegemonic and 
dominant’ (Harvey, 2015, p. 7). Therefore, in capitalism, the capitalist MOP is dominant. 
This is expressed through the existence of wage labour as a central means, but not unique, 
for surplus extraction and the wide, but not all encompassing, ‘compulsion’ of the capitalist 
market. It also means that capitalism is not uniform in its MOP. In connection to this point I 
asserted additionally that not all spheres of production and reproduction are commodified 
(e.g., social reproduction, nature). As capital expands, the non-capitalist spaces shift their 
contested boundaries. From a polarised interpretation, these boundaries can be understood as 
having a dual character. On the one hand, they can be considered as functional to capital in 
terms of capital accumulation, labour exploitation and commodification. This process is 
revealed, for example, through the gendered division of labour in social reproduction. On the 
other hand, the same non-capitalist aspects can be linked to non-capital-driven production 
and reproduction. When looking at the campesino economy, it is possible to connect these 
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non-capitalist aspects to their multifunctional character related to social and ecological 
linkages. Many of these linkages still reveal the importance of non-commodified aspects and 
non-exploitive relationships of production such as their closer ties with nature and the role 
of community and women in aspects of production and social reproduction.  
 
Furthermore, the campesino economy, defined as a secondary mode of production, is part of 
capitalism as a system. However, when looking at the process of capital circulation and 
accumulation, they might be in a contentious position with the expanding dominance of the 
capitalist mode of production. In this regard, the concrete campesino economy is mostly 
located within ‘mixed modes of production’. That is, they are not located in a purely capitalist 
or non-capitalist mode of production. This allows the development of a critique from within 
the capitalist system in which the capitalist is also defined by the non-capitalist. The 
boundaries between the capitalist and non-capitalist are dynamic and constantly disputed as 
capital expands and people resist. The latter is in line with a Latin American Marxist tradition 
that emphasises the articulation of different modes of production in the transition to 
capitalism. It specifically highlights the persistence of communal modes of production 
anchored in traditional indigenous practices (García Linera, 2015; Mariátegui, 2007; 
Mercado, 1986).  
 
As previously outlined, a detailed conceptualisation of a post-capitalist society is neither 
within the objectives of this thesis nor considered appropriate. However, non-capitalist food 
provision does offer some useful central ideas when contrasted with the capitalist MOP.  For 
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the present purpose of envisioning a more open ended and emancipatory path, my 
understanding of anti-capitalist driven food provision is defined by the collective and 
democratic control over production, distribution and appropriation of the surplus.  It avoids 
labour exploitation and excludes the capitalist market as the central mechanism of socio-
economic coordination. From a negative understanding of capital, the anti-capitalist is 
defined as the campesino economy opposing the concentration of capital in food provision.  
 
The non-capitalist definition requires a more detailed definition of the campesino in relation 
to the concept of exploitation and of its interaction with the capitalist market. Both, 
exploitation and the interaction with the capitalist market are related. Firstly, in regards to 
exploitation, I concur with Bartra (2006, pp. 189–191) who sees the campesino as 
characterised by a diversity of forms of surplus extraction. In this regard, exploitation is not 
just defined in terms of wage, but also in terms of unequal exchange in the capitalist market 
linked to the ‘compulsion’ to exchange. Contradictions are hereby expressed in market 
exchange including inputs, products and credit access, but also short-term wage labour, 
access to land, water and other means of production. In this way, the latter escapes the 
orthodox Marxist account to locate exploitation in the capitalist social relation only in 
production, which is explained through wage relation and monopoly over the means of 
production. Under the dominance of capital, the campesino may be exploited as producer, 
subsistence producer, as short-term and landless rural worker.  
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Secondly, I have characterised the capitalist market as the fundamental mechanism of 
socioeconomic coordination through which capital-driven food provision is mediated. In this 
regard, to what extent does the campesino interact with the capitalist market? Campesino 
production tends to either be directed to the market or to the reproduction of the family farm. 
Although production is directed mainly towards family consumption, other necessary inputs 
and products still need to be sourced from the capitalist market. This requires the sale of some 
output to secure money to purchase other production inputs. The destruction of campesino’s 
self-sufficiency characterises the dominance of capital when penetrating agrarian production. 
If the campesino unit is not able to ensure reproduction, as is common for campesinos living 
in subsistence conditions, the campesino may temporally sell their labour-power. In this case, 
market imperatives, as Wood (2002) described, breaks the campesino’s autonomy, at least 
temporally. As a consequence, disappearance and subsistence are contingent outcomes of 
struggles and strategies for surviving. From this contradictory dynamic, it is possible to 
recognise how the campesino is located at the intersection between non-capitalist social 
relations and the capitalist MOP. 
 
In short, conceptualised as a secondary mode of production, the campesino is not intrinsically 
capitalist or non-capitalist. It is best examined when looking at how the campesino economy 
articulates with the primary modes of production, which are historically the early communal, 
feudal and capitalist modes of production. The campesino might retain some non-capitalist 
features, such as the importance of non-commodified aspects for campesino production and 
social reproduction, or the collective control over land and surplus, while at the same time 
interacting with the capitalist market in order to buy inputs, tools, clothes, etc. Therefore, the 
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campesino might access the capitalist market, or even be exploited at some moments, but still 
operates at the margin of the capitalist logic of accumulation and profit maximisation in other 
moments. They therefore oppose to some extent the concentration of economic power in the 
food system. This argument is dealt with more thoroughly in my concluding Chapter 8 
‘Resisting capital throughout the food system’, where I examine concrete examples 
throughout four interrelated moments of the economic process -production, exchange, 
distribution and consumption. There I study how the campesino might operate in a non-
capitalist driven sense in each of these four moments of the economic cycle, while 
acknowledging that he might engage more directly with capital in another moment. To what 
extent can the campesino economy be considered non-capitalist is a dynamic and inevitably 
contradictory process. 
 
Advancing the specific characterisation of non-capitalist moments from an emancipatory 
view, it is possible to argue that elements of the former may be found in traditional campesino 
production, markets and cooperatives or urban food gardens. In these instances, the 
campesino experience and local knowledge, many times rooted in indigenous’ historical 
trajectories and cosmovisions, are crucial in resisting the advance of capital dominated food 
provision. They tend to emphasis localised exchange with known producers with cultural, 
geographical and ecological linkages. In this regard, when analysing the campesino as a 
source of critique, the possibility of non-capital-driven food provision is grounded in existing 
practice and knowledge. This is an alternative to how capital tends to arrange the food system 
characterised by intensive industrial inputs for production and impersonal relationships of 
exchange such as long-distance trade, characterised more fully in the next section.  
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Agribusiness as capitalist food provision 
So far, I have referred to ‘capital’ as a rather homogenous force. However, in this section, I 
further classify capital in how it relates to food provision. Capital-based food provision, 
which I term agribusiness, is characterised by two main forms – the corporate and the 
entrepreneurial. Corporations rose out of a process of concentration and centralisation of 
capital. Marx examined the process of concentration and centralisation of capital briefly in 
Vol I, chapter 25 of Capital. He defined concentration as the accumulation of capital by 
which individual capitals add more capital under their control. ‘Accumulation’, Marx (2010, 
p. 434) asserted, ‘presents itself on the one hand as increasing concentration of the means of 
production, and of the command over labour; on the other, as repulsion of many individual 
capitals one from another’.  
 
Centralisation also resulted in the formation of larger capitals, but through the redistribution 
of existing capitals through mergers and acquisitions. With regard to concentration, the 
advantage of centralisation lies in that it is not ‘limited by the absolute growth of social 
wealth’ and that it allows for a faster expansion through mergers and take-overs of other 
capitals or through the credit system (Marx, 2010, pp. 435–436). The corporate form of 
agribusiness organisation has benefited particularly from the centralisation process. It is 
representative of global capital linked mostly to production for exports and based on 
monoculture production through intensive soil and water use. It is dependent on the large use 
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of non-renewable fossil fuel and on chemical inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides. 
Production is also based increasingly on hybrid and transgenic seeds. If it benefits the capital 
accumulation process, intensive mechanisation is preferred. Permanent wage labour tends to 
be low, while occasional wage labour depends on the harvest conditions specific to the crop. 
In Chapter 4 ‘Agribusiness corporations and the push for a ‘free-trade’ food system’, I 
examine the corporate dynamics in the food system in more detail.  
 
With respect to corporate food production entrepreneurial farming is of smaller scale. It is an 
individual capital that also has a focus on the maximisation of the valorisation of capital. 
However, in contrast to corporate farming, besides the difference in size and that it is 
administered by managers and not owners of capital, in entrepreneurial farming the owner 
has a more direct involvement and closer management over the production process. In this 
form of farming, wage labour and use of chemical and technological inputs tend to be 
regarded as critical inputs in production. Although this capital form has its own distinct 
dynamics, this thesis focuses primarily on the role of the campesinos and corporations in the 
provision of food. The latter is considered the main driver of capital circulation and 
accumulation in the food system on account of the power it exerts through globally organised 
and concentrated value chains. This point is developed further in Chapter 4.  
To conclude, in addition to the campesino, agribusiness is the main actor in the provision of 
food; together they constitute the food system as a social relation, a relational space of 
struggle. Capitalist food production, characterised by industrial food provision based on the 
intensive use of fossil fuels and chemical inputs and driven mainly by corporate agribusiness, 
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is considered the dominant form within this system. In contrast, campesino production 
conceived as a secondary mode, retains the possibility of the non-capitalist. There are 
overlapping spaces and interactions among the two main forms of provision, which are 
interlinked in a dynamic process under capitalist expansion. As indicated, mechanisms of 
dispossession for capital accumulation feature strongly in this process.  
 
 
Some additional conceptual clarifications  
Imperialism  
So far, I have conceptualised the food system through the modes of production approach, 
emphasising in this way its internal dimension and limiting the external dimension to the 
dynamics of accumulation by dispossession. By taking this decision, more specific relations 
with capitalist metropoles have been so far neglected. However, how the internal and external 
economic relations are linked is especially relevant for analysing the historical emergence 
and contemporary dominance of the capitalist mode of production in food provision in Latin 
America. In this regard, although not the central subject of this research, imperialism looms 
large over the uneven development in Latin America. Its role is considered significant for 
understanding the historical and contemporary interaction between internal and external 
economic relations.  
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The changing character from colonial empires to capitalist imperialism has had 
corresponding impacts on domestic production configurations. Today, contemporary 
imperialism, as Katz asserts (2015), may be best conceptualised as the empire of capital. It 
emphasises that the capitalist character has be realised under hierarchical world domination, 
collectively managed under the direction of the United States. It is an arrangement based on 
expanding economic associations and military coercion that aims towards the increasing 
extraction of surplus value; in other words, the ‘exploitation’ of labour, and the stabilisation 
of privileges for economic and political elites. In short, although imperialism crystallises 
more clearly in some parts of this dissertation than in others, I have preferred to highlight the 
articulation of modes of production expressed as class struggles and the dynamics of 
dispossession to analysis the food system.  
 
The State 
The state has had a critical role in shaping the food system by enabling or restricting capital 
accumulation processes and thus influencing the changing constellation of production modes. 
Hence, although a significant factor in defining the food system, this research does not deal 
in depth with the role of the state in the food system. In order to avoid later confusion 
regarding my interpretation of the state, I propose to understand the state throughout this 
research as Poulantzas does in his book ‘State, Power, Socialism’ (2014) as the material 
condensation of a relationship of forces, among class and class fractions. This view aims to 
solve mainly the danger of an overly functionalist reading of the state when addressing the 
food system from the perspective of the incessant accumulation of capital. With that in mind, 
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in this dissertation a closer examination of the state is limited to its role in balancing the 
advance for capital while dealing simultaneously with issues of food insecurity (see the 
section called ‘Balancing social demands and capital accumulation’ in Chapter 6 ‘Capitalist 
food provision and the destruction of nature’). The previous decision does not neglect that 
the state can have, and has had, a more direct involvement in food provision.      
  
Summary 
The advance of capital in the provision of food is examined through two interrelated 
concepts: 1) accumulation by dispossession (ABD) and; 2) modes of production (MOP). 
ABD, despite its limits, is still considered relevant for it accounts for two important features 
when capital advances over rural areas. On the one hand, the systemic feature of 
dispossession such as appropriation of ancestral knowledge and the displacement of people 
from their land. On the other hand, for accounting the experiences of resistance and practices 
of non-capitalist food provision. This is understood from a perspective that differentiates 
between capital as a process and capitalism as a social formation. This allows considering a 
critique from within capitalism and taking into account experiences open to resistance.  
 
The second concept of MOP links the systemic feature of dispossession to the food system 
by allowing for different ways of organising the provision of food. It is regarded relevant for 
analysing Latin America’s historical transition into a predominant capitalist mode of 
production and contemporary non-capitalist features. Within this approach the food system 
is taken as a social relation, conditioned by nature and constituted by two main forms, the 
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campesino and capital. While the campesino economy is conceived as a secondary mode of 
production articulated in complex ways with the fundamental modes of productions, capital 
is represented by agribusiness as corporations and smaller entrepreneurial farming. In this 
dynamic, the concrete campesino economy tends to be located at the intersection of capitalist 
and non-capitalist spaces. 
 
This chapter has outlined the framework I will use in the next six chapters to conceptualise 
the food system in Latin America. The key areas of focus will be: the historical rise of capital 
over agrarian structures in Latin America; the contemporary constellation of the food system 
as constituted by corporate agribusiness and the campesino; the contradiction which emerge 
when capital penetrates agrarian structures as expressed by food insecurity and the 
destruction of nature; and, finally, for the analysis of a more open ended and emancipatory 
system of food provision.   
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3. The rise of capitalist food provision  
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter studies the expansion of the capitalist mode of production and the persistence 
of the campesino economy in food provision in former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in 
the Americas. I place the rise of capitalist food provision in its specific historical context, 
which has determined capitalist development in Latin America. With that aim, the 
consideration of the ever-expanding process of capital penetration into new areas is 
especially relevant. Adapting Cueva (1975, p. 257), I argue that the origin of the current food 
system has to be understood from an analysis of the development of capitalism in Latin 
America conceived through the articulation of the capitalist MOP with non-capitalist modes 
of production and the fundamental role of dispossession.  
 
The transition to capitalism with the coexistence of different modes of production at the same 
time in Latin America is distinct to the European formation of capitalism. In particular, 
European primitive accumulation based on the destruction of peasant agriculture and the 
establishment of colonies for the supply of raw materials and markets for final products did 
not happen in Latin America. The beginning of the capitalist process was not just imposed 
from above, but rather from extra-regional actors. In other words, the changing articulation 
in different modes of production up to the predominance of the capitalist mode in Latin 
58 
 
America has to be understood from the perspective of the requirements for industrialisation 
for those extra-regional actors. It began first with European capitalist countries, and later with 
the United States (US). Furthermore, the analysis of the expansion of capital in Latin America 
has to complement the international character of capital expansion. This takes place through 
an examination of coexistence of the mode of productions from a class approach which takes 
into consideration the national level and its articulation with the world market.    
 
This chapter is divided into five historical periods. The periodisation follows the rise of 
capitalist food provision and its connection to distinct changes in the character of capitalist 
development globally. Despite the importance of the changing forms of production for the 
present research, the aim is to avoid reducing the complex historical development of capitalist 
food provision into a narrow linear and economic process. The emphasis is rather to capture 
the qualitative changes in the social formations, and go beyond the merely chronological 
sequence. The expansion of capital and its qualitative impact on modes of production are 
hereby analysed through Latin America’s process of integration into the world economy. It 
embraces five periods: the pre-Colombian era; the colonial period of forced extraction of 
wealth; national state formation and rise of English influence; food subordination to 
industrialization efforts and the rise of US influence; the consolidation and expansion of 
agribusiness corporations importantly linked with Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and 
the establishment of the WTO’s Agreement of Agriculture (AoA).  
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I conclude that in order to understand the constitution of contemporary food provision, its 
historical grounding and transition has to be traced first from a system aimed at self-
sufficiency in pre-Colombian times over to the current domination of capitalist food 
provision, based on profit maximisation and the capitalist market. It signals, on the one hand, 
the continuous relevance and changing role of the campesino economy. On the other hand, 
but related, the shifting character of food provision during the long process of capital 
expansion in agriculture. It also sheds light on the lasting importance of non-capitalist aspects 
in food provision and the complex articulation with the rise of capital.  
 
The chapter hereby confirms the relevance of the mode of production approach and the 
constant importance of mechanisms of ‘extra-economic’ coercion to explain the rise of the 
domination of capital. This historical account helps to inform how the food system has been 
structured around the main actors of agribusiness and the campesino economy. It also 
contributes to understand to what extent food provision does not necessarily adopt the logics 
of capital. In what follows, the different stages of food provision are analysed by addressing 
the emerging process of capitalism in the region.  
 
 
Food provision in the pre-Colombian era   
This section examines food production and distribution during the arrival of the Spanish and 
Portuguese conquistadores (conquerors). It places the food system within coexisting modes 
of production: the communal and tributary.  
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Most Indigenous peoples in what is now known as Latin America were campesinos devoted 
to the cultivation of land. Gold and silver only had an ornamental use and were not considered 
precious metals. These populations based their food systems on a communal mode of 
production, characterised by collective production, land use, possession and appropriation. 
The domestic unit was not self-sufficient and depended on the wider community for land use, 
collective crops and redistribution of the social surplus.  
 
The transition from the communal mode towards first power structures and social inequalities 
did not occur for all Indigenous peoples at the same time. While some experienced this 
process relatively early such as the Olmecas (800-200 BC) and Monte Albán (300 BC), others 
such as the Theotihuacán (100-800), Mayas (250-900) or Tiwanaco (7th-10th century), but 
also the Toltecas (10th-13th century), Huari (11th-12th century), Chimu (11th-13th  century) 
transformed its socio and economic structures much later (Vitale, 2009).  
 
The tributary mode of production related to the Inca and Aztec Empire featured social 
relations of production which guaranteed the payment of a tribute in favour of the dominant 
sector.15 This appropriation was a part of the surplus, the excess produced to reproduce the 
                                                 
15The dominant sector in the Aztec Empire constituted the pipiltzin, a nobility which included important priests, 
military chiefs and other high officials. The Incan Empire also featured another privileged social group known 
as the orejones, which also included high officials, priests and some merchants. In addition, there were the 
curacas who formed a type of secondary aristocracy in charge of controlling the submitted tribes (Vitale, 
1992a).      
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social existence of direct producers, generated by the communal production from submitted 
cultures. The tributary mode was thus critically linked to the communal mode of production 
and allowed for a strong development of productive forces of the Incas and Aztecs. The 
surplus appropriated by the dominant sector can be identified as a first form of ‘exploitation’. 
Nevertheless, in contrast with Europe, the beginning of this class domination was closely 
linked with the nascent State that imposed tributes on the submitted cultures. The social 
formation already could be characterised as a form of class society with inequality between 
oppressed cultures and the dominant elite. Trade was strong in Aztec areas, and to a minor 
degree in the Inca Empire (Vitale, 1992, Chapter IV). Referring to the same period, the 
Peruvian Mariátegui (2007, p. 42) who was of pivotal importance for the development of an 
original Marxist interpretation in the region with a special focus on the Colonial inheritance 
and indigenous issues, explains that for the Incas industry and art was of domestic and rural 
character. 
  
Regarding the form and meaning of exchange, in his review of pre-Colombian commerce in 
Latin America, Noejovich (1993) affirms that although exchange existed, it was not linked 
to market imperatives or accumulation strategies. Exchange was therefore not structured by 
markets in terms of price system, money in the ‘modern sense’ and profit maximisation. 
Noejovich (1993) further argues that although exchange occurred, its impact was not 
comparable to European history with regard to the rise of several cities as major commerce 
and trade centres. There is also no evidence of accumulation patterns which would have 
supported merchant development, but rather a distributive mechanism organised by political 
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or spiritual authorities. In addition to the commonly mentioned aspects of redistribution and 
reciprocity, exchange was also linked to ecological dimensions and gifts. 
 
More importantly, exchange was carried out to meet goals of complementary supply with an 
aim of self-sufficiency. The latter is especially significant as the ‘goal system’ replaces here 
the ‘price system’. Put in Marxist terms, the objective of food provision was for use-values 
as opposed to maximising exchange-value. Consequently, production, allocation and 
consumption were thus shaped through ‘functional resource allocation’ and were 
correspondingly organised. Contrary to what is the dominant way today, food was exchanged 
in subordination to these goals with the aim of self-sufficiency (Noejovich, 1993, pp. 29–
31). As such, it was primarily a system of ‘simple’ reproduction rather than expanded 
reproduction.  
 
The interaction between humans and extra-human nature in the process of food provision 
during the late pre-Colombian period was strongly related to the ecological space occupied 
by different nations. At the time of arrival of the Spaniards and Portuguese, diverse social 
structures were present, from hunter-gatherers which were not part of the communal mode, 
to the most complex and advanced systems such as those created by the Aztecs and Incan 
Empires. For example, when the Spaniards set foot in what today is known as México, 
Indigenous populations, which accounted for over 600 groups, could be divided in two major 
categories: 1) hunter-gatherers living in the desert and northern steppes; and 2) food 
producers in the more fertile centre-south (Semo, 1973, pp. 20–21).  
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Productive forces in food production as defined by a combination of labour power and nature 
were characterised as being either extensive in land inputs or intensive in labour inputs. The 
former featured primarily in rainforests, whereas the latter were located in mountainous, 
semi-arid and coastal valley regions. Extensive food production was based on slash-and-burn 
techniques typical for corn and yucca cultivation, while intensive production was promoted 
by irrigation systems including terraces, various forms of canals and wells. Food was based 
on cultivated vegetables complemented by gathered, hunted and fish products (Chonchol, 
1994, pp. 16–43).  
 
In sum, synthesising the great variety of concrete social and economic relations in the late 
pre-Colombian era, it is possible to assert that the food system was characterised by the 
communal and tributary mode of production. Both featured distinctive social relations and 
the development of productive forces. In the communal mode, productive relations were 
characterised by collective ownership and control of land and water. Exchange had the goal 
of self-sufficiency. In areas under Inca or Aztec influence, the tributary mode of production 
was based on a dominant articulation with the communal mode. The latter subordinated mode 
lost the complete control and ownership over productive assets to meet the payment of 
tributes. The dimension of reciprocity was definitively broken. However, it retained elements 
of control over its productive arrangement from its particular communal mode. First elements 
of an early class system began to be recognisable. Commerce also served here for the 
distribution appropriated of tributes. The metabolic interaction between human and nature, 
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and the developments of productive forces were strongly conditioned by the ecological space 
inhabited.  
 
The purpose of the previous account is not to suggest a romanticised view of the past 
considering inherent protection of ‘natural resources’ or low input production, but to indicate 
different forms of socio-economic arrangement that the colonisers encountered and 
disrupted. This event triggered a change in the productive forces and social relations of 
production, which will be analysed with particular attention in the next section. Important for 
my later analysis of the contemporary food system is that some of the persistent features of 
subordination and inequality today have its roots in this encounter and that elements of non-
capitalist production and distribution continues to exist under the overall dominance of the 
capitalist mode of production.   
 
 
The food system during the colonial period  
The economy of dispossession and forced labour 
Before advancing to examine the food system, I first outline the main characteristics of the 
colonial economy in Latin America. Whereas the previous section examined the process of 
food production within pre-Colombian communal and tributary modes of production, the 
present studies food provision from an arrangement that was violently disrupted with the 
arrival of the Spaniards and Portuguese. Driven by the quest for precious metals, the colonial 
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economy was characterised by the extraction of natural resources based on forced labour. 
The resulting shift of wealth was imposed mostly through extra-economic ways of 
appropriation characterised by a systematic dispossession of communal indigenous assets 
that ended in enormous resource concentration favouring the colonisers. Three centuries of 
colonial economy created a new social formation that included a complex articulation of 
feudal, slave, communal and first elements of capitalist mode of production (Mariátegui, 
2007). Compared to the previous period, the tributary mode disappeared. With respect to the 
capitalist mode of production, as I will show later, the rise to domination happened only in 
the second half of the nineteenth century when most countries in the region had already won 
their independence.  
 
The new articulation of modes of production included a radical change in social relations of 
production characterised particularly by the imposition of different degrees of forced labour 
in the feudal and slave mode. The previous transformation was linked to a defining character 
of the Spanish and Portuguese conquest: its military and ecclesiastic enterprise. In contrast 
to the colonisation of North America, in Latin America there were no masses of colonising 
pioneers. In fact, at time of arrival, rather than colonisers Spaniards and Portuguese were 
conquerors. Spanish and mestizos (of mixed American Indigenous and Spanish descendant) 
were too few to exploit the new wealth (Mariátegui, 2007, pp. 8–9). Therefore, a fundamental 
question was labour availability for the extraction of natural resources. The preoccupation 
over labour supply was exacerbated further by the death of millions of Indigenous people 
killed through forced labour and infection from European diseases. Bartolomé de Las Casas, 
a Spanish friar, wrote perhaps the first primary account during the sixteenth century about 
66 
 
the massive enslavement and slaughter of the Indigenous population (2012). As a 
consequence, importing slaves from Africa soon became necessary to keep up with an 
extractive economy based on a disposable labour supply.  
 
Between 1502 and 1860, about 9.5 million slaves were brought to the Americas. Brazil was 
the largest importer with 38%, the Spanish colonies counted for 17% of the total, with Cuba 
being the most important destination. Slave production in Brazil and Cuba was mostly for 
sugar exports. Most slaves, approximately 80%, were transported to the ‘New World’ 
between 1700 and 1810. Death rates in Latin America were so high that the continuous 
imports of slaves was required to keep supplying labour in the plantations (Fogel & 
Engerman, 1995, Chapter I).  
 
An important institutional introduction for enforcing the new social relations to ensure the 
exclusive appropriation of mineral wealth was the establishment of the encomienda system 
by the Spanish monarchy. Formally, the system did not grant property rights over land and 
was expressed in a tax that the encomendero had to pay to the monarchy. Indigenous people, 
although formally still being King’s subjects, were allocated to the encomendero to be 
‘exploited’ and supposedly looked after. Despite being of Spanish feudal origin, labour was 
treated more like slaves than serfs (Vitale, 1969, p. 8). However, with the surplus extracted 
from ‘his’ Indigenous people, the encomendero eventually effectively appropriated lands 
(Vitale, 1969, p. 22).  
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The Portuguese were the first to establish hereditary captaincies which outsourced the 
conquest to nobles, who in turn exercised considerable control over their possessions 
including enslavement of Indigenous populations to work especially on sugar plantations. 
The system of nobles was later replaced by appointing a General Governor to administer the 
process in a more efficient manner. Relations with the Indigenous population did not change 
whatsoever and there were constant wars against the enslaved Indigenous people. In this way, 
the Spanish and Portuguese system based on forced Indigenous and later black African labour 
granted white conquerors privileged access to wealth from the monarchy.  
 
During this long period, first elements of the capitalist mode of production became visible 
through the systematic use of monetary wages as a central means of surplus extraction with 
an inherently racist component. As Federici (2004, p. 104) notes in her analysis of 
colonisation during the transition to capitalism, ‘the wage was further redefined as an 
instrument of accumulation, that is, as a lever for mobilizing not only the labour of the 
workers paid by it, but also for the labour of a multitude of workers hidden by it, because of 
the unwaged conditions of their work’. The rise of capitalist forms of appropriation, control 
and exploitation could be observed in urban centres linked to important mining or 
administrative areas (see Assadourian, 1982). The colonial economy was also characterised 
by a fundamental shift in the interaction between labour power and nature. Driven by the 
Dorado myths of a continent full of endless and hidden natural wealth, capital sought to 
appropriate and expand control over new areas. As a result, the magnitude and intensity of 
the metabolic interaction between humans and nature suffered a lasting rift.  
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In sum, throughout the colonial economy, the coexistence of modes of production was 
predominantly expressed by forced labour relations as serfs and slaves. Forced labour and 
appropriation of land were main factors in the persistence of unevenly distributed wealth, 
power and resources. These had a lasting impact on shaping the interrelation between 
productive forces and relation of production. Mechanisms of dispossession featured strongly 
in this transition process towards capitalism. An enduring result, as I will examine in later 
chapters, is that inequality in the continent had been tied to race from the very beginning.  
 
Based on Dietz’ interpretation of Cueva’s analysis of the historical development of capitalism 
in Latin America, the social formation during the colonial period may be sketched in the 
following way (1979): 
 
Table 3.1: Social formation during the colonial period 
Feudal and slave mode of production 
Dissolving communal mode of production Elements of capitalist mode of production 
Source: Adapted from Dietz (1979, p. 98) 
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As can be seen in Table 3.1, the social formation during the colonial period is characterised 
by the coexistence of various modes of production. While forced labour relations, distinct 
from the feudal and slave modes of production, were still predominant, aspects of the 
communal mode of production could still be observed and elements of the capitalist mode of 
production emerged. The dissolving communal mode of production is examined in more 
detail in the next section.  
 
Haciendas and plantations 
The organisation of food provision within the colonial economy in Latin America has to be 
understood as largely functional to the overall aim of extraction of natural wealth. From this 
perspective, it is possible to assert that, without considering areas outside colonial influence, 
agriculture provided: 1) cheap food for mining areas and export; and 2) for the reproduction 
of agricultural labour and emerging cities. A relatively fast outcome was the increasing 
establishment of agrarian markets and weak state control over land. The former developed 
over the first 50 years of arrival and was linked to agrarian consumption in non-rural areas, 
critically linked to mining areas. This conveyed a system of exchange, although one that was 
not yet necessarily monetary. However, at the same time, state control over land was weak 
and eventually perpetually legalised illicit land appropriation by Spanish ‘entrepreneurs’ 
(Mellafe, 2004, paras 6–7). From the initial competition over cheap labour supply between 
agriculture and the mining sector, the expansion of wealth extraction added struggles over 
natural resources during the second half of the eighteenth century (Mellafe, 2004, para. 15).  
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In geographic spaces under colonial influence the expropriation of land generated effectively 
large agrarian areas for food production (Vitale, 1969, p. 8). Most of these areas assumed the 
feudal estate type of hacienda or slave plantations, with important variations in terms of 
production, labour, tenure and product commercialisation (Florescano, 1975). In this way, 
the extractive economy imposed by the Spanish colony, initially through the encomienda 
system, was later reinforced with haciendas and plantations in the agrarian sector. In the 
hacienda, the coercive extraction of surplus defined diverse forms of forced relationship 
between indigenous servants and the landowner. Blacks imported from Africa working in the 
plantaciones were slaves. Mestizos or poor working Spaniards were subject to at least a 
partial wage system, which however included elements of extra-economic coercion 
(Assadourian, 2005). Overall, within the hacienda the feudal bindings were the dominant 
mode of surplus extraction, while in plantations, it was forced slave labour.  
 
The feudal bondage was based on production relations in which the direct producer was 
forced to pay rent mostly in the form of produce or labour. In return, the direct producer 
received the usufruct of small landholdings and access to some common goods within the 
hacienda such as forests, pastures and lakes. This relation tended to be reinforced through 
the obligation of domestic labour in the house of the hacienda. Over the years, this system 
was known in different ways: yanoconaje in Peru, huasipungo or concertaje in Ecuador, 
inquilinato in Chile and pegulajeros in Bolivia (Garrido, 1999).  
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In addition to the establishment of haciendas and plantations, colonial influence also marked 
the increasing dissolution of the communal mode of production. Yet, despite that coerced 
Indigenous people provided the labour supply for mines and colonial food production in 
haciendas and plantations, they still held on to large geographic areas for the campesino 
economy (Assadourian, 1994, p. 29). In this regard, the campesino economy was located at 
the margin of colonial production and featured within itself forms of production crossed by 
multiple influences coming from the remaining features of the communal mode and the 
impact of haciendas and plantations. Outside areas of immediate colonial interest, as 
Assadourian (1982, p. 18) points out, territories for the reproduction of the Indigenous 
campesino economy were preserved in peripheral subordination of exchange controlled by 
Spaniards. Notwithstanding, within the colonial space and in contrast to productive 
organisation impacted directly by European capital, Indigenous campesino arrangements still 
achieved self-sufficient production (Assadourian, 1994, p. 30).  
 
However, by the seventeenth century, the requirements of the metropolis and local markets 
meant that many indigenous communities and campesinos were no longer self-sufficient 
(Mellafe, 2004, para. 10). A consequence of this was the increasing dissolution of the 
communal mode of production. This forced the indigenous communities and campesinos to 
seek new means of surviving, including migration to urban areas, haciendas and plantations 
or moving further away from direct colonial influence (see for example Silverblatt, 1987, p. 
197). This process importantly contributed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples from 
their ancestral lands. The dispossession caused by the dissolution of the communal mode of 
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production must be understood in association with the other forms of dispossession that 
included the direct use of force and dislodgement, and specific legal institutions, such as the 
encomienda system discussed earlier (Aylwin, 2002, pp. 11–12). Federici (2004, p. 68) 
asserts that by the turn of the seventeenth century the Spaniards had privatised and enclosed 
about one third of the communal indigenous land through the encomienda system. The 
collective use, possession and appropriation of land were effectively eliminated. As such, the 
material and cultural subsistence of Indigenous peoples was permanently endangered. From 
that period on, indigenous land rights derived from their traditional laws and customs came 
under permanent attack.  
 
It is difficult to establish a sharp distinction regarding the specific articulation of different 
production modes in the food system. However, it is possible to assert that these were 
fundamentally shaped by: the location of precious metals; the presence and type of 
indigenous socio-economic organisation and; climatic and geographic influences. The type 
of articulation and speed of penetration of capital was subject to these differentiations 
throughout the continent. For instance, in the Argentinean pampas or parts of Uruguay and 
similar areas, which were characterised by the absence of Indigenous population or rapid 
annihilation the dominant mode of production, became capitalist from the beginning (Laclau, 
2005, p. 35). In territories where there were abundant minerals and indigenous labour supply 
such as parts of what are now contemporary Peru, Bolivia and Mexico, agriculture was 
largely subordinated to mining. It was characterised by strong feudal features in the 
haciendas, which dissolved the communal mode of production and a marginalised campesino 
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economy. In areas without mining and large Indigenous populations such as areas of 
contemporary Brazil, Venezuela and Caribbean islands, export crops destined for the 
metropolis in Europe such as sugar, coffee, cacao, cotton and tobacco were cultivated based 
on forced labour of imported slaves from Africa. In territories where minerals were not found 
and the climate was not suited for meeting European priority demand such as areas belonging 
today to Chile, Argentina, the Brazilian interior or Central America, production was destined 
for colonial consumption. Main products were here grain, meat and some textile products 
(Chonchol, 1994).  
 
The emergence of the capitalist mode of production, and the role and transformation of 
agriculture was quite distinct from Europe (for a contrast see Wood’s The Agrarian Origins 
of Capitalism (1998)). In Europe between the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, 
manufacturing and industry expanded through increasing use of ‘free’ labour coming from 
agriculture. In contrast, forced labour in different forms characterised Latin America’s 
transition to capitalism. Thus, the impact that primitive accumulation had on labour in 
Europe, by setting important initial conditions of capitalist expansion, was quite different to 
what happened in the ‘New World’. Here, capital expansion was continuously structured 
upon features of dispossession in combination with the use of forced labour.   
 
To summarise, food provision was organised within colonial domain mainly through 
different degrees of forced labour, notably in haciendas and plantations, and articulated 
through dissolving communal provision. The feudal and slave modes of production were both 
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established through ‘extra economic’ means and depended on the ecological space, mining 
priorities and the prevailing socio-economic indigenous organisation. As capital advanced 
over new areas for the extraction of wealth, the communal mode of production became 
increasingly under attack. Mechanism of dispossession featured strongly in the feudal and 
slave modes, but also in the rising elements of capitalist production. In this context, the 
campesino economy was specifically transformed by the hacienda and plantation system, 
and the dissolving communal mode. Yet, although increasingly operating as a subordinated 
element, beyond the limits of the expanding colonial frontier the campesino economy 
maintained some structures of self-sufficient provision and more communal ways of 
production and distribution.  
 
Throughout the colonial period, private property and land concentration linked to a new 
creole (criollos16 in Spanish) bourgeoisie expanded. However, whereas the creole bourgeoisie 
were looking for new markets for their products, cheaper inputs and lower taxes, the Spanish 
monarchy pursued opposing interests. The increasing contradictions emerging from a creole 
bourgeoisie controlling Latin America’s economic dimension while the political power was 
still under the monarchy drove the independence struggles in the region (Vitale, 1969, pp. 
65–66).  In the following section I examine how food provision was arranged within a context 
of national state formation and important integration in the world market, which was shaped 
decisively by English capital.  
                                                 
16 Son or daughter of Spaniards, but born in Latin America 
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The rise and fall of the landed oligarchy in Latin America  
The arrival of British capital 
This section shows how the penetration of British capital in Latin America did not completely 
transform non-capitalist structures, but rather increasingly subordinated them to the needs of 
industrial capital. The result, as Cueva (2004, pp. 27–30) points out, was a heterogeneous 
structure in which diverse modes of production coexisted. The penetration of British capital 
was facilitated by increasing control over marine transport and the impact of the Napoleonic 
Wars on Spain and Portugal. The Napoleonic wars increased the contradictions between the 
metropolis and its colonies. As part of the war of Spanish succession, the Methuen Treaty 
which was signed in 1703 between Portugal and England transferred privileged trade rights 
with Brazil and accelerated this transition process (Furtado, 1969, pp. 35–36). In Latin 
America, the process was advanced by an alliance between English capital and disgruntled 
oligarchic sectors that sought independence to free their tax burden to the Spanish and 
Portuguese crowns, and exert greater control over the burgeoning trade sector. 
 
In its first stage, independence struggles had massive support in Mexico and Alto Perú (term 
used in the last part of Spanish domination and referring to territories largely being part of 
what today is Bolivia and southern parts of Peru), because campesinos and Indigenous 
peoples participated with the hope of initiating an agrarian revolution (Vitale, 1969, p. 79). 
However, the resulting dominant feature of Latin American independence struggles was that 
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it favoured criollo’s economic interests linked to the landed oligarchy, but never to 
indigenous interests (Mariátegui, 2007, pp. 10–11). By 1825, every country in Latin America, 
with the exception of Cuba and Puerto Rico, had won independence. With emancipation from 
Spanish and Portuguese authorities, the former metropolis was replaced by England, which 
emerged as the first world power at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Vitale, 1969, p. 
57). The outcome was oligarchic creole control over the hacienda and mining activities from 
the nineteenth century onwards. This was complemented by English capital flows in the 
transport and finance sector.  
 
The arrival of British capital also signalled a new level of disturbance of the metabolic 
exchange between humans and nature in the continent. The drive for the extraction of new 
products encouraged capital investment for the expansion of infrastructure and the transport 
system. The new investments allowed capital accumulation to advance over natural resources 
previously considered too distant or not effectively exploited. Forced labour relations based 
on slavery ‘officially’ became increasingly illegal throughout the continent. In some 
countries, the abolishment of slavery was more or less a contemporaneous process to national 
independence such as in Argentina, Colombia and Cuba. Nevertheless, most countries 
abolished slavery after its independence, albeit not immediately. Notably, Venezuela and 
Brazil were examples of countries that only abolished slavery respectively some four and six 
decades after independence. Brazil was the last country in the region to abolish the institution 
in the Western world (Ianni, 1975).  
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The new international division of labour corresponded to the needs of British industrial 
revolution and Latin America’s decisive integration in the world market. Trade patterns were 
functional to the requirements of the English metropolis: production and exports of primary 
products and imports of consumption goods and debts. Until the middle of the nineteenth 
century, Latin America was in a trade deficit, expressed by stalled exports and imports 
financed by debt accumulation. From this moment on, after 1840, Latin America’s relation 
with the capitalist centre entered a defined relationship of dependence understood as a 
subordination of nations formally independent. This broke with the colonial situation 
(Marini, 1991, Chapter 1). 
 
Latin American food production was critical to the process of integration in the international 
capitalist economy. Food imports were especially important during the final stage of 
industrialisation. By 1880, England imported 45% of its wheat consumption, 53% of butter 
and cheese, 94% of potatoes and 70% of meat (Bairoch, 1967, pp. 248–249). 
 
Between 1870 and 1913, the world experienced a rapid expansion in world trade. However, 
as a result of British imperialism the terms of trade were not equal. On the one hand, the 
increase of trade in ‘developed countries’ saw increasing trade protection. On the other hand, 
in Latin America, Western pressure mainly coming from Britain dictated the removal of 
customs and duties. Some Latin American countries such as Brazil, however, shifted to a 
more protective trade regime to spur industrialisation. Nonetheless, the dominant exchange 
pattern during this period was still the exchange of primary products for manufactures 
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between the continent and United Kingdom (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996, pp. 5–9).  
 
The importance of increasing international integration with capitalist markets signals the 
decisive transition to a capitalist social formation in Latin America. An expression of the 
capitalist mode of production was observed at export production sites where wage labour 
first took ground (Marini, 1991, para. 33). However, despite 100 years after independence, 
in the early twentieth century Mariátegui (2007, p. 20) still recognised the coexistence of 
three modes of production: 1) feudal, 2) indigenous communal and 3) capitalist. In the case 
of the communal mode, it is important to point out that despite the domestic re-organisation 
of labour and expanding penetration of capital as a result of Latin America’s growing 
integration into the world economy between 1850 and 1930, vast territories were still outside 
the direct dominance of capital. 
 
The continuing coexistence of the three modes of production is a fact many times neglected 
by those who emphasis the sphere of circulation, or just more ‘visible’ capitalist sites of 
production, as the main argument for explaining uneven development between countries. 
When looking at export sites as an indicator of fast capital penetration, it is important to 
realise that capitalist development among countries in Latin America and within was also 
quite uneven. Exports were concentrated in few countries. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and 
Mexico accounted for 80% of Latin America’s shipments. Despite Argentina at one point 
being one of the wealthiest countries in the world, the rest of the continent was in poverty 
(Topik & Wells, 1998, p. 10).  
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In addition, the impact of international trade was uneven within countries. In Peru, for 
example, large proportions of the country were left ‘untouched’ by the export drive. Agrarian 
export areas were linked to the coast for agricultural, while mining exports were based in 
some Andean regions. Similarly, in Chile, while agrarian exports were in the centre-south 
region and minerals in the north, large territories in the south such as Patagonia, were still 
quite isolated from the impact of the world market. This is not to say that capital penetration 
and expansion did not make a significant impact on Latin America but rather challenge the 
misconception that the impact was uniform or could be presented as a generalised 
experience.17   
 
The interwar period was characterised by falling prices for Latin American exports. Low 
international prices for primary products impeded continuous capital accumulation through 
production for exports. As a result, some countries in the continent, notably Mexico, 
Argentina and Brazil attempted a shift to industrialisation policies. However, industrial 
consolidation never happened and the sector was eventually subordinated to the production 
and export of primary products (Marini, 1991, para. 46).      
 
                                                 
17 For a more detailed illustration of how capital penetrated over indigenous territories which were previously 
neglected or at the margin of the colony and later the independent republics, see Córdoba, Bossert and Richard 
(2015). The volume illustrates various ways in which capital penetrated and articulated as a co-existing mode 
with Indigenous people at the Chaco and Amazonas region to produce sugar, rubber and tannin for exports from 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. 
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At the extra-regional level, this period meant also a shift in international power relations with 
the US replacing England as the dominant world power. Correspondingly for Latin America, 
trade patterns shifted from England to the US. Importantly, trade was still framed around the 
exchange of primary products for manufactures. In contrast to England, US investment rather 
than concentrating on transport and public assets, largely targeted direct investment into 
primary production sectors as oil, mining and agriculture (Olson & Hickman, 1945, Chapter 
V). The period between 1914 and 1930 also signalled the decline of landed oligarchy in Latin 
America which had developed corresponding to English capitalist interests (Chonchol, 1994, 
p. 126).  
 
In short, after independence the social formation was still characterised by a combination of 
modes of production. After the initial dominance of the feudal mode of production, the 
capitalist mode increasingly expanded. This transition was characterised by the increasing 
integration of Latin America in the capitalist world market and consequent changes in the 
valorisation process of capital in the continent. Arrangements in the economy expressed itself 
increasingly with control and ownership over productive assets based on private property, 
capitalist markets and ‘free’ wage labour. However, elements of the communal mode of 
production could still be observed at the margin of capital dominated areas.  
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The persistence of non-capitalist elements in rural areas  
This section demonstrates, in relation to previous discussion, how the food system in Latin 
America is traversed by different modes of production. The complex articulation is expressed 
by an initial dominant feudal mode that ceded to the expansion of capital which was critically 
expressed in the shift of the ‘agrarian frontier’. The communal mode of production is still 
observable in the margin of economic centres as a subordinated mode. In this context, the 
campesino economy appears increasingly dominated by capital. As indicated earlier, the first 
stage of independence in Latin America did not completely dissolve non-capitalist modes of 
production. On the contrary, during the first years, increased land concentration and 
strengthening of slave and feudal relations of production were widely observed  (Cueva, 
2004, Chapter 1).  
 
The hacienda was still characterised strongly by the feudal mode of production which 
resulted in the system being further strengthened and legitimised. During this period, the 
combination of the different modes was intensified through the articulation of a rising 
capitalist mode. Expanding capital accumulation into new regions primarily hurt the 
communal mode of production. In that way, political independence was not accompanied by 
change to the fundamental tenets of the colonial economy and the complex coexistence of 
modes of production. As Mariátegui (2007, p. 10) asserts in his analysis on Peru, 
independence was determined and dominated by the previous conquest which gave origin to 
the colonial economy. As a consequence, with independence, the traditional hacienda 
became the dominant means of economic and political control in rural areas. In contrast to 
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two centuries earlier, land possession now confers power and prestige (Mellafe, 2004, paras 
16–17). Based on its domination over land and rural labour, the landed oligarchy was able to 
shape the establishment of national states.  
 
During this period the alliance between the creole oligarchy and British investments 
encouraged an enormous amount of growth in agricultural exports. Improvements in 
transport and the incorporation of new land for production of exports were critical in 
strengthening the integration of Latin American economies with Europe. Food export growth 
meant the rise of new commercial structures dominated by large merchant companies of 
mostly British origin which were located in export ports or European capitals. With changing 
requirements from Europe, new primary products were also incorporated in the commercial 
exchange: For example, Chile began to export copper, whereas Argentina exported wool, 
meat and cereals (Chonchol, 1994).  
 
Prior to the expansion of trade with Britain, agrarian borders were relatively stable. Only 
around 1850 frontiers expanded as a result of increasing exports and ‘traditional’ food 
production for domestic markets (Chonchol, 2003, pp. 205–206; Córdoba, Bossert, & 
Richard, 2015). This process triggered a fundamental expansion of the agrarian frontier that 
included, but was not limited to the integration of the Argentinean Pampa for wool, cereals 
and meat; the penetration into the centre south of Brazil with coffee and livestock in Río 
Grande do Sul; expansion of coffee and banana production in Central America; increase of 
coffee production in Colombia; coastal development in Peru, first due to guano export and 
83 
 
later because of sugar and cotton; expansion of banana, rubber and guayule production in 
Mexico. In Chile, agricultural areas doubled between 1875 and 1935 (Chonchol, 2003, pp. 
206–207). 
 
The expansion of the agrarian frontier for capital to extract further profit included at least 
two dimensions. Firstly, the constitution of hacienda’s large extension was rooted in the 
persistent dispossession of indigenous communities for increasing valorisation of capital in 
the international sphere. As a result of this process the campesino economy which was 
anchored in communal features was further dissolved, scattered or pushed to the margin of 
fertile lands. In this regard, it is important to point out that the expropriation of indigenous 
communities did not halt with independence, but continued during the formation of Latin 
American states. Driven by economic and ‘geopolitical’ interests, the new independent 
republics continued the processes of violent dispossession of Indigenous nations which 
resisted previous colonisation. The military campaigns ‘Conquest of Desert’ in Argentina 
and the ‘Pacification of the Araucania’ in Chile exemplify this procedure. The new acquired 
lands were handed over to landed oligarchies, or national and newer European colonisers.18 
The previous process was complemented by specific laws. In his study on Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, Aylwin (2002, pp. 33–39) concludes that with Latin American 
                                                 
18 A notably terrible account is the extermination of the Selk’nam in Tierra del Fuego, the southernmost tip of 
the South American mainland which is divided between Chile and Argentina. The landed oligarch Menéndez 
built his economic empire by introducing and exporting sheep wool to England in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. As wool production expanded, the native guanaco, Selk’nam’s main food and cloth input 
was displaced. At the same time, increasing land requirements for sheep dispossessed Selk’nam from their 
lands. As guanacos disappear, hunger drove Selk’nam to eat sheep. As a consequence José Menéndez ordered 
for all Selk’nam to be killed (Marchante, 2014).          
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independence the adoption of new civil codes consolidated private property rules in rural 
areas and indigenous territories were considered vacant lands. Moreover, poor mestizos were 
forced to the latifundio (large estates such as the haciendas or plantations) through debts or 
specific laws. For the latter, the various types of vagabond laws is a good example, as the 
legislation forced people to settle and into wage labour (Chonchol, 2003, p. 207).  
 
Secondly, the expansion of the agrarian frontier insisted on low productivity which was based 
on the appropriation and control over ‘cheap nature’, high degrees of forced labour and 
massive migration, mainly from Mediterranean Europe but also from Asian countries.19 The 
ecological rupture, by pushing the frontiers for capital to extract increasing profits from 
agriculture, placed the interaction between humans and extra-human nature on a new scale. 
Despite the fact that the growth of food exports required agrarian industrial development in 
railroads, cold chambers and ports, the sector was still characterised by very low levels of 
productivity impeding food self-sufficiency and required the import of large quantities of 
food during the nineteenth century.  
 
In summary, the period between independence and the economic crisis of 1929 signalled 
further marginalisation of the communal mode of production, the persistence of the feudal 
mode in landed areas and the decisive penetration of the capitalist mode of production, 
                                                 
19 It his review of the research and debates surrounding haciendas in Latin America, Mörner (1979) asserts that 
there is a generalized lack of information and data on the productivity of haciendas before the nineteenth 
century. However, available investigations, with some notable exceptions, tend to support the low productivity 
and profitability of haciendas.      
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particularly in export and urban areas. The campesino economy began this transition period 
as a mostly external form of food provision placed at the margin of capital, but ended up 
being largely included within capital’s direct domain. This process of interaction between 
modes of production and the increasing shift of the campesino economy from feudal to 
capital subordination was intensified by the penetration of British capital, which invested in 
infrastructure that linked exports with the local production processes. The next section 
examines food production and distribution within an already dominant capitalist mode of 
production and eroding feudal relation in rural areas. It addresses the shifting role of food 
production to the imperatives of industrialisation efforts. 
 
 
Food for industrialisation  
Dependency or industrialisation 
The two World Wars and economic crisis of 1929 disrupted the expansion of the global 
economy and the share of trade in output did not recover until the 1970s (Bairoch & Kozul-
Wright, 1996). The process of capital accumulation in the continent which had been based 
on mining and agricultural exports began to change. The fall in primary commodity export 
prices, the increase in the cost of imports, an unsatisfied domestic demand and the 
mobilisation of labour were the initial conditions that prompted a reorientation towards 
production of manufactured goods for the internal market. In Latin America, the 
transformation required in the economic sector was debated alongside the historic 
dependency of Latin America on the centres of world capitalist development. In line with my 
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previous arguments, the dependence of Latin American countries has to be understood in the 
context of the historical development of capitalism and how this dominant mode of 
production has intersected with preceding non-capitalist modes of production. In this way, 
the analysis avoids an understanding of dependency as an exclusive imposition by extra-
Latin American forces or capitalism installed from the sixteenth century.  
 
Without going into detailed analysis, this section frames the industrialisation attempt in the 
continent in terms of two big visions that pushed the dependency debate within the analysis 
of Latin American societies: on one side, the structuralist approach linked to the United 
Nations Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish acronym), 
and on the other side, interpretations stemming from a Marxist perspective. The latter is 
known in the English-speaking world as ‘dependency theory’ through the work of André 
Gunder Frank, but also includes the work of Marini, Dos Santos, Bambirra and others.20 
Importantly, both currents shared at least two main ideas: 1) capitalism conceived as a world 
system and the consequent international division of labour; 2) as a result of capital 
accumulation, development and underdevelopment were interpreted as the inverted faces of 
a same process. The main difference was that while the first saw capitalist development as 
possible in the periphery, the latter argued that development in the centre was at expense of 
development in the periphery.  
                                                 
20 Bielchowsky (2009) develops a rather uncritical review of the evolution of the ECLAC thought while André 
Gunder Frank (1971, 1980)  and Theotonio Dos Santos, (1998) elaborate a more critical perspective on 
Development Theory. For debates within the Marxist tradition see for example Cueva (1975); Henfrey (1981); 
Vitale (1966); Weeks & Dore (1979).   
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Important for this section is that the new accumulation approach in most of Latin American 
countries overlapped strongly with ECLAC’s policy recommendations under the guidance 
of Raul Prebish. Here, the strategy of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) was 
promoted. It was based on the observation that the distribution of trade gains between 
advanced countries, the ‘centre’, and less developed countries, the ‘periphery’, was 
determined by unfavourable terms of trade, which would reproduce the condition of 
underdevelopment in the ‘periphery’. The interpretation was grounded in the international 
division of labour, where the periphery specialises on the production of primary commodity 
and the centre in exporting manufactured industrial products. It challenged the mainstream 
idea that comparative advantage resulted from the international division of labour. The crux 
of the structuralist argument was the empirical observation of a tendency for lower prices of 
primary goods relative to manufactured goods.21 The ‘Prebish-Singer thesis’ argued that 
developing countries should pursue exports in goods with a higher income-elasticity of 
demand. This is because the purchasing power of countries which specialise in the primary 
commodity exports, the ‘periphery’ countries, would fall or stagnate over time. As such, they 
would become relatively poorer to manufacture exporters, the ‘centre’.  
 
With that perspective, ECLAC proposed structural transformations for a modern and 
autonomous industrial capitalism where an active state focused on greater national interest 
                                                 
21 The reflection on declining terms of trade was formulated at the same time by Singer (1950) and ECLAC 
(CEPAL, 1951). 
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could compensate for the negative impact of local and international elites. The ISI polices 
prescribed consequently a mix of state driven industrial policies, protective trade measures, 
and ‘Keynesian type’ of fiscal and monetary policy. The policies were consistent with a 
political constellation in the region demanding stronger nationalist development strategies 
(i.e. Perón in Argentina or Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Cárdenas in Mexico, Ibáñez del Campo 
in Chile, Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador). However, Prebish’s theory was criticised by liberal 
economists and Marxists alike. The former saw hidden socialist orientations, whereas the 
latter condemned the critical lack of class analysis: hereafter dependency should not be 
regarded as an outcome of subordination between states because of trade imperatives, but 
critically include the dynamics of capitalist expansion and capital–labour relationship within 
and between countries (F. H. Cardoso, 1977).     
 
In conclusion, under an already dominant capitalist mode of production, the relations 
between the metropolis and Latin America are explained as relations of subordination, not 
just at a pure economic level but also at a political, cultural and military dimension. From 
this constellation, industrialised countries or the centre countries are understood as setting 
the rules of the international political and economic system, whereas the periphery or 
developing countries are considered as sources for the continuous extraction of surplus. To 
break this dependency, countries in Latin America should focus on a development based on 
national industrialisation efforts. This would also require addressing the enclave 
characteristic, as Cardoso and Faletto (1969) called it, of mining centred industrialisation 
characterised by weak articulation with the rest of the economy, and the differing interests of 
capital and labour between and within countries.   
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The emergence of capitalist development in agriculture  
For the 30 years following World War II (WWII), ECLAC’s suggestion that agricultural 
development was only possible in parallel with growth in industry, energy, transport and 
communications was widely adopted throughout the continent. In this regard, following the 
example of industrialised countries with a historic agriculture base, ECLAC promoted the 
‘modernisation’ of agriculture in order to free up labour for industrialisation. The latter would 
eventually allow for higher salaries to absorb the increasing production (CEPAL, 1949, pp. 
1–2). Thus, underdevelopment was assumed to be overcome through industrialisation and 
the subordination of agriculture. Over the next 30 years, instead of first meeting foreign 
demand, the new accumulation dynamic shifted the role of agriculture to meet the 
requirements of domestic industrialisation efforts. Bernstein (1996) termed this challenge, 
the ‘accumulation problematic’. That is, the extent to which agriculture is able to produce a 
surplus and to what degree this surplus can be transferred or appropriated to benefit capital 
accumulation through industrialisation. As a result, during the period between 1951 and 
1974, overall agricultural export-oriented production went down from 22.9% to 17.4% in 
Latin America (CEPAL & FAO, 1978, p. 36).22  
 
                                                 
22 Of course, there is a lot of variation within the continent. For the Grupo Andino (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Chile and Venezuela), total export production increased from 11.0% to 15.3%. For Central American 
countries, with the exception of Panama, the increase was from 39.8% to 48.6%.  
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In the previous line, capitalist development in rural areas in Latin America can be understood 
through the subsidiary role agriculture has played to meet national and international industrial 
and urban demand in at least two interrelated dimensions: 1) the creation of a ‘reserve army 
of labour’ in the cities; and 2) provision of cheap food. In this regard, the main issues to 
address in rural areas were to increase the productivity of agriculture by transferring the 
campesino surplus, that is, the excess produced to reproduce the social existence of direct 
producers, without eliminating them in the process and by transforming the large, low 
productivity hacienda and plantations. The previous was undertaken critically through land 
reforms that should encourage the subordinated role of agriculture purely for the needs of 
industrialisation.  
 
However, a distinctive feature of how capitalism developed in Latin America’s rural areas 
was precisely the slow destruction and marginalisation of feudal agriculture. In most of Latin 
America, labour relations based on debt peonage and unpaid labour were still largely 
observed. They carried different names in different countries: inquilinaje in Chile, 
huasipungo in Ecuador, colonato in Bolivia, cambão in Brazil or yanaconaje in Peru 
(Edelman, 2013b, pp. 3–4; Garrido, 1999). The process of liquidation of the hacienda was 
driven by the goal of industrialisation. This process strengthened a new urban business class 
that replaced the political and economic control of the previous landed oligarchy. The latter 
was reinforced by increasing pressure for land reforms in favour of campesinos and against 
the hacienda. A short lived alliance between capital and the campesinos for the liquidation 
of the latifundio emerged  (A. Bartra, 2011, pp. 16–17). This process was carried out 
throughout the continent in different times which reflected the differing dynamics of class 
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struggles within countries. I will come back to this point in more detail in Chapter 5 
‘Campesinos: continuity and interruption in food provision’. For now, it is enough to assert 
that land reforms were a decisive policy to promote the liquidation of the hacienda.     
 
The changing balance of political power also saw a corresponding shift in agrarian public 
policies which placed a greater emphasis on active economic involvement from the state. The 
subsidiary role of agriculture was encouraged by policies that favoured emergent agrarian 
business to meet the goal of import substitution and export diversification. Some of the 
policies included free access to state land, improvements in transport through investment in 
roads and trains, provision of technical advice and cheap credit. The state also developed its 
own food industries and protected national agrarian developments with tariffs and prices. At 
the same time, the tendency for the state to favour the interests of urban areas resulted in 
limited labour protection and services in rural areas. As a result, despite massive rural-urban 
migration, misery among rural dwellers was actually intensified over the last 25 years 
(CEPAL & FAO, 1978, p. 92).  
 
Despite the changes in political power and the short-lived alliance with the campesino for 
land reform, the rise of the capitalist mode in agriculture was slow. The emergent 
agribusiness was characterised from its beginning by low levels of productivity and high 
requirements for seasonal labour, as well as appropriation of ‘free’ nature. In a study that 
covers 25 years of agriculture in Latin America from 1950 to 1975, ECLAC and FAO (1978, 
Chapter II and IV) examine in detail the changes in production, use of productive resources 
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and characteristics of the agricultural production process. The study emphasises the low 
levels of productivity during the 1950s and the slow progress over these years. The main 
reasons for this that are put forward include, with variations between countries, the limited 
demand of the domestic market, difficulties in further expanding the agrarian frontier, low 
levels of investments in mechanisation and technology linked to the urban industrialisation 
bias, and the type of land tenure. Regarding wage labour, its demand depended on the harvest 
duration of the product. Seasonal wage labour was sourced mostly from campesinos who 
combined the work on their own plot with seasonal wage work and, proletarian wage labour, 
who wandered from harvest to harvest to sell their labour power. In the latter case, capitalist 
agrarian development was carried out in previously scarcely inhabited regions. 
Consequently, wage labour supply was low and required migrant workers from elsewhere 
(e.g. Santa Cruz in Bolivia). In other areas, despite massive migration to cities, labour supply 
for food production was offset by demographic growth in rural areas. The agrarian population 
increased by 1.4 times, from 87 million in 1950 to 123 million in 1975 (below the twofold 
increase of the total population). During the same period, ‘under-utilization’ of agrarian 
workers at the time was estimated between 20% and 30% (CEPAL & FAO, 1978, p. 8).23  
 
In addition to taking over land from haciendas and plantaciones, business agriculture also 
appropriated new lands by expanding agrarian borders, displacing campesinos in this process 
(Ortega, 1982, p. 113). Yet, despite the attack from capital, the campesino economy proved 
                                                 
23 Under-utilization is loosely defined as the capacity of the agrarian sector to absorb labour supply under 
adequate income conditions, especially rural labour, (CEPAL & FAO, 1978, p. 7) 
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resilient over this period in terms of its contribution to overall food supply. Thus, albeit 
ongoing dispossession as a result of capitalist development in agriculture, in a survey of 
several studies, the same author (1982, pp. 84–85) noted the importance of campesinos in 
direct food provision and food supply for industrial transformation. Ortega (1982) reported 
that in 1976, 80% of harvested land in Brazil still belonged to non-wage labour. In Mexico, 
campesino agriculture accounted for about 70% in corn, 67% in beans, 33% in wheat and 
49% in fruit production. In Colombia, ‘small agriculture’ production accounted for 63% of 
total production. This figure increases to 67% if only most consumed food was considered. 
For the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru), campesino 
agriculture produced between 50% and 60% of final agricultural consumption goods in 1980. 
In Central America, campesinos provided 36% of food in Costa Rica, 62% in El Salvador, 
64% in Honduras and 53% in Guatemala. Thus, most of food in the 1970s was still provided 
by campesinos, which was understood in this report as production on small landholdings 
based on family agriculture.24 
 
In summary, the capitalist mode of food production slowly took over due to industrialisation 
and the decline of landed oligarchy. This process was encouraged by an active role of the 
state that was reflected in a shift in power relations in favour of a rising urban business class. 
Land reforms enacted during this period perhaps represented the best example of the concrete 
materialisation of the state in agrarian transformations. It was also a battle ground of shifting 
                                                 
24 Limited by available data, each country study adopted different operational definitions for the campesino. 
Production on small landholdings based on family agriculture should be regarded as a conservative estimate. 
Brazil, for instance, also distinguished for the type of workforce in the production units.  
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alliances between rising capital and the campesinos as main actors. Mechanisms of 
dispossession featured strongly in this emergent accumulation process in rural areas and 
forged the ground for ensuing valorisation of capital.  
 
The period examined was still characterised by hybrid forms of productive relations in 
agriculture with features of feudal relations which were increasingly less apparent through 
the fall of the latifundio and rising elements of the capitalist mode based on agribusiness 
production. Increasingly impacted by the direct involvement of capital in the agricultural 
sector (CEPAL & FAO, 1978, pp. 90–91), the campesinos displayed adjusting and 
contradictory dynamics with the primary modes of production. On the one hand, the 
campesinos forged an alliance with capital in the attempt to secure their own land, broke 
feudal ties, became occasional wage-labourers and migrated in masse to urban areas 
abandoning their campesino existence. On the other hand, the campesino existence, 
expressed through the subsistence economy, continued to be a significant factor in national 
food supply.25 Up until the 1970s, despite the impact of capitalist development on the 
campesino existence, capitalist development had still not reached all Latin America’s rural 
areas. 
                                                 
25Subsistence is a changing condition bound to the dynamic of capital’s appropriation of the campesino surplus. 
The campesino is exploited by capital which appropriates the campesino surplus – the excess produced to 
reproduce its social existence – shaping the contours of the subsistence conditions. This will be explained in 
more detail in Chapter 5. The same campesino family may face, in different moments, diverse subsistence 
conditions. These conditions can change for various reasons such as a new family member, changes in the 
climate, and changes in the economic activities in the territory or in the prices of the products that the campesino 
sells. Depending on these subsistence conditions the campesino may spend more or less time as a direct 
producer, temporarily sell his labour-power during harvest, or contract help during harvest season. To guarantee 
its subsistence, the campesino may buy means of production and consumption products in the capitalist market 
with the aim of reproduction, but not to accumulate. 
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Consolidation of agribusiness corporations 
Paying off debts: another round of dispossession 
This section examines the consolidation of capital’s expansion throughout Latin America 
from the 1970s onwards. Given my focus on the penetration of capital in agrarian production, 
I only note briefly some of the ways in which global accumulation dynamics shaped these 
transformations. In this regard, I point out three key arguments – namely the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) implemented at the country level and 
the establishment of the WTO and its push for liberalisation at the international level. All 
three may be read as forms of dispossession for further capital accumulation.  
 
Firstly, an important factor was capital over-accumulation in the 1970s in central countries 
that looked for an outlet in Latin America. The flow of capital funds in form of easy credit 
supply invaded the region. Attracted by low interest rates and the short-term profit motive 
from local elites, the over-accumulation of capital was channelled as financial capital to the 
region. In the single year of 1974, countries in Latin American accumulated more debt than 
the 19 years between 1950 and 1969. The relaxed credit environment was interrupted with 
the interest rate spike in 1979 by the US Federal Reserve Bank that increased interest 
payments on past loans substantially. The excess supply of local currencies, the contraction 
of the US market for Latin American exports and the fall of prices of primary products 
spurred the transfer of capital to the centres. In this way, Cueva (2004, pp. 265–266) argued, 
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the resulting Latin American crisis contributed to finance solutions for industrialised 
countries. Critical in this respect was that until the 1930s, default on debt was recurrent. Yet 
with the debt crisis of 1982, whatever the cost for the debtor country, new compliance norms 
imposed the repayment of debts to the advantage of capital (Eichengreen & Portes, 1989; 
Ocampo, 2014).      
 
Secondly, in order to assure the re-payment of debts, the International Monetary Fund/World 
Bank (IMF/WB) placed conditions on financial aid through SAPs. Conditions included large 
cuts in fiscal spending, privatisation of state enterprises, tightening of monetary policies, and 
trade and capital liberalisation. As a consequence, the previous strategy of ISI was abandoned 
and the accumulation strategy was reverted back to natural-resource based export-oriented 
growth. The result had a deep impact in Latin America, including a huge transfer of 
ownership and control from domestic capital to US business owners (Harvey, 2007, p. 162). 
The shift of wealth was undertaken through a similar set of reforms throughout the continent, 
consisting in liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation policies ‘required’ for the 
repayment of debts.26 With its characteristic paternalistic voice, in 1989 the policies were 
summed up in a list of 10 measures considered ‘desirable’ for the region (Williamson, 2004, 
                                                 
26 In many cases, notably Chile, it is possible to speak about a ‘double-dispossession’ process. First with support 
of the military government state owned companies were ‘sold’ to national elites to be subsequently vended 
again to foreigners. Between 1973 and 1989 about 725 State companies were privatized. In rural areas the 
actions included the appropriation of 5,809 landholdings and the expulsion of 230 campesino cooperatives 
which were legal landholders. More than 57,000 campesinos lost their land during this process (Cámara de 
Diputados de Chile, 2005, pp. 441–442).  
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p. 1). With support from the Washington institutions (IMF, WB) and the US Treasury, the 
‘Washington Consensus’27 was born.  
 
Last but not least, the augmenting of international capital required a functional system of 
cross-border exchange. In addition to SAPs, capital’s conditions of expansion were further 
improved by the establishment of the WTO via the promotion of ‘free trade’. In this way, on 
one hand, the free mobility of capital through stabilisation, privatisation and liberalisation 
policies were implemented at the country level. On the other hand, under the WTO umbrella, 
the push to free up capital movement for goods and services across borders were set up in 
ad-hoc international arrangements.28 As such, the WTO, but also bilateral and multilateral 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been fundamental tools for re-shaping the regulatory 
space and a form of ‘primitive accumulation of the conditions of production’ (McCarthy, 
2004, p. 337). In this sense, WTO rules and FTAs feature normative frameworks, which 
legalise new non-economic mechanism of dispossession. It binds the liberalisation, 
privatisation and capitalist market-oriented processes at the national level with enforceable 
international trade agreements. Notably, the WTO is not just about liberalisation in goods 
and services. It also includes rules on intellectual property rights, dispute-settlements and the 
definition of ‘trade-distorting’ domestic support. 
 
                                                 
27 For a critical review on the Washington Consensus look at Marangos (2010, 2012) 
28 In the next chapter I study in more detail the advancement of international agreements that foster capital 
accumulation throughout the food system.  
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In terms of the capital-labour relationship, the outcome of these global dynamics and their 
political economy was a shift in power in favour of capital over labour. Increasingly 
precarious working conditions and the dismantling of collective bargaining structures 
permitted capital the upper hand in search for the cheapest labour. As I will show next, the 
agrarian sector was not spared by these transformations.   
 
 
Back to exports 
In this section, I argue that capital-based production in agriculture was consolidated around 
export-oriented and industrial-input intensive food production, and through the concentration 
of land ownership in specific territories for few products. As outlined in the previous section, 
the improvement of capital’s international condition for expansion in the food system from 
the 1980s onwards has been increasingly subordinated to capital expansion through 
Washington Consensus applied reforms, but also through the emergence of the WTO-
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)29 and FTAs. As part of the ‘extra economic’ process of 
surplus extraction and larger process of capital accumulation, the reforms set for a critical 
normative background for the current expansion of capital in food provision. As a result, the 
new global agriculture architecture became increasingly controlled by international 
corporations. McMichael (2009, pp. 151, 153) termed this new period as ‘corporate food 
                                                 
29 Just with the final act of the Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and which created the WTO 
trade in agriculture was effectively integrated. The AoA entered into force in 1995 with the clear aim of 
increased capitalist market orientation in agricultural trade. 
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regime’ because of corporate power in the world food system. In this regime, the WTO’s 
AoA plays the role as the vehicle of the corporate-driven world food system in which 
corporate power is institutionalised, setting the minimum liberalisation for other bilateral and 
regional agreements.30 
 
The dynamics of capital accumulation that favoured agribusiness can be characterised by two 
main forms: corporate and entrepreneurial farming. The former comprises of two origins (a 
more detailed examination is developed in the following Chapter 4 ‘Agribusiness 
corporations and the push for a ‘free trade’ food system’). One is based on national 
agribusiness which was born out of the transformations of the haciendas. These tended to be 
related to the traditional export crops of the countries such as sugar, cane, wheat, corn and 
rice, and more recently to the emergence of new crops such as soy. The other corresponds to 
an increasing fraction that is related to international capital. They are not only from outside 
Latin America such as Dole, Del Monte, Unifrutti and Chiquita, but are also and connected 
to the first point, from within the region. An illustration is Brazilian capital invested in soy 
production in Bolivia and Paraguay, or Chilean capital invested in wine industries and 
produce in Argentina and Perú. As Borras et al. (2012) assert, the latter continuous to be an 
                                                 
30 The creation of legal conditions for the free movement of capital in agriculture takes place at various levels. 
In face of uncertain ‘progress’ of free trade through WTO negotiations, being one of the contended issues the 
continuous liberalisation in agriculture, bilateral and regional trade agreements have become increasingly 
prevalent. In the last 20 years, countries in the region have signed over 60 free trade agreements. Although 
many of them are negotiated within Latin America, most of them are with extra-regional countries, such as the 
US and European Union, but also increasingly countries of Asia. In addition, over 30 partial agreements have 
been signed (OAS, 2014).        
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ongoing dynamic today. As a result, and driven mainly by corporate agribusiness, land 
concentration in Latin America is higher than in the 1960s (FAO, 2012a).  
 
Entrepreneurial agribusiness is of smaller scale and tends to be of domestic capital, with 
greater direct influence from the owner in the farming process. It also has at least two 
recognisable origins. A relatively minor fraction emerged from the differentiation process of 
campesinos that were able to move up the entrepreneurial ladder (Archetti & Stolen, 1975). 
A second form emerged through new mid-sized landholding. It emerged from some agrarian 
reforms and agrarian border expansion. Some important examples were new coffee 
plantation in Colombia, soy production in Brazil and Paraguay, and fruit production in Chile 
(Chonchol, 1994).  
 
The new form of agribusiness also specialised in a small number of products, away from 
supplying national industries and towards export-oriented consumption crops (Rubio, 2001, 
pp. 74–79). Production in agribusiness mostly specialised in animal farming, dairy products, 
soy, corn and sorgo for animal feed, but also wheat, rice oleaginous products, vegetables and 
fruits, coffee, cotton, sugar cane and sugar beet. Production sites are linked to good 
communication and transport systems to reach markets. Products are destined for fresh food 
consumption supported by modern conservation and stocking techniques or industrial 
transformation (Chonchol, 1994, pp. 346–347). When looking at how this process played out 
in each country, it is possible to observe that at the beginning of the 1980s debt crisis, more 
than half of agrarian exports were concentrated in one product such as in the case of Colombia 
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and El Salvador (coffee for the two countries), and between 30% and 38% for Paraguay 
(cotton), Guatemala (coffee), Dominican Republic (sugar) and Honduras (bananas). For 
Latin America as a whole, no more than 10 agrarian products accounted for more than 50% 
of export incomes. Only Chile exported a greater variety of products, mainly fresh fruit and 
vegetables (CEPAL, 1990, pp. 27–28).   
 
In addition to land concentration and its specialisation in smaller number of products, the 
dominance of agribusiness also concentrated in particular geographical areas. Underlying the 
territorial concentration and in continuation with the historical process of capital expansion, 
the rise of agribusiness placed the access, quality and control of nature linked to the food 
system as critical elements of disputes. In this sense, increasing land concentration linked to 
differentiation of soil quality and property rights over water resources facilitated the 
conditions for further capital accumulation (CEPAL, 1990, p. 48). The previous was 
complemented by water irrigation improvements linked to large private investments, or to 
public subsidies which benefited business agriculture and exports. In terms of its geographic 
location, agribusiness capital concentrated in the central-southern regions of Brazil, the 
Argentinean pampa, Chile’s central valley and some coastal areas of Peru and Ecuador, as 
well as certain highlands in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, parts of Venezuela, the pacific 
coast of Central America, and some irrigations areas in the north of Mexico and central parts 
of the country (Chonchol, 1994). 
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Nevertheless, capital organised agrarian production tends not only to be characterised by 
concentration of large lands, few products, geographic areas and its export-oriented focus, 
importantly, it is also characterised by the use of new technologies and its intensive use of 
chemical and energy inputs (CEPAL, 1990, p. 44).31 As a consequence, in its examination of 
the agrarian situation in the continent, CEPAL (1990, p. 68) concludes that since the 
transformations in the 1980s, there has been a relative rise in the cost of production due to 
machines, chemical fertilisers and pesticides vis-à-vis soil and labour. As a result of the 
previous process, conditions for wage labour in agribusiness production have also changed. 
Although most agricultural wage labour originate from rural areas, there has been increasing 
migration from urban areas to work as day labourer (jornalero in Spanish) in large 
agribusiness (see CEPAL, 1990).  
 
 
The campesinos: disintegration and persistence 
This section briefly examines the context the campesino economy faces after wide spread 
liberalisation of domestic and international agrarian structures due to Washington Consensus 
type reforms and international commitments that spurred the expansion of capital in agrarian 
production. In Chapter 5 ‘Campesinos: continuity and interruptions in food provision’, I will 
                                                 
31The use of fertilizers per hectare of arable land (kg/ha) for permanent crops in Latin America and the 
Caribbean increased from 28.7 kg/ha in 1975 to 51.4 kg/ha in 1987. The number of tractors almost doubled, 
rising from 757,658 to 1,440,611 over the same period (CEPAL, 1990, p. 87).  
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address more specifically why the campesino is still relevant today, not just because of its 
various socio-ecological linkages, but for its critical contribution to food supply.  
 
Teubal (2001, pp. 46–47) summarises the impacts of capital accumulation as: the expansion 
of rural wage labour mostly under precarious conditions and associated to the need of various 
simultaneous jobs (CEPAL, 1990, pp. 67–68); the expulsion of medium and small 
landholders; increased rural-urban migration (Lattes, 1995; Ruiz Chiapetto, 1990); capitalist 
market sale growth of agricultural products; and the subordination of campesinos to 
increasing transnationally owned corporations (FAO, 1980, pp. 91–92).32 This transformation 
tended to happen in an inverse relation to campesino’s landholding size and also included the 
growth of landless workers. As a general result, still within a context of low international 
food prices at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the campesinos are systematically 
excluded through the dominance and exploitation of agribusiness capital (Rubio, 2001).  
 
The deterioration of rural labour conditions has greatly benefitted capital. At the domestic 
level, the initial negative external situation due to the debt crisis was compensated by the 
ability of agribusiness to gain greater bargaining power. This included their ability to access 
reduced labour costs due to high unemployment rates in rural areas, reduction of social 
security, and changes in labour legislation in favour of capital that resulted in further 
                                                 
32 The percentage of the Latin American population living in urban areas increased from 57% in 1970 to 71% 
in 1990 (de A. David, 2001, p. 65). Despite migration to urban areas, the percentage of the rural population 
living in poverty remained at about 60% between 1970 and 1990 (CEPAL, 1993, p. 100). In 1980 it was 
estimated that 17.6% of rural families had no land. In addition, the real wage in the agricultural sector fell by 
about 14% between 1980 and 1985 (CEPAL, 1990, pp. 46, 66).  
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deterioration of rural labour bargaining power. The latter is illustrated by the contribution to 
the fall in labour costs compared to the total cost of agriculture production derived from the 
increase in temporal and precarious rural jobs (see CEPAL, 1990, pp. 45–80). This process 
was reinforced by the fact that with the adoption of industrialised production, with exception 
of harvest time, corporate farming does not rely on employing a large wage labour force.  
 
However, the negative impact on rural labour was further shaped by the increased 
international mobility of capital. As a consequence of the WTO and the AoA, millions of 
campesinos where displaced (Bello, 2007, p. 3). Thus, in addition to the adverse national 
domestic policies that conceived the campesino as redundant producers and beneficiaries of 
anti-poverty programmes, the outcome of the AoA further undermined campesinos (Kent, 
2010, p. 44; Moore Lappé, Collins, & Rosset, 1998). After reviewing the impact of the 
WTO’s AoAs on 23 countries, even the FAO (2003a, Chapter 4) concluded that small 
farmers would be further marginalised, while agribusinesses would improve their profit 
margin through reduction in trade barriers and trade expansion. However, as I will examine 
in more detail in Chapter 5, despite the unfavourable conditions with lasting impacts, the 
campesino economy still proves important for the provision of food.  
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
The chapter examined how food provision in the continent has transformed from the aim of 
self-sufficiency in pre-Colombian Latin America to profit maximisation in a capitalist mode 
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of production dominated social formation. It placed significant emphasis on the role of food 
production within the imperatives of national and global capital accumulation process. The 
analysis also showed that mechanisms of dispossession are inherent to the current capital 
accumulation process and not just limited to slave or feudal modes of production. The 
production of food is part of the continuous process of capital accumulation over new socio-
ecological areas that sit within the particularities of the transition and articulation between 
modes of production with increasing links with the world economy. Consequently, the linear 
sequence of slave-feudal-capitalist modes used to explain Europe’s path is not applicable for 
explaining Latin America’s historical transition.  
 
As examined, capital expansion in agriculture has transformed the prevailing structures in a 
long process considerably different with the ‘agrarian origin of capitalism’ in England, but 
also different from the fast consolidation of capital in urban areas in Latin America. The 
mode of production (MOP) approach emphasised that capitalist social relations were slow to 
take foot in agrarian production. Critical for this understanding was the rise of agribusiness 
which is taken as the capital-based mode of production and the campesino, conceptualised 
as a secondary mode of production. Despite being subjected to the historical transition and 
articulation of the primary modes of production (communal, tributary, feudal and capitalist), 
the campesino persists as an integral part of the food system in Latin America.  
 
Despite being integrated in the capitalist system, the campesino retains its social and 
ecological linkages centred on the work of land. Subject to the influence of the dominating 
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capitalist mode, the campesino works the land be it as land owner, landless worker, renting, 
occasional wage labour or contracting labour during harvest time. All these labour forms 
respond today to the process of capital circulation and accumulation. Although the campesino 
is conceived as a direct food producer, their activities intersect with the primary mode of 
production in a complex manner in which they are exploited by capital, marginalised, and 
excluded, but also reproduce and resist. In this way, the historical understanding that this 
chapter has provided is important because of two reasons. On the one hand, it contributes to 
explaining why the campesino does not necessarily operate according to the pure logic of 
capital. On the other hand, it helps to comprehend how contemporary food provision has 
been organised fundamentally by the campesino and agribusiness.    
  
In this regard the chapter has a twofold importance for the continuation of this research. 
Firstly, it opens up a venue of interrogation over the effective control and appropriation of 
the campesino surplus by capital without eliminating them in the process. However, instead 
of placing this question at the domestic level, now it has to be placed at the international level 
under the dominance of agribusiness corporations. Secondly, it remains to be answered to 
what extent the campesino today still plays a fundamental role in the provision of food, and 
how the campesino economy resists the dissolution by the dominant mode of production in 
Latin America. Regarding the first question, it has to be considered that production is just 
one part for bringing food from seed to the plate. Much of the profit is actually outside 
production in the control of inputs and exchange. This will be examined in the next Chapter 
4 ‘Agribusiness corporations and the push for a “free trade” food system’. With respect to 
the second question, my understanding of the campesino has to be contrasted in three ways. 
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Firstly, theoretically against the insignificance of the campesino as a social category of 
analysis, and claims of perseverance and re-emergence as family agriculture. Secondly, 
historically to account for the enduring relevance of the campesino as critically linked to 
struggles over land access and land reforms. Thirdly, empirically against the ‘invisibilisation’ 
of the campesino through surveys. This will be studied in the subsequent Chapter 5 
‘Campesinos: continuity and interruptions in food provision’.   
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4. Agribusiness corporations and the push for a 
‘free trade’ food system 
 
Introduction 
Following on from Chapter 3 which traced the historical rise of capital in Latin American 
food provision, this chapter examines how the capital-dominated food system is organised 
today. It studies how a few transnational corporations exert enormous influence over the food 
system by dominating one or several links in the supply chain, through oligopolistic control 
over inputs, processing, distribution, retail and the trade of food. I argue that the 
concentration of ownership and profit is based on a globally integrated food system tied to 
ad-hoc international arrangements that favour the free movement of capital.  
 
In discussing the corporate agribusiness dominated form of food provision, this chapter is 
structured around three sections. The first section looks at empirical data to allow for an 
analysis of concentration in the food system. I map the concentration of agro-food 
corporations and show that concentration of corporate capital facilitates an expanded scale 
of production through global value chains, which is recognised as the dominant form of 
international trade. I relate this process to a push for a trade-oriented food system, which has 
been instrumental for capital expansion organised in global value chains. The next section 
evaluates how this expansion has been supported by so-called ‘free trade’ ideology. I argue 
here that, although ‘free trade theory is based on the theory of comparative advantage, the 
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theory in itself does not explain how trade works in practice. As such, it is important to 
scrutinise the underlying assumptions of trade policies and international arrangements that 
advocate for improved movement of capital in the ‘global south’ while protecting corporate 
interest in the north.  
 
This discussion is then linked to the last and longest section which studies the advance of ad-
hoc corporate oriented international agreements that foster capital accumulation throughout 
the food system. The latter is examined through the analysis of two key agreements that 
illustrate the effective translation of the ‘free trade’ approach: The Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). The former proves useful in revealing the role of agribusiness in 
shaping the international trade system, the distinctiveness of food trade, the negative impacts 
for developing countries, and the differing positions of Latin American countries regarding 
trade liberalisation. The latter allows, on the one hand, an examination of the various political 
and economic projects underlying regional integration efforts in Latin America, and on the 
other hand, a more concrete study of the negative consequences on the campesinos. It is 
argued that these international agreements are better understood as shifting class relations. In 
the case of the AoA and NAFTA, they could be understood as examples of capital favoured 
accumulation based on dispossession founded on international bounded legal rights. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the ‘free trade’ type of agreements also express more clearly 
the potential to undermine sovereign decision by democratic elected governments to choose 
their own path of development. 
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Centralisation through global value chains33 
Consolidating capital 
Underpinning the consolidation of capital in food provision is the oligopolistic control of the 
conditions of production and exchange, including the domination of other links of the food 
system such as inputs, processing, distribution and retail. The result is that food provision in 
Latin America is shaped by an internationally integrated food system in which transnational 
corporations are key actors. This process has been characterised by the integration of capital 
at various levels of the food chain including the control of land access and knowledge, and 
consequent high ‘market concentration’ and the fragility of national food systems.   
 
As argued in Chapter 2, the theoretical chapter, the expansion of capital is characterised by 
two interrelated dynamics, namely by the concentration and centralisation of capital. In the 
former case, capital accumulation is characterised by the expansion of existing capital, while 
in the latter, the growth of capital in the hands of a few is accelerated by the fusing of capitals 
through various means such as take-overs, mergers, joint ventures or the credit system. The 
latter dynamic accelerates growth for large capital through the growth and expansion of 
                                                 
33 The focus on global value chains is only considered important for the first section of this chapter and not for 
the overall development of this thesis. As will be examined here, the term is used to describe the tendency of 
international trade to be organised through global value chains. It is not my purpose to apply the term as a 
distinct approach, methodology or form of analysis, and for this reason, the term was not included in the 
theoretical framework. As also indicated later, for critical approaches on global value chains, see Taylor (2007), 
Starosta (2010) and Milberg and Winkler (2013). 
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corporations. It is especially relevant in Latin America, which is strongly characterised by 
the internationalisation of capital and the constitution of transnational corporations.34 As 
analysed in Chapter 3, the historical chapter, the wave of trade and financial liberalisation, 
the mass privatisation of previously state owned enterprises and the attack on labour has 
facilitated the process of capital accumulation and concentrated ownership in a small number 
of regional and extra-Latin American companies. The latter transnational corporations tend 
to be headquartered in the ‘north’, while basing most of its production in the ‘global south’. 
In contrast to earlier periods, these corporations do not necessarily have the same national 
origin, but might combine capitals from the US, Japan and Europe. In this way the 
predominant historical division of capitals competing on a national basis is broken (Katz, 
2015, p. 38). However, within the food supply chain land concentration manifests distinct 
patterns with a distinct role for Latin American corporations expanding over neighbouring 
countries (Borras Jr et al., 2012). 
 
                                                 
34 One way to look at the presence of international companies in Latin America is to look at the composition of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). While 1991 marked the first year after the debt crisis to record a positive net 
inflow of resources to Latin America, in the year 2000, direct foreign investment already tripled the annual 
average of 1990-1994. In this process, foreign ownership increased its participation in the sales of the 500 
largest Latin American companies from 27% in 1990-1992 to 43% in 1998-1999. During the same period while 
domestic companies maintained their participation, state companies reduced their share from 33% to 19%. In 
terms of regional participation, most of these mergers and take-overs occurred in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
(CEPAL, 2001). This process has distinct characteristics throughout the food system. A recent study for South 
America undertaken by the advisory firm Valoral Advisors (2018) reveals that between 2010 and 2017, 60% 
of all mergers and acquisitions – in terms of the percentage of total deal volume –  in the food and agriculture 
sector involved extra-regional companies. For the five categories examined, local or regional mergers and 
acquisitions surpassed 50% in the case of ‘Farmland and primary production’ (55%) and ‘Food distribution, 
food retail & food service’ (75%). For the three remaining categories extra-Latin American companies were the 
dominant players: ‘Agricultural inputs supply & distribution’ (59%), ‘Storage, logistics & trading’ (93%) and 
‘Processing & food production’ (59%). 
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Oligopolistic competition for profit between large capitals in the food system does not take 
place in a ‘perfect market’ given capital’s tendency to centralise. It is expressed in high levels 
of ‘market concentration’ in different parts of the food chain from seeds up to retail. In this 
regard, agro-food corporations do not operate in the Neoclassical notion of perfect 
competition market with atomistic firms, but compete in markets dominated by few large 
companies (Shaikh, 1990a, pp. 17–18; Weeks, 2013). Oligopolistic competition between 
large capitals tends to reduce the market price for inputs in order to increase market share 
and profit. Organisation into larger firms has, in principle, the advantage over smaller firms 
through large economy of scales to cheapen commodities by increasing the productivity of 
labour (Desiere & Jolliffe, 2018; Key, 2018; Nkonde, Jayne, Richardson, & Place, 2015). 
Yet, despite competition, concentrated corporate control remains a structural feature in the 
provision of food. 
 
The following table unveils one aspect of power of corporation in the provision of food by 
pointing to the horizontal market concentration in each segment of the food system.  
 
Table 4.1: World market concentration in the food system 
Food 
system 
Supply chain Market concentration  
 
 
Animal Feed (1) 10 companies account for 16% by volume 
Livestock breeding 
(2) 
4 companies account for 56% by value 
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Inputs35 
Pesticides (3) 6 companies account for 76% by value 
Animal Pharma (3) 3 companies account for 46% by value 
Fertiliser (3) 10 companies account for 41% by value 
Farm machinery (2) 4 companies account for 39% value 
Handlers  Trade in Grain (4) 4 companies account for 73%  
Processors Processing (1) 10 companies account for 28% by volume 
Retail36  Supermarkets (5) 10 companies account for 41% of sales of top 
100 retail firms 
Source: adapted from 1) Berne Declaration & EcoNexus (2013); 2) Fuglie et al., (2011); 3) Data for 2011, (etc 
GROUP, 2013); 4) Murphy et al., (2012, p. 9); 5) etc Group (2011).  
 
While the general trend is for the food system to concentrate throughout the supply chain, 
the reasons for the lack of concentration in certain sectors, such as in animal feed or food 
processing, responds to various factors, including competition among local established 
companies (Valora Advisors, 2018), higher profit margins in specific products, or through 
vertical integration. For instance, whereas overall concentration in the animal feed sector 
might not be considered high, 90% of salmon feed is produced by just three companies. With 
                                                 
35 The share in the global market for agricultural inputs supplied by the private sector in 2006 was: Animal Feed 
(39.9%); Livestock Breeding (1.1%); Seeds (5.5%); Pesticides (9.0%); Animal Pharma (2.7%); Fertilisers 
(21.0%); Farm Machinery (20.7%) (Fuglie et al., 2011, p. 12). 
36 Growth of transnational supermarkets in the region has been very fast (see Reardon & Berdegué, 2006; Traill, 
2006). Supermarket share of retail food circa 2002 for selected Latin American countries: Argentina (54%), 
Mexico (45%), Brazil (49%), Chile (62%), Costa Rica (55%), Colombia, Panama (50%), El Salvador (54%), 
Guatemala (35%), Honduras (42%) and Paraguay (35%) (Traill, 2006).  
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regards to food processing, drink producers register the highest profit margins in the food 
system (Berne Declaration & EcoNexus, 2013). Another reason is that effective control to 
achieve higher profits is also achieved through vertical integration. The previous table points 
to just one important form of market concentration by large companies. Nevertheless, much 
of the control throughout the system is exerted by vertical concentration. In other words, 
increasing corporate control of food provision is not just expressed by their relative share 
within parts of the value chain (horizontal integration) as showed in Table 4.1, but also by 
their presence within different stages of the value chain through vertical integration. For 
instance, Cargill is not just one of the major players in animal feed, but also the world’s 
largest agricultural commodity buyer. Charoen Pokphand is both the largest feed 
manufacture controller and the largest meat and shrimp producer (Berne Declaration & 
EcoNexus, 2013, p. 6). Another example is soybean production in Brazil, which is mostly 
used for animal feed. While there are more than 243,000 producers in the country, exports 
are concentrated in just a few companies (Brown-Lima, Cooney, & Cleary, 2012). Grain 
trade offers another good example of vertical integration. In 2003, Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus controlled 73% of global grain trade.37 These 
corporations not only make profit as intermediate carriers, but also sell inputs such as seeds 
and agrochemicals. Once bought, they even command storage facilities and even own 
transport (Murphy et al., 2012, p. 9). A report by the Bern Declaration and EcoNexus (2013, 
p. 4) demonstrates how different stages of food provision are dominated by a small number 
                                                 
37 An illustration of the disputed control of global trade in corporations headquartered in the north was the 
banana war fought between US and European companies, both over their respective domains – US banana 
production in Latin America and European production in Africa. US companies pushed to open new export 
markets in Europe that favoured imports from Africa. 
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of corporations. Cargill, for example, controls inputs such as soy for the feed industry, seeds 
and fertilisers. It contracts farmers for cereal production and cattle and pig fattening. In 
addition to trading, Cargill also participates in the processing of beef, pork and soya. Another 
example of vertical integration is that six of the top agrochemical companies appear also as 
largest seed companies (etc GROUP, 2011, p. 22).  
 
The domination of corporations in the global integrated food system would not be complete 
without control over land and knowledge. As an economic source, land is of course greatly 
disputed, not only for the production of agricultural products, but because it holds other 
essential natural resources such as forests, water and minerals. In Latin America, land 
ownership is highly concentrated. A small number of very large farms, exceeding 1000 
hectares in size, own about half of all land (see Lowder, Skoet, & Singh, 2014, pp. 13–14). 
The World Bank (2011) has asserted a recent rise in the demand for farmland since the price 
spike in ‘commodities’ in 2008. In line with my argument in this chapter, the FAO (2012a) 
has examined how this dynamic unfolded in Latin America and revealed that concentration 
and ‘foreignisation’ of land are linked to capital-driven global-value chains. Importantly, the 
report specifically emphasised the role of ‘translatinas’ (Latin American based transnational 
companies) operating in border areas, such as Brazilian companies in Bolivia and Paraguay 
for soy production. A review of the FAO study (Borras Jr et al., 2012), however, deprioritises 
the excessive ‘foreignisation’ narrative and added the important role of domestic capital in 
driving land acquisitions in Latin America.  
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However, the control in the food system is not only exerted by corporations through directly 
providing seeds, fertilisers or food, but increasingly through the appropriation of knowledge 
through privatisation and concentration in research (see Fuglie et al., 2011). Expanding 
control of capital through genetic alteration and patents of life is perhaps the most extreme 
expression in the constant quest for profit (e.g. Shiva, 2000). High levels of corporate 
concentration in land and knowledge also reveal again the underlying processes of 
dispossession for accumulation of capital. Traditional knowledge strongly linked to the 
‘territory’, many times related to ancestral practices of the campesino economy are 
expropriated and secured for large capital in international treaties.  
 
Importantly, both vertical and horizontal integration continues to be a critical tendency of 
accumulation under capitalist food provision (see Clapp, 2015).38 This process has at least 
two implications for the campesinos. While horizontal integration has tended to be a direct 
mechanism for displacing campesinos, vertical integration has been instrumental for capital 
by subordinating direct producers as providers and buyers of food related goods. As a result, 
with the consolidation of global agro-food corporations, power and control in the food system 
has shifted at the expense of the campesinos. As Hefferman (2000, p. 71). asserts, this process 
has gone so far, that the category of national food system is rendered useless. Furthermore, 
with the expansion of corporate capital over the different parts of the food chain, a growing 
                                                 
38 Among recent mergers, the Monsanto/Bayer deal is probably the most important. At the time of writing, 
Bayer – one of the world’s largest companies dedicated to pharmaceutical and health care business but also 
including biotech products and agricultural chemicals – was attempting to take over Monsanto, famous for its 
role in crop chemicals and seeds. Combined, the new organisation would be the largest seller of seeds and 
agricultural chemicals (etc GROUP, 2016). 
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share of people’s daily food is mediated in one way or another  by corporations (see Lang & 
Heasman, 2004; Teubal & Rodríguez, 2005). In the next section, I will examine how the rise 
of corporations in the food system goes hand in hand with increasing trade. 
 
 
Expanding capital through trade 
As already explained in the historical chapter, the rise of capitalist food provision in Latin 
America has been linked to its integration in the global food system from the beginning. It is 
an integration which is characterised by the increasing concentration of corporate capital. 
Although much of the analysis of trade focuses on countries, international exchange in food 
is carried out fundamentally by firms. Indeed, countries rarely trade, campesinos do not 
engage directly in international trade, and small agribusiness seldom trades directly – but 
transnational agribusinesses do. Furthermore, much of international trade takes place 
between a few number of companies and industries. Latin America is no exception. In the 
continent, 70% of all exports (not just food) are concentrated in the largest 1% of exporting 
companies39 and about 82% of exports are shipped outside the region (ECLAC, 2014, p. 21). 
FAO (2016d) reports that globally food is also traded strongly. It has almost tripled its value, 
and increased its volume by about 60% between 2000 and 2012. Latin America has played 
an important role in this tendency as it has become the largest food exporter in the world. 
                                                 
39 For 10 out 14 countries where data was available, more than 70% of exports are concentrated in 1% of 
exporting companies (Colombia, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Argentina). For four countries, the percentage varies between 42% and 54% (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, 
Uruguay) (Urmeneta, 2016). 
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Thus, trade has risen with the growth of agribusiness corporations (Heffernan, 2000; Murphy 
et al., 2012).40  
 
Agribusiness corporations tend to organise provision in global value chains (GVCs) that have 
become the ‘dominant mode of international trade’  (Milberg & Winkler, 2013, p. 10). The 
international division of labour is hereby expressed by companies seeking ‘to combine 
technology, innovation and know-how from developed countries (headquarter economies) 
with the lower cost of labour’ and natural resources ‘in developing countries (factory 
economies)’ (ECLAC, 2013, p. 10).41 Especially in food, the decision as to where to locate 
production is determined by lower costs of labour and climate conditions. Latin America’s 
exports integrate into this international division by moving around three major hubs where 
transnational corporations are mainly headquartered: the US, Europe driven by Germany, 
and Asia which has shifted from Japan to China (ECLAC, 2013, p. 16).  
 
While some ‘low-wage countries’ have climbed the ladder to provide high-quality 
manufactured goods, Latin America has mostly remained in its historical role as exporter of 
raw materials and basic derived products. In 2013, raw materials made up 41% of all regional 
exports. If manufactures based on raw materials are added, the figure goes up to 
                                                 
40 Some of these corporations are of Latin American origin. However, precise information is difficult to obtain, 
as official trade statistics tend to report the product, volume, value, country of origin and final destination – but 
not the origin and name of the corporation.      
41 Argued within a firm centred value chain framework by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. For more critical approaches on global value chains look at Taylor (2007), Starosta 
(2010) and fundamentally at Milberg and Winkler (2013).  
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approximately 59%. Variations between Latin American countries, in terms of content and 
destination, are shaped to a significant extent by the distance to the destination. For instance, 
Central America and Mexico are particularly influenced by the US with the shipments of low 
value added exports (ECLAC, 2014). 
 
Trade in food between ‘north’ and ‘south’ also has distinct characteristics. According to some 
scholars, the content of this food trade can be expressed in grain staples shipped from the 
North for ‘high-value’ food from the South such as meats, fruits and vegetables (McMichael, 
2009, p. 148). The latter historically produced by campesinos for self-consumption and/or 
local markets but now constitute important sources of export revenue (Teubal, 2001, p. 49). 
However, this perspective has to be amended by looking at the important role of Argentina 
and Brazil in global grain trade.  
 
In order to secure maximum capital mobility, it is important to note how the regulatory 
framework of the international trade has been shaped to favour global corporations. When 
asked about their greatest preoccupations, corporations named natural resource scarcity, 
workforce shortage and concerns regarding changes in regulations and laws (see Aon Risk 
Solutions, 2014, p. 9).42 As a consequence, lobbying for a shift from public to corporate 
shaped regulations in the agro-food system has been critical for the advance for corporate 
                                                 
42 Based on a survey of the main risk factors acknowledged for doing business in the food sector. The other 
factors which made the top 10 list were in decreasing order: Commodity price risk, Weather/natural disasters; 
Distribution or supply chain failure; Exchange rate fluctuations; Economic slowdown/slow recovery; Increasing 
competition; and Failure to innovate/meet customer needs.  
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capital to control the food chain (McMichael & Myhre, 1991). In their search for lower costs, 
transnational corporations tend to push their host countries to intensely compete with each 
other. Exerting various forms of power (see Clapp & Fuchs, 2009), corporations are able to 
influence the positions negotiated between nations on treaties and agreements that rule the 
trading system. It is in this sense that transnational corporations but also governments tend 
to reassert again and again the advantages of their ‘free trade’ interests. 
 
In sum, the integration of agribusiness corporations is a fundamental feature of capital 
accumulation in the food system. Transnational corporations formed in this process control 
the provision of food by concentrating on different parts of the food chain and trading in 
global value chains. This dynamic is complicated by the intra-regional features in land 
concentration driven by domestic and ‘translatina’ capital. Although in different forms, 
campesinos have been mostly negatively impacted in this process through displacement from 
their land, adverse integration and/or dispossessed of their traditional forms of food provision 
(more on this point in the next Chapter 5). At the same time, large capital organised through 
global value chains requires improved mechanisms of mobility and expansion of the 
international division of labour. In order to expand capital accumulation in the food system, 
the institutional framework of international trade has been re-regulated to promote so-called 
‘free trade’. To shape trade rules that consolidate and expand their domination and control 
over the food system, trade theory anchored in ‘free trade’ has been instrumental for the 
advance of corporate capital. The following two sections address firstly the ‘free trade’ theory 
as ideology and then proceed to the attempts by the WTO-AoA and NAFTA to organise the 
international food system.   
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 ‘Free Trade’ as ideology 
Comparative advantage for capital  
‘Free trade’ theory, based on the idea of comparative advantage, does not necessarily reflect 
the practical reality of how trade actually works. However, to comprehend the arguments that 
underpin discussions on international exchange, institutional arrangement and policy analysis 
– it is important to understand the assumptions behind ‘free trade’ theory. ‘Free trade’ 
oriented liberalisation arguments are based on the idea of comparative advantage, first 
developed by David Ricardo, and have been used to justify wide policy reforms in the 
region.43  
 
As examined in the previous Chapter 3, Latin American countries submitted to the condition 
of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in order to secure IMF/WB financial aid to repay 
their debts. These so-called Washington Consensus policies included trade liberalisation 
policies as part of the larger ‘market oriented’ reforms of privatisation, liberalisation and 
stabilisation. The ‘economic argument’ behind the Washington Consensus policies was 
based on the Neoclassical economic insight that efficient allocation of resources would arise 
from competitive markets tending towards equilibrium. Within this framework, liberalisation 
                                                 
43 Ricardo’s now famous example for illustrating how comparative advantage works was based on trade 
between Portugal and England to justify how Portugal would benefit from cloth import and wine export, even 
though Portugal could produce wine and cloth with less labour than England. He showed that it would be 
advantageous for both countries if they specialise in line with their respective comparative advantages. As long 
as the cost ratios are different for both, specialisation and international exchange would benefit both countries. 
Absolute costs are not important for international trade. It was based on the critical assumption that labour and 
capital do not move between countries (Ricardo, 1821, Chapter 7). 
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policies were advanced through ‘free trade’ theory arguments based on comparative 
advantage.  
 
The contemporary use and significance in policy debates of the supposed benefits of 
comparative cost through liberalisation is well illustrated in a statement on the website of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on trade liberalisation (OECD, 
n.d.): 
 
All countries that have had sustained growth and prosperity have opened up their markets 
to trade and investment. By liberalising trade and capitalising on areas of comparative 
advantage, countries can benefit economically. Use of resources - land, labour, physical 
and human capital - should focus on what countries do best. 
 
The previous quote reveals the persistence of ‘free trade’ theory-ideas which originated from 
Adam Smith (1998) and his study of colonial trade. Smith concluded that colonies should 
concentrate on their absolute cost advantage, the cost incurred in producing a good, exporting 
agricultural products and importing manufactures from Great Britain.44 In this view, 
international trade is determined by each of the two countries producing one good at a lower 
absolute production cost than the other country. will take place only if each country Of 
                                                 
44 For a view that negates Smith as the representative of the theory of absolute advantage and forerunner of the 
theory of comparative advantage see Schumacher (2013) 
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course, the US did exactly the opposite once they gained independence and promoted import 
substitution by placing tariffs to develop their own manufactures (see Hill, 1893). 
 
The political and ideological origin of comparative advantage, the core idea in modern 
international trade theory, derived from David Ricardo and his active deliberation 
surrounding the Corn Laws during the first half of the nineteenth century in Great Britain. 
The discussion expressed the continuing relevance of trade and the special place that food 
played in it. Yet, importantly, it also displayed the underlying political root of comparative 
advantage and how Portugal became underdeveloped and economically dependent on Great 
Britain between 1640 and the 1890s (Magdoff, 1978; Sideri, 1970). Moreover, it perhaps 
illustrated the first political campaign and ideological use of the comparative cost based free 
trade theory (see Trentmann, 2009). Furthermore, it portrayed the conflicting interests 
aligned to specific economic sectors within Great Britain such as agriculture and industry. 
Whereas the former argued for tariff protection, the latter proposed the elimination of tariffs 
or ‘free trade’. These arguments had a lasting impact in debates within classical political 
economy and economics. In particular, Ricardo’s participation entailed pivotal theoretical 
insights regarding ‘free trade’. Ever since, the defence of ‘free trade’ has been theoretically 
grounded in Ricardo’s theory of ‘comparative advantage’ by which ‘each country naturally 
devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each' (1821, p. 
139). The theory expressed Ricardo’s attempt to extrapolate his labour theory of value based 
on cost differentials in terms of labour time to the sphere of international trade. Removing 
the labour theory of value, even today, as previously exemplified, much of the discussion 
concerning trade is in the realm of these first debates. 
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The ideological reason behind ‘free trade’ theory was asserted by Ricardo himself. Contrary 
to the claim of universal benefits arising out of trade liberalisation based on comparative 
advantage arguments, Ricardo was actually quite explicit in terms of the intention behind his 
theory. The expectation from ‘free traders’ was that the elimination of trade barriers for grain 
imports mean cheaper food prices. Consequently, lower food prices meant lower wages, and 
the ability for capitalists to obtain higher profits. And consequently, space to lower wages 
and get higher profits. In Ricardo’s (1821, pp. 80–81) words, when stripping off the armour 
of his theory of comparative costs: 
 
It has been my endeavour to show throughout this work, that the rate of profits can never 
be increased but by a fall in wages, and that there can be no permanent fall of wages but 
in consequence of a fall of the necessaries on which wages are expended. If, therefore, by 
extension of foreign trade, or by improvements in machinery, the food and necessaries of 
the labourer can be brought to market at a reduced price, profits will rise.  
 
More than 100 years later, the idea of comparative advantage was reformulated with 
Neoclassical economics insights by Heckscher and Ohlin (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 1933) 
and complemented by Paul Samuelson (Samuelson, 1949). Heckscher and Ohlin expanded 
on Ricardo’s theory by asserting that countries with different sets of productive resources, 
termed endowments or factors of production (capital, land, labour), reflect corresponding 
production and trade patterns. The industrial, already relatively capital abundant country, 
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benefits from trading capital-intensive goods with poorer relatively labour-abundant country, 
which should continue to export labour intensive products. Stolper and Samuleson (1949; 
1941) added some theoretical hope for developing countries embracing free trade forecasting 
price factor equalisation. They demonstrated that in a perfectly competitive world, prices for 
identical production factors, such as wage rates or return to capital, converge absolutely and 
relatively as a result of international trade. Thus, eventually wages and return to capital in 
developed and developing countries would tend to converge, the final Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) 
model. Trade theories based on comparative advantage have been further developed since, 
but Heckscher-Ohlin grounded models are the predominant version in most of textbooks and 
can be regarded as the mainstream position (Prasch, 1996, p. 38).45  
 
To sum up, ‘free trade’ is assumed to benefit all participating countries because of 
comparative cost advantage rising from differences in productivity due to labour or 
technology (Ricardo), or differences in factor endowments as capital and labour (Heckscher-
Ohlin). Underlying both propositions is Ricardo’s law of comparative costs (Shaikh, 1990b, 
pp. 155–157). The theory has at least two implications. Firstly, trade policies following the 
idea of comparative advantage would encourage ‘less developed’ countries to export labour 
                                                 
45 Even within mainstream economics, most empirical studies have failed to find evidence to support HO models 
trade pattern predictions and factor price equalisation. The findings by Leontief through his research on US 
trade disputed the factor intensity principle of the theory (1953), the evidence of rising trade in intra-industry 
trade between countries of similar development levels refuted the trade pattern prediction of the model 
(Krugman, 1979, 1981) and the absence of price equalisation evidence contradicted Samuleson’s liberalisation 
impact prognoses (Leamer, 1984; A. Wood, 1995).  
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for capital with industrialised countries; and secondly, underpinning ‘free trade’ theory is the 
advance of capital over labour in both ‘developed’ and ‘developing countries’. 
 
Do what I say, not what I have done 
Different trade theories and studies have pointed to major gaps between the claims of ‘free 
trade’ theory and empirical evidence. These refutations from empirical evidence include the 
persistence of income and technological differences between north and south, the non-
consideration of unemployment, the conception of capital as homogeneous, and increasing 
and diminishing returns (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003; Dosi, Pavitt, & Soete, 1990; Galbraith, 
2008; Stewart, 1984).46 However, ‘free trade’ theory is still widely used to justify the 
expansion liberalisation for capital (e.g. Hufbauer, Cimino, & Moran, 2014) and for labour 
movement restrictions compensated by trade in goods (Edwards, 2015, p. 28). As a result, 
today most arguments for the elimination of tariffs and non-trade barriers, deregulation of 
capital flows and domestic labour markets still rest on the principle of comparative 
advantage.  
 
                                                 
46 The model predicts that equilibrium in international trade is reached when the prices of the factors, i.e. capital 
and labour, become equal. In other words, international trade equilibrium is reached when the marginal 
productivities of labour and capital are the same in both countries. The underlying neoclassical production 
function rests on exogenous given technology and resources, constant returns to scale, competitive equilibrium 
and diminishing marginal productivity. However, it does not hold with heterogeneous capital goods which 
cannot be aggregated and measured in physical units. It also fails in the presence of unemployment as gains 
from trade cannot be secured for the country as a whole when these are at the expense of unemployment. The 
significant relationship between technological innovation and trade also undermines the model that rests on 
exogenous technology. Moreover, the implication of increasing returns to scale within the firm or the industry 
further hampers the model. 
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However, the key problem with the idea of comparative advantage rests with the fact that it 
is an ahistorical model that does not acknowledge the very unequal playing field within the 
international trade system. It does not account for asymmetries influenced by original 
colonial force and the international division of labour in which conditions of production and 
exchange have been skewed to favour capital accumulation for core countries. From the logic 
of comparative advantage, Latin American countries should continue to ‘develop’ through 
exports based on natural resources to industrialised countries instead of, for example, 
exchange with countries of similar development. 
 
Contrary to its claims, unequal development between nations has been the empirical outcome 
of ‘free trade,’ not increased welfare for all. Rather than benefitting all participating 
countries, it has allowed advanced capitalist countries to dominate international exchange, 
and placed less developed countries in the precarious position of continual deficit and debt. 
The discrepancies between the theory and the empirical evidence are due the comparative 
cost principle. It is absolute advantage, Shaikh (2016, pp. 508–522) concludes, and not 
comparative advantage which determines trade patterns. This is due to two main problems 
with Ricardo’s comparative cost model. Firstly, the model does not capture the fact that 
prices and costs are intrinsically linked and therefore “changes in the relative international 
prices of goods will also affect the relative costs of the same goods” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 509). 
As a consequence, the comparative costs will not behave as predicted by Ricardo. Secondly, 
Ricardo conflates the trade balance with the balance of payments. This explains different 
movements of the real exchange rate and its impact on capital and trade flows to those 
envisaged by Ricardo,. The latter theoretical critique is in line with Rodrik’s (2001) finding 
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that economic growth is not associated with preceding trade liberalisation, but when trade 
was actually protected. Chang (2002) demonstrates that countries tend to reduce trade 
barriers as they get richer not before. Once they are able to compete in the international 
market, they argue for ‘free trade’ which effectively ‘kicks away the ladder’ of state support 
for less developed countries.  
 
In conclusion, more important than the theoretical assertion of ‘free trade’ is the political 
implication for countries ceding their sovereignty in policy making to decide their own 
development path. Trade liberalisation prescription based on ‘free trade’ theory arguments 
‘is the mercantilism of the strongest power’ (Sideri, 1970, p. 6) and ‘natural’ comparative 
advantages are politically constructed (Bowden, 2005). The history of ‘free trade’ policy 
grounded on comparative advantage, illustrates the centrality of ideology and the exercise of 
power in capitalism. As a consequence, transnational corporations have lobbied strongly to 
assure that trade policies become conditional on capital accumulation.  
 
Food and comparative advantages  
In several ways, agriculture has featured prominently in discussions concerning ‘free trade’.  
Agriculture has been a key example in the elaboration of the seminal theory of comparative 
advantage in Ricardo’s wine for cloth case. It has also been a key example for the actual 
translation of the theory into practice by promoting the exchange of manufactured goods 
from the ‘north’ for natural resource based goods from the ‘south’. However, the theory of 
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‘free trade’ displays some additional limitations when addressing goods with a distinct 
ecological origin. These can be summarised into two key points.  
 
Firstly, when countries are not able to produce the same goods, as assumed under the 
traditional standard two-country and two-commodity model, the comparative advantage 
argument falls apart. In the absence of homogenous productive capacities, it is not possible 
to establish an absolute cost for the good in each country, and as a consequence, no relative 
cost. The latter is especially the case when biodiversity is of concern, such as tropical or sub-
tropical climate condition production. Thus, the absolute cost for bananas, coffee or 
avocadoes cannot be defined for temperate climates (Patnaik, 1999, p. 7). Because of 
abundant labour, and tropical and sub-tropical climate, it is possible to think that the ‘global 
south’ should be the main exporter of food products. Yet, the contrary was the case for a long 
time. From a national food self-sufficiency perspective, it is even conceivable to defend tariff 
protection and subsidies for domestic food production in the US and EU. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of these kinds of arguments are questionable given that the transformation of the US 
and the EU into major food exporters has undermined local producers and food security in 
development countries. 
 
Secondly, another related point refers to the diminishing returns of scale, which is especially 
relevant for industrial food production anchored in the metabolic rift. The continuous 
expansion and intensification of agrarian production reaches its own limits through the 
destruction of its own comparative advantage. The advantage of relative costs are hereby 
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reversed with the expansion of production ‘where land or ecology places limits’  (Galbraith, 
2008, p. 69). I will come back to this point in more detail in Chapter 7 ‘Capitalist food 
provision and the destruction of nature’. For the time being, it is enough to assert that ‘free 
trade’ policies founded on comparative advantage have additional shortcomings when 
addressing international exchange in food.   
 
So far, I have argued that, despite its theoretical and empirical limitations, ‘free trade’ 
continues to be used as an ideological instrument for the advance of capital with negative 
implications for ‘developing’ countries and labour in general. ‘Free trade’ theory has been 
used to justify the implementation of institutional frameworks that facilitate corporations’ 
ability to further accumulate capital globally. With that in mind, the next section will address 
how corporate concentration expresses itself in particular arrangements in the global food 
system that tends to reinforce their interests. Within that perspective, as McMichael (2009, 
p. 153) asserts, the WTO and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been considered as key 
instruments in advancing the rights and privileges of corporations in the organisation of 
global production and trade.  As such, it is of interest to briefly examine the AoA grounded 
at the WTO and NAFTA. Together they represent a good picture of the contested institutional 
arrangement. These agreements reflect the manifold contradictions that emerge when food 
liberalisation expands. In addition, it also represents a good venue to recognise countries’ 
differing position in the region.   
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Rise and stagnation of the WTO-AoA agenda of 'free trade'  
As already examined, agribusiness corporations require the expansion of the international 
division of labour through global value chains. Consequently, corporate concentration in the 
global food system seems to lead directly to international arrangement that favour 
agribusiness’ interests (McMichael, 2005). These have taken different forms: from the 
multilateral negotiation under the WTO to regional and bilateral trade agreements. These 
agreements build upon SAPs, the country by country reforms promoted in Latin America 
under the IMF/WB tutelage. By facilitating the geographic expansion of capital, these 
international agreements are mechanisms to remove national-scale constraints for greater 
capital mobility (McCarthy, 2004, p. 332). By expanding the reforms agreed under IMF/WB 
supervision, the WTO has locked trade liberalisation into international treaty laws (Lappé, 
Collins, & Rosset, 1998, p. 118) and brought most of developing countries to eat on the 
liberalisation table.  
 
 
Integrating agriculture in the international trade system 
The consolidation of a global food system based on the ideology of ‘free trade’ is strongly 
linked to the efforts in creating an international trade institution. However, as neither the US 
nor the EU had any intention to remove protective barriers from their domestic agriculture 
sector, the incorporation of agriculture in the international trade system had inherent 
problems from the beginning of the post-war planning efforts (Josling, Tangermann, & 
Warley, 1996, p. 11). The first seven negotiations rounds carried on within the framework of 
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the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)47 resulted in little progress in 
agricultural liberalisation.48 During the Uruguay Round, which eventually concluded with the 
formation of the WTO, the US priority was to expand liberalisation on new previously 
excluded sectors. This included agriculture, services, investments and intellectual property 
rights (Devereaux, Lawrence, & Watkins, 2006, p. 58). However, they did not want to do 
this at the cost of dismantling their own support structures. Above all, it was a possible 
agreement on agriculture between the US and EU .49 which would largely determine the final 
outcome.  
 
The final agreement reflected the increasing role of corporate agribusiness interests in the US 
and the EU. It reflected the double standard of pushing for trade liberalisation abroad while 
maintaining domestic support at home (see Guyomard, Mahe, & Roe, 1993).50 In particular, 
                                                 
47 After the Second World War the US and the UK led an effort to re-shape the world. The new institutional 
structure was to be erected around four pillars: the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank (WB)) and the International 
Trade Organization (ITO). ‘The system of linked, bilateral trade agreements that countries negotiated during 
the period of British hegemony was replaced under US leadership by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the precursor to the WTO’ (VanGrasstek, 2013, p. 4). However, with the opposition from the 
US business sector to the ITO charter, the US Congress did not approve the ITO; just the GATT chapter 
survived (Diebold, 1993, p. 339). The reason might have been related to the success of UK diplomacy during 
the Geneva negotiations which ended with the signature of the GATT by 15 countries, without the UK agreeing 
to the US demand to dismantle its imperial preference system (Toye, 2003, p. 487).  Although, an agreement to 
set up an international trade organisation failed, in the long term the GATT proved to be more than just an 
agreement on tariffs and preference concessions. It provided a platform for addressing trade disputes and further 
trade negotiations (Gardner, 1969, p. 361). As a consequence until the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 
international trade was arranged around the supposed provisional General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(VanGrasstek, 2013, p. 10).  
48 As the WTO its forerunner GATT was structured around negotiation rounds. There were four early trade 
negotiations rounds between 1947 and 1956, the Dillon Round (1960-1961), the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) 
and the Tokyo Round (1973-1979).  
49 Back then still the European Communities (EC) 
50 The outcome of the Uruguay Round is further questioned as many countries (18), mostly smaller African 
countries, did not even send representatives to Uruguay (see Farnsworth, 1986). 
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US agribusiness was seeking new possibilities for accumulation. Between 1981 and 1987 the 
US registered a fall in its food exports, mostly grain and corn, and the loss of a third of its 
foreign markets (Gehlhar & Vollrath, 1997). Key reasons attributing to the decline of US 
agriculture include: the decline in imports from debt laden developing countries; a 
conservative domestic agricultural policy in response to the Soviet grain embargo; and, 
importantly, the impact of agricultural policies in the EU.51 The change in EU agricultural 
policies had a double negative impact on US agriculture. On the one hand, it produced a loss 
of one third of export markets due to self-sufficiency in the EU. On the other hand, it also 
squeezed US exporters out of markets in the third world as the EU rose as a major grain 
exporter. The negative trend of US grain and oilseed exports continued until 1994 (see 
Gehlhar & Vollrath, 1997). 
 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and from which the WTO 
was created, agriculture was effectively integrated into the institutional framework of 
international trade. The final agreement institutionalised the unequal trade patterns within an 
international institutional setting. The agreement legally enforced the ‘free trade’ approach 
in international agricultural exchange through the AoA. The AoA entered into force in 1995 
with the clear aim of ‘increased market orientation in agricultural trade’.52 The AoA was 
                                                 
51 Introduced from 1962 under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) programme.   
52 The arrangement is built on four main pillars: ‘the Agreement on Agriculture itself; the concessions and 
commitments Members are to undertake on market access, domestic support and export subsidies; the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and the Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed 
and Net Food-Importing Developing countries’ (WTO, n.d.). The key mechanisms to expand liberalisation in 
agri-food products are negotiated over tariff liberalisation for ‘market access’ and expressed as tariffication and 
reduction in tariffs; elimination of trade distorting measures framed as ‘domestic support’, and reduction in 
‘export subsidies’. 
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complemented by agreements on trade-related property rights and trade-related investment – 
both of which had important implications for international trade in primary products in 
general and food related products. 
 
 
The meaning of the AoA for developing countries 
This section argues that the implementation of the AoA further reinforced the uneven 
distributional effects of ‘free trade’ and formalised the absolute advantage of developed 
countries in the international trade system. Most Latin American countries already had 
unilaterally liberalised their agricultural sector under the SAPs, with liberalisation often 
exceeding the AoA requirements. While developing countries disproportionally dismantled 
their support for domestic agriculture, developed countries kept higher tariffs, domestic 
support and export subsidies. Entire range of subsidies, mechanisms for export support such 
as export credits, guarantees and insurance programs were mainly used by developed 
countries. They were not subject to restrictions, and further exacerbated already low 
international prices which further harmed domestic producers in developing countries (see 
WTO, 2001). Furthermore, pre-existing benefits which were accrued to preferential margins 
as a result of non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements were eroded with the expansion of 
trade liberalisation (see WTO, 2000). In addition, before consenting to the new rules, 
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developed countries further raised their support levels in order to begin the reduction 
commitments from a higher base (Patnaik, 1999, p. 19).  
 
As a consequence, the AoA which was promoted as being especially ‘beneficial’ for 
developing countries through greater market access and larger amounts of exports to 
developed countries proved to have the opposite effect. The enforcement of the WTO AoA 
tended to aggravate the imbalance between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries by imposing 
liberalisation upon the latter and keeping supporting structures for the former (Bello, 2009; 
Clapp, 2006; Rosset, 2006).  For many developing countries, ‘[w]hile trade liberalisation had 
led to an almost instantaneous surge in food imports’, as FAO (1999) assessed, ‘these 
countries were not able to raise their exports’.53  
 
The new rules tended to prevent developing countries from raising tariffs in order to protect 
their agricultural sector from dumping of cheap imports. The provision to provide reciprocal 
access for agricultural exports with developed countries especially hurt net-food importing 
developing countries which mostly relied on one or two export products. The latter case is 
especially relevant for small countries and islands such as Cuba or Dominican Republic, who 
had the added vulnerability of natural disasters. According to Patnaik (1999), the loan-
conditioned policies and the new WTO rules had two major impacts: 1) an inverse 
                                                 
53 Aspects of food security and environment are treated within the framework of the WTO as non-trade 
concerns. However, as we will examine in more detail in the next two chapters, deregulation and liberalisation 
of the agri-food sector has spurred food imports curtailing domestic production making countries even more 
vulnerable to food insecurity.  
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relationship between food exports and food availability and 2)  de-industrialisation. We will 
examine the first claim in more detail in the subsequent Chapter 6 ‘Capitalist food provision 
and the destruction of human nature’. Lack of industrialisation has already been addressed in 
the historical chapter, Chapter 3. In short, industrialisation was not able to be completed 
throughout the continent. The only countries that were able to sustain some industries in the 
long-run were Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. But for the vast majority of countries which 
mostly had a smaller internal population, industrialisation never consolidated into the rise of 
new industries. 
 
Despite negative impacts on developing countries, benefits of trade liberalisation founded in 
the AoA and wider WTO measures continue to be promoted through the use of trade models 
based most of times on Computable General Equilibrium models (or CGE models). However, 
eventually most of shares in new ‘market opportunities’ arising from the Uruguay Round did 
go to the ‘global north’. Exceptions were some economic sectors in countries such as 
Argentina and Brazil which displayed more consolidated domestic agribusiness in specific 
products (L. Taylor & Von Arnim, 2006; Wise, 2009).  
 
As a result of the uneven outcome of the Uruguay Round that integrated agriculture in the 
international trading system, the WTO launched the Doha Development Round in November 
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of 2001 with the explicit task of addressing developing countries’ concerns.54 However, the 
current round has once again reflected the hypocrisy of the win-win rhetoric which underlies 
‘free trade’ theory. Currently, the Doha Round negotiations are stalled in great part due to 
disagreements related to food security issues, specific measures for Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and the dismantling of protective US and EU farm subsidies. 
 
 
The differing position of Latin American countries 
Although the outcome of the AoA might be assessed as mostly negative for developing 
countries, it is interesting to note that positions among Latin American countries varied 
greatly. In this regard, the negotiations at the WTO are a good place to examine the different 
positions and interests of countries on agriculture and food. This will be undertaken by 
looking at the different negotiation groups in Latin America with a special emphasis on the 
rise of G-20 coalition and the fall of the Cairns Group. In fact, most negotiating coalitions 
have been formed around agricultural issues. As opposed to the African members of the WTO 
who formed the African Group and Asian developing members, Latin American countries 
have no common platform. I argue that the formations may be best understood in the light of 
alternative propositions to the EU and US. In brief, the EU is the member with the highest 
absolute support for its agricultural sector, which is reflected in its high tariffs, domestic and 
                                                 
54 The WTO is structured around Ministerial Conferences which generally meet every two years. At each 
meeting, all WTO member countries or customs unions are able to take decisions upon all topics covered in the 
multilateral trade agreements. The 10th Ministerial Conference was held in Nairobi between the 15-18 of 
December 2015.  
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export subsidies. As a result, its position regarding market access, export subsidies and 
domestic support mechanisms has been mainly defensive. This is contrary to its position on 
food aid or state trading enterprise, where the EU favours elimination. The US, on the other 
hand, defends its domestic support strategies, export credits and food aid, while pushing for 
liberalising trade barriers for its agribusiness. As can be observed in Table 4.2, Latin 
American countries are divided in regard to negotiations in agriculture. The dynamic process 
of the negotiations in reaction to ongoing propositions is reflected in the shifting weight of 
coalitions and country strategies over time.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Coalitions with important Latin American presence in AoA negotiations 
Groups Main interest in AoA negotiations Latin American Countries (a) 
Small, 
vulnerable 
economies 
(SVEs)(b) 
Seek to moderate concessions on tariff 
liberalisation 
WTO members (15):  Bolivia, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Paraguay.  
Cairns 
Group 
Coalition of agricultural exporting nations 
lobbying for agricultural trade liberalisation. 
WTO members (20): Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay.  
Tropical 
products 
Coalition of developing countries seeking 
greater market access for tropical products 
 
WTO members (8): Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, 
and Peru 
G-20 Coalition of developing countries pressing 
for reforms of agriculture in developed 
countries with some flexibility for 
developing countries 
WTO members (23): Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela  
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G-33 Also called ‘Friends of Special Products’ in 
agriculture. Coalition of developing 
countries pressing for flexibility for 
developing countries to undertake limited 
market opening for ‘special products’. 
Advocates for public stockholding for food 
security and special safeguard mechanisms 
to raise tariffs in special situations.  
WTO members (46): Bolivia, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, and Venezuela 
Source: adapted from WTO (2014). (a) in brackets, total members of the group; (b) SVEs defined by the WTO 
as those countries that hold a small share of world trade between 1999 and 2004. 
 
At first sight, the picture seems rather confusing when looking at the participation of 
individual countries. For example, while Bolivia participates in all groups, Mexico is only a 
member of the G-20. With the exception of Panama and Costa Rica, the rest of Central 
American countries are part of the SVEs group. By participating in various groups countries 
are able to defend their conflicting domestic interests. These include: the relative importance 
of manufacture, the size of the domestic market, the role of campesinos and export-oriented 
agribusiness, and political alliances able to influence government policies. For example, 
while Paraguay and Bolivia push for opening ‘markets’ in the global north through the Cairns 
Group, at the same time, they seek to protect small producers at home. The liberalisation of 
food trade tends to be defended particularly by Chile, Brazil and Argentina as they share the 
presence of important domestic and international headquartered agribusinesses. In addition, 
Chile has a small domestic market and opening up foreign markets is considered in their best 
interest. The latter situation demonstrates that, given their varying interests, there is no 
consensus towards a common Latin American position 
 
140 
 
The rise of the G-20 and the crisis of the Cairns Group demonstrate the complexities 
concerning different ‘free trade’ projects among Latin American countries. Both group 
formations have been the principle groups for articulating an opposition and proposing 
alternatives to the US and the EU. They represent a good example on how countries have 
tried to push forward their particular ‘free trade’ agenda. These are fundamentally shaped by 
the relative agricultural structures of different countries and their positions as grain exporters 
or importers. On the one hand, the Cairns Group55 have advocated for the elimination of 
‘trade-distorting’ domestic support, export subsidies and trade barriers. On the other hand, 
the common interests within the G-2056 coalition have been to attack the support structures 
in the ‘global north,’ particularly the US and the EU. However, in contrast to the Cairns 
Group, the G-20 has been willing to cede on wide tariff liberalisation. The crises of the Cairns 
Group can be pin pointed to the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003 which also marked 
the rise of the G-20. Differences between developed and developing countries were focused 
around agricultural negotiations during this conference.  
 
In opposition to the US and EU proposals, developing countries prioritised the emergence of 
a wider coalition from the ‘global south’. This included countries as India, China, Pakistan 
                                                 
55 Countries included in the Cairns Group following the statement signed in 2013 at the Bali conference: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay and Viet Nam (Cairns Group, 
2013). Not signed by Bolivia.  
56  Countries acting under the G-20 coalition following the press release signed at the G-20 Ministerial Meeting, 
at the 19 march 2005 in New Delhi when Uruguay was welcomed as the newest member: Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. (Government of India, 
n.d.) 
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and Egypt with large rural populations linked to ‘subsistence’ agriculture and/or which are 
net importers of agricultural products. Within that wider framework, the ‘free trade’ position 
advocated by some Cairns Group members such as Australia, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile as food exporters proved too narrow. The new G-20 coalition emerged through the 
leadership of Brazil, India and South Africa. In particular, it appeared that Brazil’s negative 
assessment of the Australian-led Cairns Group, as being too complacent a player regarding 
US-EU agreements on AoA negotiations, spurred the new coalition (da Motta Veiga, 2005).  
 
As most WTO members are developing countries, pushing the liberalisation agenda further 
without committing to dismantle developed countries’ own support structures has exposed 
its limits during the Doha Round. Nonetheless, the advance of trade liberalisation in food has 
not stopped at the multilateral level. As I will examine in the next section, similar to the US, 
the EU and lately China have been expanding in Latin America through bilateral or regional 
trade agreements. The following section will briefly survey Latin American integration from 
its historical roots to contemporary political struggles, before analysing NAFTA. Both 
integration efforts might be best understood as situated within an inter-state system rooted in 
the succession of global hegemonic countries which are aimed at further expanding capital 
accumulation (Arrighi, 2002). 
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Regional and bilateral Free Trade Agreements in Latin America 
Patria Grande versus the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) 
After two centuries of the Monroe Doctrine (1823)57 in which the US asserted Latin America 
as its ‘sphere of influence’, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) was established as the first organisation that gathered all Latin American countries 
without the presence of the United States. In its inaugural declaration of 2011, CELAC 
declared that ‘[t]he path of our Liberators’ (‘El camino de nuestros Libertadores’ in Spanish) 
was in the spirit of the Bolivarian dream – a reference to Latin American independence hero 
Simón Bolívar. In this regard, the aspiration to achieve greater regional integration in Latin 
America is not new and can be traced back to the independence struggles during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
 
In 1790, when Latin America was still under European colonial rule, the Venezuelan 
independence hero Francisco de Miranda, forerunner to Simón Bolívar, was already 
advocating for a regional union. He proposed a union that reached from as far as the 
Mississippi to Cabo de Hornos (Rioseco, 2008, p. 305) and linked independence critically to 
                                                 
57 Stated by the US President James Monroe during his address to the Congress which claimed Latin America 
as a US ‘sphere of influence’ in opposition to prevailing European interests, mainly Spain and Portugal.   
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the ability to freely trade (Miranda, 1982, p. 302).58 Later, Bolivar59 reformulated it as the 
dream of creating a gran patria Americana with the aim to integrate all Latin America: the 
Bolivarian dream.  
 
After years of relegation, regional integration schemes again have gained momentum at the 
turn of the twenty-first century. According to Katz (2006, 2015), these may be categorized 
in three different approaches. The first is representative of US sponsored Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and refers back to the Monroe Doctrine, the Panamerican model (Ardao, 
2006), such as the failed FTAA, which can be considered  perhaps as the most ambitious and 
emblematic project, and NAFTA. The FTAA project was intended as a short-cut to include 
the entire hemisphere within the same rules and within one negotiation. The creation of a 
common market that encompassed all the Americas was another milestone in the ‘free trade’ 
approach advance by the US. These integration efforts are characterised, in line with previous 
Washington Consensus policies, by trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. Its 
agreements seek to secure wide legal rights for the accumulation of transnational capital and 
regulate the restrictive mobility of labour. These agreements are underlined by the interests 
                                                 
58 ‘…the absolute independence of the Colonies’ government and, as a consequence, its free trade with the rest 
of the world as its fundamental stipulation’. (Author’s own translation) 
59 In the ‘Letter of Jamaica’ from the 6th September of 1815, Bolívar famously proclaimed: ‘It is a great idea 
to intend the formation of one nation out of the New World with only one link that bonds all its parts, and with 
it the whole. As it has a single origin, a single language, common habits and a single religion, it should, as a 
result, have a single government that confederates the different states that will be established’. (Author’s own 
translation) 
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of local elites whose privilege is dependent on the US through trade, and political and military 
intervention. 
 
The second integration schema is characterised by a more autonomous form of national 
capitalism. It is represented by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR in Spanish) led 
by Brazil .60 Katz sees the social class character of MERCOSUR as one based on national 
elites pursuing a smooth transition to liberalised trade by excluding popular demands.61 Since 
its foundation, the association of national elites with international capital has been reflected 
by how the common market has benefitted transnational corporations based in Brazil and 
Argentina. In contrast to the US influenced integration schema, the sub-regional bloc 
promotes greater sovereign foreign relations than countries that are part of the Panamerican 
model. Katz concludes that MERCOSUR is an ambiguous and vulnerable project of the 
dominant domestic classes. On the one hand, it backs local capitalists at the cost of US 
interests and fosters stronger articulation with Latin America. However, on the other, it is 
subordinated to the world economy due to its high dependence on the export of natural 
resource-based products. Because of this contradiction, it remains a project with an 
incomplete free trade zone and no plan for the establishment of a common market. In terms 
of food provision, MERCOSUR has favoured agro-export expansion which contributed 
                                                 
60 At the time of writing full members were Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Associate 
members were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Surinam.  
61 Without going into a detailed discussion on the concept of elites, national elites include and exceed national 
capital. This also considers political elites that do not necessarily coincide with those of capital.    
145 
 
further to the displacement of campesinos, has opposed land reforms, and deepened the 
destruction of ecosystems.    
 
Katz argues that the third effort of regional integration is best represented by the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in Spanish). It is an ‘anti-imperialist’ project 
that seeks income redistribution and more radical reforms. It is based on principles such as 
‘cooperative advantage’. For instance, it promotes the exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban 
medical services. Instead of locating trade in capitalist market competition and demand 
driven by purchasing power, it encourages exchange based on complementary national 
capacities for the satisfaction of basic needs. With regard to food production, it asserts the 
strengthening of the campesino economy. Its future depends on the continuity of Venezuela’s 
ruling party (the United Socialist Party of Venezuela).  
 
In conclusion, regional integration per se does not necessarily entail a ‘progressive’ project. 
The type of integration depends very much on the participation and degree of US 
intervention, but also on the role of transnational companies, national elites, and the 
fulfilment of ‘popular demands’. When looking at the provision of food, both the 
Panamerican approach to regional integration and the MERCOSUR represent arrangements 
that tend to express corporate agribusiness’s drive for profit within an international ad-hoc 
arrangement. In contrast, at least at first sight, ALBA appears more promising for the 
campesino economy. The following examination of NAFTA has to be understood in terms 
of the US influenced schema.  
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‘Free trade’ in practice: the case of NAFTA  
Background 
For understanding how the corporate dominated food system is arranged, the case of NAFTA 
is critical. It was the first effective translation of the US ‘free trade’ agenda to an actual 
agreement which included a less developed country from Latin America. The creation of this 
‘free trade’ area also meant the practical implementation of ‘free trade’ theory and the first 
operational legal framework for the regional expansion of capital. Under the sponsor of the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) established in 1990 by the first Bush 
administration, the US pushed for the expansion of trade and investment liberalisation in the 
region.62 Within this framework, NAFTA was the most important official and ‘open’ US 
involvement in Latin American integration since the 1980s.63 Eventually the NAFTA 
between the United States, Mexico and Canada was enacted in 1994. It was the first 
agreement of this type signed by any Latin American country with the US (see ERS, 1995).64  
 
For years to come, discussions on regional integration and ‘free trade’ have referred back to 
NAFTA as the benchmark for the likely empirical outcome of trade liberalisation. Proponents 
                                                 
62 The EAI recommended also the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in December 1994 at the Summit 
of the Americas. 
63 In 1984, the US implemented the Caribbean Basin Initiative offering trade preference for Caribbean and 
Central American countries.    
64 Chile was the next in line to integrate NAFTA.  
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for the expansion of FTAs have pointed to NAFTA to illustrate the benefits for participants, 
while opponents have pointed to the negative consequences. The former tends to point mostly 
to selected aggregate figures of trade and investment variations, while the latter instead focus 
on asymmetrical distributional outcomes and loss of sovereignty. Backed by conventional 
trade models that predicted a win-win result for all three members, on the eve of NAFTA on 
December 31, 1993, 300 renowned conservative and liberal economists in the US endorsed 
the agreement (Faux & Lee, 1992, p. 5; Shaikh, 1996, p. 65). At the same time, other 
academics predicted a reduction in Mexican employment of about 1.6 million, mostly due to 
an important decrease in agricultural employment (Koechlin & Larudee, 1992). The decline 
would especially hit small corn producers in Mexico (Levy & van Wijnbergen, 1992; 
Robinson, Burfisher, Hinojosa, & Thierfelder, 1991).65 Even today, 20 years since it was 
implemented, NAFTA is praised to have contributed to higher living standards in all three 
countries (e.g., Hufbauer et al., 2014). On the other hand, Weisbrot et al. (2014) conclude 
that after 20 years, the impact of NAFTA on Mexico has been vastly negative. They report 
that, between 1960 and 1980, GDP per capita grew by 98.7%. In contrast, in the 20 years 
since NAFTA, real wages only increased by 18.6%, barely over the 1980 level. Moreover, 
poverty rates in 2012 are similar to the levels of 1994. As a result, 14.3 million more 
Mexicans are living under the poverty line.  
 
Importantly, NAFTA has served as a model for other FTAs, not just regarding pure trade 
issues, but also by shifting investment regulations in favour of transnational corporations 
                                                 
65 See Young (1995) for a critical discussion of the predictions of NAFTA’s impact on agricultural labour.  
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such as an investor-to-state dispute settlement system. Consequently, corporations now retain 
the right to sue foreign governments for the loss of profits despite neither states nor citizens 
having the same right. Typical cases refer to stricter social and environmental policies that 
might hurt corporate interests and include, for instance, protection of foreign investment 
against possible expropriation. In practice, the regulation forces democratically elected 
governments to defend policies in front of dispute settlement panels in arbitration courts. It 
also entails the loss of sovereign and democratic development strategies.66 Some have called 
this mechanism as a form of primitive accumulation for capital over the conditions of 
production instead of the means of production. From this perspective, NAFTA and similar 
trade arrangements seek to guarantee further capital accumulation by legally protecting 
investments. This may be best illustrated by the investor protection provisions that enforce 
new definitions of property rights and environmental governance (McCarthy, 2004).  
 
 
Impacts for Mexican agriculture 
NAFTA further consolidated Washington Consensus-type of policy reforms which had 
begun in the mid-1980s in Mexico. In agriculture, the agreement built critically on the land 
                                                 
66 The investment provisions, including the investor-state dispute settlement, are found in Chapter 11 of the 
NAFTA. As of January 2018, 23 out of 85 NAFTA investor-state claims have been made by foreign investors 
against Mexico. Compared to Canada and the US, Mexico has so far paid out the highest NAFTA damages, 
totalling more than US$205 million to foreign investors. Most of the claimant investors belong to the agrifood 
and real estate sectors. In addition, most of the contested public policy measures have been in the Administration 
of justice (5), Agricultural and industrial policy (4), Environmental protection (4), and Land use planning (4) 
(Sinclair, 2018). Mumme (2007) discusses in more detail the possible negative impact of ‘free trade’, including  
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provisions, on national environmental policies in Mexico.   
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reforms of 1992, which modified the two forms of land tenure originally established in 1917 
– namely the ejidos and agrarian communities. The former distributed land with rights of 
usufruct for mestizo campesinos under state property, while the latter was established for 
collective use for indigenous communities who could provide evidence of a claim to the land 
from colonial documents (A. Bartra & Otero, 2008, p. 488). The land reform allowed the 
privatisation of land and ended any claims for further land re-distribution for campesinos. 
Changes in agricultural policies included the elimination of domestic producer support by 
privatising irrigation facilities, reducing fertiliser and credit subsidies. In addition, price 
controls for ensuring food access were also lifted. These policies complemented the counter-
land reform which had a particularly hard impact on the cereal sector which brought together 
the majority of the campesino economy (see USDA Economic Research Service, 1995).  
 
A good illustration of how US sponsored ‘free trade’ impacted the campesinos is through the 
example of corn trade since NAFTA. Prior to NAFTA, corn production was the most 
important traditional and economic activity for campesinos.67 The enactment of NAFTA 
changed this situation by progressively reducing corn tariffs, but at the same time kept US 
support through the agribusiness biased US Farm Bill. While the US is the largest world 
producer and exporter of corn, concentrating about 39% of total world corn exports for the 
2016/2017 trading year, exports account for just a minor share of domestic production 
(USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2018). World prices are shaped in this way towards 
                                                 
67 The importance of maiz for Indigenous people is illustrated in Popol Vuh, a foundational narrative of Maya 
creation myth, or in the novel Men of Maiz of the Guatemalan Asturias.     
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prevailing US prices (see USDA Economic Research Service, 2016). As a consequence, by 
the end of the first 10 years of the agreement, campesinos were already massively displaced 
through the dramatic increase of corn imports from the US, but also of wheat, sorghum, soy, 
rice, beans and cotton. Corn imports during this period increased by 240%, compared to their 
annual average level between 1984-93 (Zahniser & Coyle, 2004, p. 3).68 In rural areas, the 
shift in trade patterns went hand in hand with the advance of agribusiness and the 
decomposition of the campesinos. ‘Family agriculture’ which used to constitute about 78% 
of total employment in agriculture, diminished by 58% between 1991 and 2007. At the same 
time, short-term workers in agribusiness export sites increased during the same period by 
over 150% (Weisbrot et al., 2014). Armando Bartra (2004) called this outcome a loss not just 
in food but also in labour sovereignty. 
 
The uneven outcome between the US and Mexico can also be explained by the different cost 
structure of US agribusiness and Mexican campesinos that renders competition impossible. 
The typical corn agribusiness farm in the US is about 270 hectares, highly mechanised, and 
intensive in chemical inputs. It needs just one-half hour of labour to produce 1 metric ton of 
corn. Moreover, while US corn yields average about 8.8 metric tonnes per hectare, Mexican 
yields achieve 2 metric tonnes per hectare on rain-fed land and about 5.8 metric tonnes per 
hectare on irrigated land (Zahniser & Coyle, 2004, p. 5). Furthermore, in Mexico, 72.6% of 
all agrarian production units are smaller than 5 hectares. Campesinos producing white corn 
                                                 
68 Although the bulk of US exports consist of yellow corn used mainly for animal feed and Mexico produces 
mostly white corn for human consumption, there exists overlap between both varieties.  
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yield on average 3.2 metric tons per hectare, which renders them insufficient income for the 
year. As a result, most of the almost 3 million campesinos producing on 5 hectares or less 
dedicate their output for their own consumption (de la Madrid Cordero, 2009). The purpose 
of the previous argument is not to argue for a more efficient large-scale farming. As Rosset 
(1999) has claimed, when considering that small-scale farm units tend to use crop mixtures, 
they can be considered more productive than large-scale farms.69 
 
Underwriting the previous comparison is also massive unequal state support in favour of 
agribusiness. The corporate-driven US Farm Bill illustrates this tendency repeatedly. In this 
sense, unequal competition is also explained by US subsidies that enabled the reduction of 
export prices below production costs, defined as dumping. According to Wise (2010) 
dumping contributed to an increase of 413% in US corn exports between the 1990s and 2005. 
The author concludes that in contrast, rather than helping farmers to increase productivity, 
Mexican corn subsidies compensated for US dumping. The final result, Wise concludes, was 
a ‘widely observed “retreat to subsistence” among Mexican smallholders’ (2010, p. 170). 
However, despite massive displacement and differentiation of campesinos, many still persist 
today. This point will be investigated in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
69 As recent research shows, discussions on productivity remain highly contested. The relationship between the 
farm size and productivity does not just depend on the use and definitions over land or labour productivity, 
yields, or total factor productivity, but also on other factors such as demographic pressure, access to technology, 
the tenure system and the relative importance of the agriculture in the national economy (Rada & Fuglie, 2018). 
This requires caution when comparing productivity between campesinos and agribusiness, for it not only 
depends on how we measure and define productivity, but also on other underlying factors.   
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 Summary and conclusion 
After tracing the historical rise in the previous chapter, this chapter examined how capitalist 
food provision in Latin America has been shaped by corporate agribusiness. These tend to be 
globally organised through highly concentrated value chains. In this dynamic, land 
concentration has distinctive intra-regional features with an important role for ‘translatinas’ 
and domestic capital. Accumulation of capital in this internationally integrated food system 
requires favourable regulations to facilitate increased mobility and an expanding 
international division of labour. With that aim, the arrangement of a capital ad-hoc 
international trading system has been critical. Despite its theoretical and empirical 
limitations, ‘free trade’ theory arguments based on comparative advantage have been 
functional in achieving the advance of capital through multilateral, regional and bilateral 
agreements. These international arrangements importantly build on previous domestic 
reforms and, include not just pure trade issues, but also other important stipulations, notably 
on health regulations, investment and intellectual property rights.  
 
As illustrated with the WTO AoA, this type of agreement legally enforced the ‘free trade’ 
approach and effectively formalised the ‘comparative advantage’ of developed countries at 
the international level. The multilateral negotiations also revealed that that there was no 
common Latin American position on the ‘free trade’ agenda. The political struggles 
underlying trade negotiations were examined through the example of regional efforts of 
integration. Within that framework, NAFTA was examined in more detail for understanding 
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how the corporation dominated food system is arranged. NAFTA is especially relevant as the 
first effective translation of the US pushed ‘free trade’ agenda to an actual agreement which 
included a less developed country from Latin America. It also meant the practical 
implementation of ‘free trade’ theory. Examined through its implications on corn trade, the 
agreement resulted in the advance of agribusiness corporations at expense of campesinos.         
 
An international integrated food system dominated by corporations has delivered benefits in 
offering more food varieties and food supply during off seasons, especially for consumers in 
the ‘north’.  A food basket in the ‘global north’ without bananas year around seems highly 
unthinkable today. However, as pointed out by several authors, corporations influence 
international rules that are supposed to limit their own activities, but have negative 
implications for campesinos, nature and food security (Bello, 2009; Buttel, Magdoff, & 
Foster, 2000; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; McMichael, 2004; Weis, 2007). The new international 
arrangements are therefore better understood as shifting class relations in favour of capital 
by restructuring the institutions underpinning class domination. Seeking to secure legal 
rights, these trade agreements can be interpreted as forms of accumulation by dispossession 
for capital. It is in this sense that the international trade system favoured by corporations, 
such as the WTO or NAFTA type regional agreements, are, in multiple ways, forms of 
consolidating corporate power for the expansion of capital. In this regard, perhaps the 
foremost example is NAFTA’s investment chapter that grants capital full mobility and 
enables corporations to sue national states. The expansion of corporate capital is hereby not 
just expressed by the rise of profits at expense of labour, but critically by undermining 
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sovereign decision-making by democratic elected governments to decide their own path of 
development.  
 
This chapter showed that capitalist food provision, as expressed by agribusiness corporations, 
is not bound to a tight form of trade arrangement. As the long WTO negotiations between 
the US and the EU to integrate agriculture in the international trading system proved, ‘free 
trade’ and protection are both possible outcomes from the same negotiation: trade 
liberalisation for them, protection for us. The dominant narrative regarding ‘free trade theory’ 
as beneficial for all therefore leads to a false dualism between liberalisation and state 
protection. However, unlike states, agribusiness organised in globally chains tend to be free 
from contradictory positions about national questions and the workings of ‘free trade’ theory.   
 
As already indicated, with the advance of corporate food provision through implementation 
of SAPs and the advance of trade agreements, campesino food supply has been increasingly 
destroyed. Nevertheless, concentration in the food system is not directly mirrored in food 
production. Despite the importance of the globally integrated food system dominated by 
corporations, local food provision still relies importantly on non-agribusiness food provision. 
After all, regardless the decomposition of campesinos, close to one million people still work 
in world agriculture on about 570 million farms. Out of these, more than 500 million are 
‘family farms’. These ‘family farms’ produce about 80% of the world’s food in value terms. 
About 72% of these ‘family farms’ have less than 1 ha (Lowder et al., 2014). The next chapter 
proceeds to investigate the other side of food provision, where campesinos still play a key 
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role. This requires the integration of the analytical focus on class politics of this chapter with 
categories that account for campesino persistence.   
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5. Campesinos: continuity and interruption in food 
provision  
 
Introduction  
As I have argued in Chapters 3 and 4, capital circulation and accumulation has transformed 
agrarian structures in a long process that today includes campesino’s subordination to the 
dominance of corporate agribusiness in the globalised integrated food system. This process 
has also comprised of the continuous displacement of the campesino economy. In this 
chapter, I argue that despite the relative decline of agriculture in national economies and the 
increasing differentiation process of agrarian workers, the campesino has resisted dissolution 
by the dominant capitalist mode of production. As a result, despite the influence of 
corporations in the food system, the campesino economy still plays a significant role in 
providing food. 
 
Because of the importance of the campesino for the overall argument of this dissertation, I 
will briefly review some of their key characteristics that I clarified earlier in Chapter 2. 
Following Armando Bartra’s (2006) definition, the campesino is someone that directly 
produces food, but the definition can also include the occasional wage labourer, sellers of 
crafts and other forms in the appropriation of nature such as fishing, logging or artisanal 
mining. I place this definition within the mode of production (MOP) approach by 
conceptualising the campesino as a secondary mode of production. In this way, although 
157 
 
subject to the primary mode of production, the campesino retains distinctive features that can 
be best synthesised in Rosset’s (2006) understanding of multifunctionality. 
Multifunctionality seeks to grasp the distinct and manifold functions of the campesino 
economy which are strongly linked to social and ecological aspects. In this way, although 
subject to the primary modes of production, the campesino is irreducible to them. 
Subsequently, the campesino is distinct to some of the European Marxist understandings of 
peasantry temporally limited to the pre-capitalist period.  
 
The secondary mode of production allows a conceptual understanding of the persistence of 
the campesino in Latin America throughout the historical transition to a dominant capitalist 
mode of production today. It is an explanation that differs from the European experience of 
the peasant which was constrained to a linear succession of modes of production, the 
existence of wages and limited experiences of land tenure arrangement. As already shown in 
Chapter 3, this approach would lead to a restricted view and misunderstanding of Latin 
America’s social and economic development. Through the emphasis on the articulation of 
different modes of production in capitalism and its multifunctionality, the campesino can be 
comprehended as located at the intersection of capitalist and non-capitalist spaces.  
 
From an emancipatory perspective, as I will further study in Chapter 8 ‘Resisting capital 
throughout the food system’, the campesino can produce, distribute and appropriate the 
surplus in ways which attempts to bypass the capitalist market as the central mechanism of 
coordination. In this regard, some of the campesinos’ practices and experiences are at the 
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margin of capitalist logic of accumulation, and to some extent oppose the concentration of 
economic power for corporate agribusiness capital. This perspective is an attempt to 
conceptually prioritise the campesino’s persistence through practice and experience. It is not 
an attempt at presenting a theoretical vision of a post-capitalist society. Consequently, the 
campesino is not considered the inherent bearer of an economic alternative to capitalism that 
abolishes the law of value. The concrete alternative is fundamentally shaped by the ups and 
downs of campesino struggles, certainly not all anti-capitalist. The aim is to strike a balance 
between an overly romanticised view about the campesino’s role in undermining the 
expansion of capital, and an overly pessimistic interpretation that denies any space for the 
campesino in the construction for an alternative to a capital-driven food provision.          
 
Based on this definition, I enquire more concretely in this chapter why the campesino has not 
been eliminated in the process of capital accumulation, and why it continues to play a 
fundamental role in the food system. In this regard, I proceed to elucidate the role of the 
campesino as opposed to capital-driven agribusiness by contrasting my conceptual 
elaboration against further theoretical and empirical arguments. In what follows, I endeavour 
to identify key elements that help to explain the persistence of the campesino economy in 
Latin America.  
 
For this purpose, the chapter is structured around three sections that account for campesino’s 
persistence and key role in food provision. The first section contrasts my theoretical 
understanding of the campesino and its persistence over time with the historical debate of the 
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‘agrarian question’ regarding the campesino’s dissolution in Latin America. In other words, 
to improve our understanding of the campesino in Latin America, I compare my conceptual 
elaboration with the core arguments from debates surrounding the agrarian question in the 
continent. The aim is therefore not to review in full detail the various classical and 
contemporary interpretations of the ‘agrarian question’ as this would take me beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Rather, my goal is limited to using one of the classical debates regarding 
the agrarian question to further reveal the contemporary relevance of the campesino in Latin 
America.70  
 
I argue that critical readings of ‘peasantry’ informed by Leninist and Chayanovian traditions 
have privileged a particular account in relation to its role in capitalist development. This 
chapter claims that the debate in the region has inherited serious weaknesses from both. 
Concerning the examination of the campesino in Latin America at least three characteristics 
of the debate have been obfuscating the role of the campesino economy in agrarian 
production and society. Drawing on Bartra (2006), I firstly argue that underlying the agrarian 
question is a dual ‘macro-micro’ view of the campesino. The campesino is often analysed as 
either part of a global process of capital expansion, or just from the perspective of its internal 
logic, rather than addressing both the macro-micro dynamics as an interrelated process. In 
the second section, I explain that because a large proportion of rural workers are of 
indigenous origin with strong historical ties to their land, the constant expansions of capital 
                                                 
70 For an examination of the classical debates and an effort to update the agrarian question to contemporary 
issues see Akram-Lodhi and Kay’s (2010a, 2010b) review.  
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over new territories and resources have concrete expressions in territorial struggles. 
However, the classical agrarian question has largely relegated the importance of Indigenous 
campesinos. Thirdly, in the agrarian question, the campesino tends to be conceptualised in 
very abstract terms relating only to its functionality or its inherent resistance to capitalism, 
instead of linking the dynamics to actual empirical struggles. 
 
The previous point leads to the next section in which I account for the enduring relevance of 
the campesino as critically linked to struggles over the territory through land access and land 
reforms. Although the agrarian characteristics found within and between countries have 
varied since colonialism, disputes over land have been central to the socio-economic 
development of the region and the configuration of wealth and power. Today, the region is 
the most unequal in terms of land concentration, which has significantly worsened since the 
1960s when land reform was widely promoted (FAO, 2012a). The issue reflects the central 
importance of land access claims, ranging from the historical demands by Indigenous 
populations to contemporary campesino movements, which also includes the marginalised 
and the unemployed in both urban and rural areas (Antezana Ergueta, 1992; Bengoa, 2000; 
Chonchol, 2003; Kay, 2012; Pereira Leite & Vieira de Ávila, 2008; Teubal, 2009a, 2009b; 
Toledo Llancaqueo, 2005).  
.  
In the concluding section, I examine empirical evidence found in national surveys which 
account for the role of campesinos in food provision. I proceed by contrasting my concept of 
the campesino with the recent emergence of the notion of family agriculture, disconnected 
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from agrarian production relations. I conclude that, although national surveys are not tailored 
to scrutinise the campesino in depth, existing data support campesino existence and its critical 
role in food provision.    
 
 
The dialectic of evanescence   
Setting the agrarian question in Latin America 
At least since the 1960s, the debate over the role of campesinos in the economy and society 
convened important attention in the region. Numerous studies have been undertaken 
regarding its social nature and class dimensions, its forms of organisation, its links with 
society and its possible persistence. There are at least two reasons for the proliferation of this 
topic for study. Firstly, the importance of the ‘agrarian question’ in Latin America. Secondly, 
the Cuban revolution and the Alliance for Progress which put agrarian reforms and 
campesinos on the political agenda. I will discuss the former first and address the latter in my 
account of historical struggles for land access in the next sub-title.  
 
Firstly, it has to be clarified that although issues related to the transformation of the 
campesino economy by capital had been debated, the specific ‘agrarian question’ linked to 
the ideas of Chayanov and Lenin only became part of continental discussion much later. In 
this respect, Lenin’s position had a critical temporal and political advantage as the translation 
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of Chayanov into Spanish only occurred in 1974 (Cortés & Cuellar, 1986, pp. 63–64).71 The 
‘agrarian question’ regarding the dissolution of peasantry emerged in Russia at the turn of 
the twentieth century as part of the discussion concerning the peasant’s role in the transition 
from capitalism to socialism. As Shanin (1979, pp. 22–23) notes, this was based on the 
orthodox interpretation of Marx, which situated the question within capitalist transformation 
and the conceptual debates regarding differentiation and modes of production. Two key 
arguments emerged from the debate. Firstly, the populists or narodniks claimed that peasants 
would play a progressive role in the transition. This position was later heralded by most 
critiques linked to the Chinese revolution. A major exponent of this strand was Chayanov, 
who focused his analysis on the peasant productive unit, emphasising reproduction in terms 
of a family/household economy, which is both a production and consumption unit mainly 
interested in use value. 
 
Secondly, the Leninist position focused on capital penetration, landed property and labour 
exploitation. According to Lenin, the peasantry was experiencing a differentiation tendency 
which would stratify peasants into the classes of capitalist societies. Most peasants would 
therefore become proletarian with a minority becoming agrarian bourgeoisie. Two paths 
would emerge – 1) the ‘Prussian path’ of landed property from above; and 2) the ‘American 
path’ or ‘Junker path’ not parting from landed property, and of a gradual shift into agrarian 
capital and wage-labour relations. He characterised the first as reactionary and the latter as 
                                                 
71 Chayanov was identified by Stalin as an anti-scientific economist opposed to Lenin (Stalin, 1929) and 
executed later under his regime in 1937.  
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progressive in political terms. In contrast to Marx who analysed the dissolution of peasantry 
in terms of the process of primitive accumulation in the rise of capitalism in Britain, Lenin’s 
contribution was important because he emphasised the role of differentiation in capitalism in 
a backward country (Bernstein, 2009, pp. 59–61).  
 
Studies based on Asia and Latin America added new important dimensions for understanding 
the impact of capital penetration in agrarian structures which were absent in the initial 
classical debates. Two main points framed the discussion from the beginning in a different 
context. Firstly, as already argued, capital did not liquidate direct agrarian producers as in 
Marx account of primitive accumulation in England. Secondly, in contrast to India and Latin 
America, Russia was never a colony forced to export raw materials in service of a metropolis. 
In this regard, research on India regarding sharecropping, bondage relations, credit and labour 
markets added particularly important new issues (K. Basu, 1994, pp. 1–3). Studies on India 
also pointed to patterns observable in Latin America such as the high degree of land 
concentration and the great economic differentiation of campesino with a majority of 
‘subsistence production’ characterised by a combination of labour forms and various tenancy 
arrangements (Patnaik, 1994, p. 161). The latter corresponds to what Kautsky analysed in his 
book The Agrarian Question, where he outlined a more nuanced explanation of the 
incorporation of peasants within the capitalist production. Here capital dominates and 
exploits the peasantry, but without entirely dissolving them (Alavi & Shanin, 1988, p. xxxii).    
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In Latin America, the importance of the agrarian question debate holds different weight 
depending on the country, with more importance placed in Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia 
(Lizárraga & Giarracca, 2009). These are also countries with a substantial Indigenous rural 
population. The debate on this issue, which was initiated in Mexico in the 1970s, comprised 
of two opposing views on the future of the peasantry.72 On one hand, there were the 
descampesinistas who predicted, alongside Marx and Lenin, the disappearance of the 
campesino. This was to be the case because of the economic non-viability of campesino 
production and the inevitable absorption of the campesino into wage relation (e.g., Astori, 
1981; R. Bartra, 1976; R. Bartra & Otero, 1988). On the other hand, there were the 
campesinistas, who stressed the persistence of the campesinos against the view of its 
generalised incorporation into wage labour (e.g., Esteva, 1980; Schejtman, 1980; Warman, 
1980). In between these two opposing views, there have also been more nuanced arguments. 
There are those that support a re-campesinisation process who have tried to merge Marxist 
concepts with the persistence of the campesino (e.g., Coello, 1981; Warman, 1988). These 
have been called as working within ‘marxo-campesinismo’ by Schejtman (1981) or 
‘chayanovist marxists’ (‘marxismo chayanovista’ in Spanish) in Lehmann’s (1980) words.  
 
Although the controversy between campesinistas and descampesinstas was to some extent 
purely academic, it also corresponded to a discrepancy regarding the political strategy for 
achieving socialism. In this regard, it is possible to observe in the descampesinistas elements 
                                                 
72 It is not the aim of the chapter to develop an exhaustive review on the agrarian question in Latin America. 
For the historic discussion the present section draws mainly on Kay (2009).  
165 
 
that align them with the Communist parties at the time. In contrast, the campesinistas’ 
approach supported the revolutionary potential of campesinos. The latter was critically linked 
to earlier experiences in Mexico, but also to recent events in Cuba, China, Vietnam and the 
situation in Chile.  
 
Today, the role of the campesino is no longer discussed in relation to the construction of a 
socialist society. As already stated, the debate is mostly framed regarding its marginal or 
superfluous position in agrarian production, and its analytical vacuity as a concept. To further 
clarify my argument that the campesino is still a critical actor within the food system, I will 
examine three shortcomings of the agrarian question: 1) the dual view in regarding the 
campesino solely from a systemic (macro) or internal (micro) logic; 2) the strong indigenous 
ties of a large proportion of agrarian workers; and 3) the tendency to see the campesino with 
respect to capital in a functional or resistant position. 
 
 
Global capital and the campesino work 
To grasp the campesino as a critical player in the capital dominated food system, based on 
Bartra (2006), I argued earlier on in Chapter 2 that we have to be able to show the campesino 
from a dual macro-micro view that synthesises the campesino economy as a result of global 
capital and show the campesino work as the starting point that ends up with valorised capital. 
Both levels of abstraction – macro and micro – have to be balanced and understood as 
interrelated. This is contrary to the common dichotomist views derived from the agrarian 
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question. On the one hand, there is Lenin’s ‘systemic’ approach which is based on dynamics 
of global capital accumulation and asserts that campesinos ultimately finish off as wage 
labour or capitalists. On the other hand, there is the Chayanovian ‘internal logic’ approach 
which is based on the distinctive economic campesino unit. The latter asserts that traditional 
Marxist concepts would not hold in the analysis of this specific organisation as there are no 
wages, profits and, critically, family based labour production equals to consumption.73  
 
As I have argued from the outset, the campesino is characterised by a combination of labour 
forms. Over centuries, campesinos have worked their land, have sometimes been contracted 
as workers or have sold their own labour power. The constant flux between labour forms is 
inherent to campesino livelihood strategies. While Lenin was certainly right in recognising a 
tendency of increasing differentiation due to the expansion of capital, to proletarise or semi-
proletarise all campesinos reduces the constitutive heterogeneity of their rural work. In 
addition, as I have also argued previously, the campesino cannot be understood as a semi-
proletarian functional to capital, waiting to be fully proletarised. Latin America is a continent 
where about 20% of the occupying population do not derive income from wage labour (OIT, 
2012, p. 82).74 In this regard, the basic bipolar class schema of wage labour and capitalist 
                                                 
73 Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2016) point out that Marx actually had a more nuanced view of capitalist agrarian 
transitions than is often suggested. This view emphasises the specific context and balance of social forces rather 
than a historically inescapable and uneven process. In this regard, it overlaps with Chayanov’s elaboration. 
However, in contrast to Chayanov, Marx’s more nuanced perspective had no track record in Latin America, 
and for this reason, this section draws upon the discussion of the agrarian question between Chayanov and 
Lenin.      
74 This percentage excludes people with tertiary education and managers.  
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proves insufficient in capturing the specific socioeconomic dynamics in Latin America, 
particularly the campesino. 
On the other side, my approach does not pretend to idealise the campesino by just taking into 
account the ‘internal logic’. Although the examination of more specific campesino work is 
indispensable (A. Bartra, 2006, p. 241), campesino production does not directly contain 
within itself the clue for understanding the exploitation of campesinos and the appropriation 
of campesino’s work. Exploitation of campesinos in production is only recognisable if the 
specific process is located within the framework of global capital reproduction. As I have 
shown within the globalised integrated food system, corporations exert their influence not 
just at the point of production. In this regard, when not going directly into reproduction, 
production is realised through exchange and can be interpreted as a relation of production. 
And the price of the product sold by the campesino taken as a ‘concealed wage’ (Banaji, 
1977, p. 34). Thus, when sold on the capitalist market, exploitation of the campesino 
crystallises in the sphere of exchange. 
 
To summarise this section, I have aimed to further clarify my understanding of the Latin 
American campesino by contrasting my conceptual understanding with the two dominating 
arguments underlying the classical ‘agrarian question derived from the debates between 
Lenin and Chayanov. In this regard, this section supported my previous claim that a 
comprehension of the campesino should account for both macro and micro perspectives. It 
needs to account for both, the impact of global capital accumulation, which can be derived 
from a Leninist view, and be able to evaluate the particularities of the campesino economy 
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to explain valorised capital, as can be derived from the Chayanovian tradition. An exclusive 
reliance on one of the two approaches would obfuscate a more comprehensive view of the 
campesino in Latin America.  
 
Indigenous campesinos  
Another reason the campesino has persisted and remains an important provider of food is 
linked to the indigenous roots for a large proportion of campesinos in the continent. Countries 
that have significant Indigenous populations include Bolivia (62%), Mexico (15%), Peru 
(24%), Guatemala (41%) or Chile (11%) (CEPAL, 2014). The proportion increases further 
if only rural populations are considered.75 It has to be added, however, that indigenous 
identification in surveys is highly sensitive and depends on how the question has been 
posed.76 Moreover, due to several reasons, including a long racist history, many Indigenous 
people prefer to self-identify as mestizos or whites. This is further complicated in countries 
with large afro-descendant communities. An example is Ecuador where just 7% identified as 
indigenous.  
                                                 
75 In Bolivia, the campesino union Confederación Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) 
asked in 2010 that the national indigenous day (día del indio) should be changed to the day of the Indigenous 
campesino production day (día de la producción campesina originaria).  
76 For example, in Chile the people that identified themselves as ‘Indigenous people’ went down from 10.3% 
of the total over 14 year’s old population to 4.6% between the 1992 and the 2002 census. Between both 
censuses, the question changed from ‘If you are Chilean, do you consider yourself as belonging to one of the 
following cultures’, giving only the option to choose among the three largest Indigenous nations in 1992, to 
‘Do you belong to one of the following Indigenous peoples?’ giving 8 options (Gundermann K, Vergara del S, 
& Foerster G, 2005). Another illustration is Bolivia. In the country, the percentage from the 2001 census, 62%, 
went down to 41% for the 2012 census when the question changed from: ‘Do you belong to one of the following 
Indigenous peoples?’ (‘indígena originario’ in Spanish) to ‘As a Bolivian, do you belong to any nation or 
campesino Indigenous peoples or afro-Bolivian?’ (‘pueblo indígena originario campesino o afro-Boliviano’ in 
Spanish).   
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The latest study for the region claims that the Indigenous population even went up by 49.4% 
between 2000 and 2010 (CEPAL, 2014). Of course, this demographic jump cannot be 
explained through a possibly higher reproduction drive in the Malthusian sense. Rather there 
has been an effort to compensate for the historical lack of reliable data on indigenous lives. 
Surveys have since been better designed and more widely implemented. As a result, the 
Indigenous population did not only increase dramatically during 10 years, but autochthonous 
nations identified went up from 624 to 826. The change in more accurately accounting for 
Indigenous populations also has reflected their historical lack of political power and 
recognition of their socio, economic and cultural contribution, including rural work. As I will 
argue next, something similar has also occurred to the role of indigenous rural workers in the 
agrarian question.     
 
The orthodox Marxist interpretation tends to subsume adscription within its class schema, 
neglecting additional forms of oppression and domination. However, throughout the 
continent, socioeconomic and ethnic categories tend to intersect. When looking at national 
household surveys, Indigenous people are worse off than non-Indigenous population in terms 
of social and economic indicators such as poverty, education, housing and health. With this 
claim, I do not pretend to overlook the fact that there also exists socioeconomic 
differentiation between Indigenous people. Additionally, interpretations based on Chayanov 
have seen the agrarian unit largely as a family unit, ignoring the role of community as it 
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relates to indigenous traditions (see García Linera, 2015). In this sense, both interpretations 
are not able to capture important features for understanding the campesino in Latin America.      
    
The consideration of the Indigenous campesino helps to highlight several important aspects 
of agrarian dynamics in Latin America. There are at least four interrelated factors: Firstly, 
reproduction is not just reduced to the household unit, but linked to the community. Secondly, 
the attention of the ethnic factor helps to analytically distinguish land rights from ownership 
and to account for diverse traditions in customary tenure. This is linked to a different concept 
of the land, not just considered as a productive asset, but a territory that connects humans and 
nature in deeper ways (for a case study on Nicaragua see IRAM, 2000). Thirdly, many un-
capitalised natural areas are in indigenous territories. In this regard, the indigenous 
characteristic of campesinos reveals when capital penetrates new areas for accumulation. 
Conflicts arising out of these encounters have been common. Between 2010 and 2013, 200 
social and environmental conflicts in indigenous territories were recorded (CEPAL, 2014). 
These conflicts include the killing of land and environmental defenders, who are often also 
Indigenous campesinos (Global Witness, 2016).77 Fourthly, it permits an understanding of 
contemporary campesino struggles insofar as they are rooted in common colonial history of 
class exploitation and ethnic oppression (see Quijano, 2000).  
 
                                                 
77 Notorious was the recent killing of Berta Cáceres in March 2016 and Isidro Baldenegro López in January 
2017. Both won, respectively, the 2015 and 2005 Goldman Environmental Prize. Cáceres for a campaign against 
the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam and López for a campaign against illegal logging that has been displacing 
the Tarahumara communities.  
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Coming out of this debate on the identity of the campesino, Armando Bartra (2010) goes as 
far as to categorise Indigenous campesinos as campesindios. However, in a more nuanced 
view, Otero (2004) shows, in the case of Mexico, that although ethnicity might be an 
important element when analysing the content of class struggles, the concrete response of the 
campesino in terms of their struggles vary and is subject to contingency. Related to the 
previous debate is the discussion regarding the campesino as functional or resistant actor to 
capital. Both views underlie the agrarian question and will be reviewed next. 
  
Functionality or resistance 
As reiterated earlier, neither the Leninist nor the Chayanovist approach captures the 
campesino experience. Campesinos do not fit into either the Leninist derived narrative of the 
disappearance of the campesino into mostly wage labour nor the Chayanovist associated 
narrative, of the campesino as an inherent, distinct, and anti-capitalist form of production. As 
corporative agribusiness tends to control and appropriate the benefits in food provision, what 
role does the campesino continue to play? 
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, as secondary mode of production, the campesino economy is 
shaped by capital, but without necessarily adapting to capital imposed relationships. Again, 
the difference between capitalism as a broader social formation in which capital is dominant 
and hegemonic, and capital as a process of circulation and accumulation is useful. The 
campesino economy is part of the capitalist ‘system’, but this does not mean they are 
inherently functional to serve the expansion or logic of capital. As already asserted, 
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capitalism is not uniform in its mode of production and not all spheres of production and 
reproduction are commodified. A simple functionalist reading of campesino existence would 
argue for its persistence because capital does not have to bear the full cost of labour power. 
This logic illuminates why campesinos persist through food production for the domestic 
market. The campesino provision stabilise the domestic food supply while agribusiness tends 
to export a large share of their output. It also explains the role of campesinos as a reserve 
army of labour, as migrant workers in cities and as short-term labour in seasonal agricultural 
work. I agree up to an extent to the logic of the above argument. However, are campesinos 
always regarded as strictly functional to capital?  
 
History, with various notable examples in Latin America, has shown that the degree of 
functionality is subject to contingent class struggle. So yes, there have been periods where 
the campesino has been more clearly exploited, dominated and oppressed. However, from 
the Mexican revolution of 1910 to Chiapas in 1994 and contemporary campesino 
movements, the degrees of subordination have been subject to contingent moments of 
history. Thus, the question of campesino’s persistence rising out of capital’s or campesino’s 
weakness or strength cannot be understood using purely theoretical criteria. In line with my 
earlier explanation in Chapter 2 regarding the possible non-capitalist character of the 
campesino, the latter point does not mean that the campesino is inherently resistant to 
capitalism. The concrete campesino economy is rather located within ‘mixed modes of 
production’. That is, they are not located within a purely capitalist or non-capitalist mode of 
production. As Otero’s research on Mexico (2004) has demonstrated, the question cannot be 
resolved in purely abstract terms, but needs to be answered concretely. The author shows 
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how campesino struggles, in terms of their demands and organisation, differ across the 
country. Whereas some struggles are rather ‘reformists’ framed in terms of better working 
conditions and higher wages, others can be considered ‘postcapitalist’ in terms of the 
organisation of their production and the importance of ‘non-economic’ claims. The latter is 
illustrated by Otero through the case of the Zapatista area, notably populated by Indigenous 
campesinos. 
 
In summary, I acknowledge that there have been tendencies of campesino differentiation 
which has restricted the role of the campesino in Latin America. This has evolved from the 
one conferred by the classical debates of the agrarian question in Latin America which 
limited our understanding of how the food system operates. In order to further comprehend 
why the campesino is a relevant actor in the contemporary food system, I examine next how 
the campesino has been constituted by struggles over land and autonomy.  
 
 
Agrarian reforms and the (re-)constitution of the campesino 
The territory defines the campesino existence. As every Indigenous people understands and 
refers to their territory in different ways, its conceptualisation is not straightforward. The 
various definitions tend to understand the territory as a living entity that allows for life. This 
goes beyond the land and refers to a material and immaterial conception; to the space where 
the Indigenous people develop and reproduces its cultures, laws, economies and forms of 
organisations (Del Popolo, 2017, pp. 171–175). It connects the multifunctional character of 
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the campesino economy related to social and ecological linkages. The campesino is 
characterised by a bundle of activities in which the work of the land belonging to the territory 
is core. Even when not owning the land, such as landless rural workers, or through renting, 
land access has always shaped the campesino. Precisely how this access is defined has been 
mediated through disputes over land. In this regard, I next turn to examine struggles over 
land allocation in Latin America in the 1960s. This history is important because it explains 
much that belongs to the capitalist system today but is hidden by dominant and hegemonic 
processes of capital circulation and accumulation. It was a period that proved especially 
revealing in terms of social and political forces in land control. Three key interacting 
dynamics underpinned this period: 1) the campesino’s demand for land; 2) rising urban 
capital; and 3) the hemispheric influence of the US.  
 
 
During the 1960s, the region was characterised by increasing political participation and push 
for wide social, economic and political change. In particular, this translated into growth for 
social demands of large sectors until then marginalised. Agrarian reforms were part of 
national programs to address basic unresolved material problems. The land reforms of the 
1960s were greatly influenced by three other key precedents in Latin America. The first was 
the campesino struggle led by Emiliano Zapata during the Mexican Revolution and the 
policies of the government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40). This eventually resulted in the 
distribution of more than 20 million hectares as ejidos – a traditional collective use of 
communal land. The second was the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, when Aymara campesinos 
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acquired most the latifundios. The third was in Guatemala in 1952, when the agrarian reform 
was frustrated by a counterrevolution backed by the United Fruit Company, that traded 
mostly bananas, and the US government. 
 
The Cuban Revolution of 1959 added further impetus for the regional push for agrarian 
reform. The new government took control of 84% of land and redistributed the rest to 
campesinos. As a countervailing response to the spread of Cuban influence, the US sponsored 
the Alliance for Progress78 in 1961 and encouraged national governments in the region also 
to pursue agrarian reform. In particular, the Alliance for Progress suggested that national 
governments transform the unjust system of landholdings and exploitation of land for a more 
just system of property (Alianza Para el Progreso, 1961). In order to continue receiving 
economic aid from the United States and international financial organisations, even 
conservative government in the region, such as Jorge Alessandri in Chile, eventually 
supported agrarian reform (Chonchol, 1994, p. 266).  
 
The power shift from traditional landed elites to a new urban business elite also meant greater 
support for land re-allocation for the purpose of industry. The push for industrialisation, in 
turn, also meant greater demand for cheap food and raw material inputs. This contrasted with 
                                                 
78 The documents from the Alliance for Progress are rich in references against the Cuban revolution. Che 
Guevara attended the meeting where the US launched its hemispheric initiative representing Cuba and 
denounced the imperial character of the Alliance.       
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the traditional latifundio which was characterised by slow growth, and limited absorption of 
new technologies, fertilisers and machines.  
 
At the same time, campesinos increasingly linked the causes of life and employment 
conditions to the unequal distribution of land and income. High levels of exploitation, 
undernourishment, lack of health and formal education in rural areas gave impetus to 
campesino movements and increased pressure for agrarian reform. In 1960, 73% of 
campesinos in the region still lived on ‘subsistence’ levels. In contrast, large properties of 
over 500 hectares accounted for 3% of total landholdings, and occupied 67% of total land 
(CEPAL & FAO, 1978, p. 85).79 In this context, a non-explicit alliance emerged between the 
US, rising urban capital and campesinos with the common objective of removing 
disproportionate control of land from the old landed oligarchy. For the US, they saw the 
latifundistas as an obstacle to political stability; for the emerging urban business elite, they 
saw the latifundistas as an obstacle to securing land for industry driven capital accumulation; 
and for the campesinos, they saw the latifundistas as an obstacle to improved living 
conditions. In these circumstances, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil and the Central 
American countries promoted new agrarian reform laws. 
 
                                                 
79 Based on a survey of 10 countries in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru.  
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The end of the ‘honeymoon’ and beyond 
Conflicts of interest arising from land reallocation were reflected in difficult negotiations 
among political parties and power groups. The precise outcome of land reforms depended on 
the balance of political power and the outcome of social struggle. The ‘honeymoon’ period 
between striving urban capital and campesinos was short-lived and eventually ended up in 
divorce during the last third of the century (Bartra, 2011, pp. 16–17). The weakness of 
campesino organisations, and the exclusion of landless campesinos and waged workers made 
it even more difficult for a unified and strong position. As a consequence, land reforms were 
framed for the most part according to capitalist interests and did not include the participation 
of campesinos. Legal institutions related to the means of production, resource appropriation 
and control, as well as public and private land transfers were enforced according to the 
requirements for capital expansion.  
 
Moreover, many agrarian reforms were formally enacted in law but were not effectively 
implemented due to unclear wording and operational problems. As a result, Dunham (1982, 
p. 164) concludes that land allocation was actually slower than the growth of landless people. 
The two notable exceptions in Latin America during this period were Chile and Peru. The 
first ended with the military coup in September 11, 1973. The latter was intensively promoted 
by the nationalist military government of Velasco Alvarado, which destroyed the traditional 
rural power structures but lost its initial radical content (Chonchol, 2003, pp. 209–2010; 
Eguren, 2006).  
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In conclusion, despite campesino participation in the initial period to agitate for agrarian 
reform, the final land allocation mostly reflected the power shift to the urban capitalist class 
and their needs for industry. Underlying this process it is possible to recognise Bernstein’s 
(1996) ‘accumulation problematic’ with respect to the extent and possibilities to transfer the 
agriculture surplus to support industrialisation. The campesinos’ claim for land was 
subordinated to the needs of the urban capitalist class which required low-wage industrial 
labour and cheap inputs. As a consequence, the campesino’s struggle for more land tended 
to serve the reallocation of power towards urban business elites against landed oligarchy. The 
outcome was a shift in patterns of domination and subordination.  
 
In the mid 1970s, land reform was still an issue in some countries. Progress depended on 
concrete social and political conditions. However, the political constellation began to change. 
From the late 1960s onwards, a series of military coups, notably in the southern cone,80 cut 
short the possibility of democratic participation in many countries. This process was imposed 
through violent domination and political control. It wiped out all democratic barriers, such 
as unions and political parties. As a consequence, from the mid of the 1970s onwards, the 
continent witnessed a very conservative political and economic turn. The few exceptions 
were Cuba with its state led socialist process and Nicaragua.81  
                                                 
80 Latin America’s history has been characterised by many successive dictatorships. Brazil in 1967, Chile in 
1973, Uruguay in 1973 and Argentina in 1976 can be signaled to mark a rupture with previous dictatorships in 
terms of the alliance between a sector of the dominant national class and the transnational capital linked to the 
US.  
81 The Sandinista revolution which came to power in 1979 established, next to the private agrarian sector, a 
cooperative sector with heavy state influence. Future changing political conditions reversed much of the 
transformations in the agrarian sector.   
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In the country side, the limited land distribution that was achieved through agrarian reforms 
in the 1960s was reversed. The coups did not mean a return to landed oligarchies, but 
furthered the development of agrarian capitalism, promoted the accumulation of capital-
based on cheap wage labour and widened the door for the entrance of transnational 
companies. As a result, struggles over land access seldom resulted in improvements for 
agrarian workers, and today there exists an even higher land concentration than in the 1960s 
(FAO, 2012a). As traced in Chapter 2 and examined in more detail in Chapter 4, the new 
process of capital accumulation expanded agribusiness and replaced the old hacienda and 
small landholdings. This was all facilitated by wide and deep pro-capitalist market reforms. 
These transformations set out the fundamentals of the current agrarian structure characterised 
by an increasing control of national and transnational corporate capital. In this regard, Kay 
(2015) suggests that these changes have marked a shift in the key agrarian question. The 
fundamental question according the author has moved from being one of a highly unequal 
land tenure system in the 1960s and 1970s to one of a high concentration of corporate capital 
today.  
 
What did survive from the period of land reforms was notably the term campesino. Changes 
in constitutions and the enactment of agrarian laws institutionalised the campesino. For 
example, it impacted the peonage working under feudal conditions who acquired the 
condition of citizenship. Related to my argument on Indigenous campesinos, in countries 
with large rural Indigenous population like Bolivia, Peru and Mexico, Indigenous agrarian 
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workers were renamed as campesinos in the context of agrarian reforms. The notion of the 
indio which was considered to have a pejorative connotation was displaced to the margin of 
the capitalist system such as to Indigenous people living in tropical forests (see Albó, 2008, 
p. 32; A. Bartra, 2010, p. 12). Not only was the campesino institutionalised. For political 
reasons related to opposing class interests on the campesino, the notion of latifundista was 
also institutionalised and consolidated in the process of struggles over land allocation (for 
the case of Brazil see de Souza-Martins, 1985, pp. 9–11).  
 
After its consolidation as an institutionalised subject of agrarian policies during the 1960s, a 
good way to look at how capital advanced over the campesino economy is to examine how 
the campesino has vanished today from public policy in favour of the notion of ‘family 
agriculture’. I use the debate upon the emergence of family agriculture in the next section to 
explain the continuing role of the campesino in food provision.  
 
 
Family agriculture, or the subtle death of the campesino  
During the 1980s and 1990s with the implementation of ‘Washington Consensus’ type 
reforms, the campesino was relegated from the focus of public policies, and from political 
and academic debate. As a consequence, the social and productive contribution of the 
campesino was deprioritised in favour of ‘modern’ export-oriented agribusiness. The 
campesino vanished from public policy narratives and was replaced by a subject in social 
risk, a poverty target in social policy, which deserved the attention of welfare policies with 
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the aim of reducing poverty indicators (see for example World Bank, 1997). The campesino 
officially disappeared for good as a critical or potential player of the food system, and family 
agriculture slowly emerged.  
 
With the 2008 food crisis (which I will address in more detail in Chapter 6), international 
institutions rediscovered the importance of small landholders for food production (e.g., 
HLPE, 2013; IFAD & UNEP, 2013). In these documents the absence of the term peasant is 
notable, while the terms of ‘family farm’ and ‘smallholder’ are recurrently used without clear 
definitions and in an exchangeable way. However, an understanding of the term ‘family farm’ 
is a prerequisite for the adequate quantification of family agriculture, a major concern for 
international and state institutions. The FAO (2014h) estimates that 90% of the world’s farms 
are family run. These family farms occupy about 70-80% of farm land and make up more 
than 80% of the world’s food supply. In a revision of these results, Graeub et al. (2016) called 
these estimates ‘guestimates’  on account for their strong underlying assumptions and limited 
data bases. In their revision, including a wider sample size and newer data, the authors 
conclude that family agriculture comprises ‘98% of all agricultural landholdings, manage 
53% of total agricultural land, and provide at least 53% of global agricultural production’ 
(2016, p. 2). Two major differences with the FAO’s estimates are immediately apparent: a 
significantly lower concentration of agricultural land and a smaller contribution to the 
world’s food supply. The latter is derived by assuming equal productivity per hectare, in 
contrast to the FAO’s assumption of greater productivity of smaller-scale farms. The 
estimates of Graeub et al. (2016) are highly sensitive to the classification of family 
agriculture, as this in turn determines landholdings and food production.  
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The authors acknowledge that the term ‘family agriculture’ is rarely defined in agricultural 
censuses. According to the authors, just Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and the 
United States of America have a formal definition of family agriculture. As a consequence, 
Graeub et al. (2016) base their estimates of the number of family farms in the world on the 
sum of countries and territories using: multi-criterion definition of family farmers (6); sole 
holder criteria (33); national smallholder criteria (10), and the 10 hectare criteria (56). 
Although a clear improvement on previous attempts, their estimates still rely mostly on land 
size. Despite this, the authors join the HLPE (2013) and the FAO (2014h) in warning against 
the definition of family agriculture solely by the size of landholdings. In their estimates just 
6% of the world’s family farms are based on a clear definition of ‘family agriculture’.  In this 
way, the number of family farms in the world is largely devoid of relational meaning. This 
point is discussed in more detail in the next section, where I estimate the number of 
campesinos in Latin America and address the extent to which my definition of campesino 
overlaps with the definitions of family agriculture in the region. 
 
In addition to the quantification of family farms, most debates regarding small farms can be 
classified into three categories that further illustrate the process by which the term of ‘family 
agriculture’ lacks relational meaning. The first considers the farm’s scale and efficiency, the 
second the importance of small farms for poverty reduction strategies, and the third the 
changing agrarian structure and the future of small farms (Wiggins, Kirsten, & Llambí, 
2010). Unintended or not, these debates avoid the ‘agrarian question’ discussions, such as 
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the role of capital and labour in agriculture. As such, ‘family agriculture’ is defined hereafter 
in terms of entrepreneurial potential rather than how they are constituted historically and 
specifically in Latin American conditions. Family agriculture was in this way grounded 
within the paradigm of agrarian capitalism. It was expected to integrate the opportunities 
provided by the capitalist market to consolidate its economic footing (Abramovay, 2007; 
Mançano Fernandes, 2014).   
 
In Latin America, the notion of ‘family agriculture’ has been particularly promoted by 
international institutions, such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation’s Regional Office for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO). In recognition of the important role of ‘family 
agriculture’, the FAO declared 2014 as the year of ‘family farming’.82 However, its lack of 
theoretical foundation has brought about inconsistent terminology with the same 
international institutions interchangeably using ‘family agriculture’ and ‘campesino family 
agriculture’. As a consequence, the emergence of ‘family agriculture’ has been the latest 
attempt to reconcile the absence of agrarian relations of production, while accounting for 
family based land work. It has effectively emptied family based food production of its 
relational meaning, while simultaneously gaining space in public policy.  
 
                                                 
82 In Spanish the year was called Año Internacional de la Agricultura Familiar: the ‘International Year of 
Family Agriculture’.  
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In contrast to Lenin’s explicit ‘kick out of history’ interpretation of the campesino, the 
existence of the campesino has simply been concealed in ahistorical Neoclassical economic 
terms (e.g., Berdegué & Fuentealba, 2011). As Mançano Fernandes (2014, p. 29) concludes, 
instead of its physical disappearance because of proletarianisation, the campesino was killed 
ideologically by its substitution with ‘family agriculture’.   
 
 
The campesino underlying family agriculture 
Given the interchangeable use of campesino and family agriculture: To what extent are 
family farms equal to the campesino economy in Latin America? At first sight when looking 
at regional surveys, although there seems to be a wide use of the term ‘family agriculture,’ 
the term ‘campesino’ is also inconsistently used in national definitions. Some official 
national designations are: Family Agriculture and Rural Family Entrepreneur (Brazil); 
Campesino Family Agriculture (Chile); Small Agrarian Producer (Argentina); Campesino 
Family Agriculture (Paraguay); Family Agrarian Producer (Uruguay); Family Agrarian Unit 
(Colombia); Family Agriculture (Costa Rica); Family Agriculture (Mercosur).  
 
When looking at the different underlying national designations, a first impression is that 
national household surveys and agrarian censuses are not designed to precisely define family 
agriculture, and much less to clarify the role of campesinos and capital in agriculture. The 
analytical content has few commonalities and many differences. Yet, by forcing a minimum 
common denominator, it is possible to assert that family agriculture is based on varying 
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notions of: 1) predominant family labour; 2) limited size of landholdings; and 3) agriculture 
production as source of main income. Heterogeneity among countries in defining family 
agriculture is reflected in the inclusion of variables such as: who controls or manages the 
production unit; size of capital involved; owner’s requirement of direct work; type of land 
tenure; exclusion of anonymous societies; residence in relation to the production location; 
type of production; and whether production is for own consumption or sold on the market. 
Interestingly, many of these questions would constitute critical information in looking at the 
current differentiation within family agriculture. However, they have not been used 
systematically throughout countries. These methodological differences in national surveys 
render the comparison of cross-national data particularly difficult. 
 
Taking into consideration the many different and ambiguous meanings of family agriculture 
and problems associated with drawing immediate conclusions, the FAO (2014a, p. 37) 
reports that 78.6% of landholdings are family agriculture units in Central America and 
Mexico. For the Andean countries of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, family agriculture 
comprises 79.8% of landholdings. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, family 
agriculture makes up 83.9% of landholdings. The average size of these exploitations varies 
considerably between countries. In Argentina, the average size of landholdings in family 
agriculture is 107 ha. Following far behind, the second country in terms of average 
landholding size is Chile with 46 ha. For countries in Central America, average landholding 
size for family agriculture is lower than 2 ha. In demographic terms, family agriculture is 
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characterised by an older population, with low but increasing female-headed landholdings83, 
and is located at the ‘subsistence level’. In the presence of large Indigenous populations, 
‘subsistence family agriculture’ intersects strongly with ethnicity (FAO, 2014a, pp. 39–40). 
 
In order to uncover the campesino within family agriculture, it is necessary to further break 
down these categories. In a study based on seven countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil), FAO & BID (2007) classified family agriculture in three 
categories: 1) Subsistence Family Agriculture; 2) Transition Family Agriculture; and 3) 
Consolidated Family Agriculture. In all the countries researched, close to 60% of total family 
agriculture was located at the subsistence level, which is defined here as production for own 
consumption. They were found to have insufficient productive and income resources to 
guarantee the reproduction of the family. Subsistence Family Agriculture ranges from about 
55% in Chile to about 85% in El Salvador. The latter is consistent with related regional rural 
poverty levels. The segment of Transition Family Agriculture is characterised by production 
for own consumption, for the market, and able to satisfy the reproduction of the family, but 
without generating enough surplus to develop the productive unit. Considering all the 
countries studied, on average it accounts for 28% of family agriculture. This segment is 
largest in Chile with over 30%. Some 12% of family agriculture is considered consolidated 
                                                 
83 A detailed analysis of the role of women in the campesino economy in Latin America goes beyond this 
dissertation. However, a review of a study undertaken by FAO (Nobre, Hora, Brito, & Parada, 2017) reveals at 
least three recent trends: 1) Women have an increasing role in economically sustaining their communities; 2) 
Due to men's rural-urban migration there is increasing female-headed rural households; and 3) Despite the 
unequal access to land when compared to men, women's labour in subsistence farming provides rural women 
with greater economic autonomy than women in urban areas.       
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and is similar to small entrepreneurial agribusiness. It features larger landholdings, access to 
technology, capital for investment and inputs and possibility of capital accumulation. 
 
Considering the previous classification and my definition of the campesino it is possible to 
assert that the campesino make up between 60% (when just counting Subsistence Family 
Agriculture) and 88% of family agriculture (when adding Subsistence and Transition Family 
Agriculture). Since family agriculture makes up about 80% of total landholdings in Latin 
America, is linked to 17 million production units, and 60 million people (CEPAL, FAO, & 
IICA, 2013, p. 175) it is possible to assert that a critical share of total production units still 
resemble the campesino economy.      
 
Since this data refers to cross sectional information, it does not explain dynamics over time 
and merely points to a structural location. This has to be considered when examining the 
previous classification. Moreover, for the case of Subsistence Family Agriculture, which is 
defined as insufficient for the reproduction of the family unit. In line with my conception of 
the campesino, this is consistent with livelihood strategies that complement income through 
various sources such as temporary wage labour and/or sporadic non-agricultural employment 
opportunities. In this regard, the large proportion of family agriculture classified as 
‘subsistence’ can explain the increasing importance of non-agrarian income in family 
agriculture. Yet, despite the importance of non-agrarian income, FAO (2014a) reports that 
for data available for five Central American countries, this type of income in family 
agriculture is still situated mostly under 20%. Of course, the consideration of dynamics 
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throughout time, as indicated in the historical chapter, would also have to link livelihood 
strategies to migration and the very unlikely transformation into consolidated agribusiness.  
 
With the assertion of the existence of a large proportion of campesinos within family 
agriculture, I do not neglect the important transformation in the food system which occurred 
in the last decades. These transformations include: ‘a reduction in agricultural employment, 
an increase in the employment of women (especially in non-agricultural activities), an 
increase in wage employment versus a drop in self-employment, and the increase in 
agricultural workers with urban residence’ (ECLAC, FAO, IICA, 2012, p. 15). However, as 
I have aimed to show in this section, by contrasting my concept of the campesino with data 
from different countries in Latin America; while being cautious about the limits of the data, 
these tend to support my claim that the campesino is still an important actor within the food 
system. That claim is further supported by the critical contribution of family agriculture in 
the provision of national food (see Table 10.1 in the Appendix). In this regard, as the lion's 
share of corporate agribusiness sell their products abroad, aspects of national food provision 
and wage setting remain strongly linked to campesino’s production. Beyond the claim that 
campesino farming has multiple functions with social and ecological linkages such as a 
respect for nature, looking after biodiversity, keeping cultural traditions, and encouraging 
territorial development – this chapter has aimed to highlight its continuous critical economic 
role in food production. 
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Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrated the persistence of the campesino as a critical actor within the 
food system in Latin America. I did so by contrasting my understanding of the campesino at 
three different levels. Firstly, through a discussion embedded in classical Marxist debates 
over the destiny of the peasantry in capitalism. I showed through three arguments how 
orthodox readings of the classical agrarian debate between Lenin and Chayanov-inspired 
political economists neglected fundamental features in comprehending the role of the 
campesino in Latin America. Secondly, I showed how the campesino has been constituted 
historically in struggles over land. Finally, I contrasted my concept of the campesino with 
contemporary empirical data based on national surveys and discussed the overlapping notion 
with family agriculture 
 
There is no doubt that dynamics of capital accumulation – particularly related to the persistent 
dispossession of campesinos through land privatisation, abolition of communal property and 
suppression of rights over common goods – have been important throughout the continent. It 
has been presented that the expansion of capital has dissolved global peasantry. This has led 
to the questions concerning whether the campesino is still a key food provider and its 
relevance as a social category of analysis (e.g., Bernstein, 2001, 2010). However, contrary to 
these claims, I have demonstrated that the campesino continues to survive today through 
tracing some of the Marxist debates, looking at the historical struggles of the campesino and 
contemporary data. Moreover, the campesino does not just survive, as they continue to be a 
relevant actor within the food system, which is not completed only by agribusiness. The 
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persistence of the campesino is not explained though, as van der Ploeg (2010) does, by an 
inherent predisposed actor of resistance. Rather, the campesino is an agent subject to 
contingency.     
   
As I have already argued in Chapter 2 and demonstrated throughout this chapter, agribusiness 
does not exhaust the provision of food. As agribusiness is mostly focused on the export of 
food, it requires the campesino to stabilise the provision of domestic food. In this regard, 
capital in agriculture has, to some extent, operated on the basis of the campesino. The 
campesino compensates for the export of food at the domestic level through its contribution 
to internal supply. Yet, endless capital accumulation which constantly attack campesinos’ 
livelihoods threatens to destabilise the very conditions of expanded reproduction for the 
capital-driven trade-oriented food system. In the next chapter, I will examine what happens 
when this fragile equilibrium is disrupted.   
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6. Capitalist food provision and the destruction of 
human nature  
 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, I traced the rise of the capital-dominated food system, and the 
conflicting role of agribusiness and campesinos in food provision. I portrayed a system that 
is driven by two fundamental forms of production and exchange, which coexist under the 
expanding dominance of corporate agribusiness. The capital dominated system of food 
provision thus displays a dual character of adjusting and diverging dynamics. As I 
demonstrated earlier, campesinos are critical for the continuation of the system as they still 
provide a large share of food to meet national requirements. Campesinos function in this way 
as a sort of stabiliser for overall domestic food provision. Nevertheless, as capital expands it 
undermines the transfer of the complementary campesino surplus. This contradiction is 
exemplified by the persistence of food insecurity predominant in rural areas in developing 
countries ‘where family farming and smallholder agriculture is prevailing’ (FAO et al., 2015, 
p. 26). 
 
This chapter builds upon the previous account in the thesis by examining the consequences 
of a capital dominated food system on food consumption. Hunger ‘caused by insufficient 
food energy consumption’ (FAO, 2008a, p. 3) might be the foremost expression of the limits 
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to food consumption, importantly representing the concrete destruction of human life.84 
Inadequate food access for sufficient dietary energy has lasting impacts on the physical and 
cognitive development of humans. As discussed later in this chapter, debatable conservative 
FAO estimates report that one in eight people in the world suffer daily from this condition. 
The irreversible impacts are also transmitted biologically from mothers to children 
sentencing millions of people to a physically and intellectually constrained future. Half a 
million mothers die every year while giving birth, mostly due to insufficient nutrition during 
pregnancy. Once born, malnutrition kills over three million children a year causing about 
50% of child mortality for children under five years old. Adequate food is also the first 
mechanism of defence against diseases as it strengthens the immune system (da Silva, 2014; 
Ziegler, 2013, p. 6).   
 
In terms of social and economic organisation, the persistence of hunger also illustrates one 
of the clearest failures of humanity to assure the minimum material basis for social life. This 
is accentuated by the fact that food scarcity at an overall level is no longer a problem 
(Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012; FAO et al., 2015). Moreover, every year, around one third 
of all food produced for human consumption is lost. This includes 30% of cereals, 20% of 
dairy products, 35% of fish and seafood, 45% fruits and vegetables, 20% of meat, 20% of 
                                                 
84 Although in this chapter I concentrate on the negative impacts of hunger, obesity is also becoming an 
increasing public health problem in Latin America. Obesity is ranging from 16.3% in Paraguay to 28.1% in 
Mexico. For women, the percentage rate tends to be substantially higher. A report from the World Health 
Organization and the Pan American Health Organization blame mostly the 28% increase in the intake of highly 
processed food and beverages between 2000 and 2013 in Latin America (PAHO & WHO, 2015). Raj Patel 
(2012) in Stuff and Starved: the Hidden Battle for the World’s Food System examines in more detail how hunger 
and obesity are two distinct but connected realities of a corporate controlled food system. 
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oilseeds and pulses and 45% of roots and tubers. Importantly, while in medium and high 
income countries food is significantly wasted at the consumer level, in low-income countries 
food is mainly lost in earlier stages of the supply chain (FAO, 2011). Despite sufficient 
overall food supply, according to the FAO (2009a), ensuring global food security is 
anticipated to become more complicated due to the expected increase in food demand of 70% 
by 2050.85  
 
So why does hunger persist despite accumulated wealth and scientific and technological 
knowledge? In this chapter, I examine to what extent the contradiction of sufficient overall 
food supply and hunger coexist in the Latin American region. It builds upon the previous 
chapters where I demonstrated how agribusiness corporations pushed for a ‘free trade’ 
oriented food system. This liberalised trade framework facilitated the accumulation of capital 
through the organisation of global value chains, but did not dissolve the campesino economy 
as a critical food provider.   
 
The chapter comprises of three sections. The first section is organised into three arguments. 
Firstly, the concept of hunger is discussed, contrasting pro-capital-driven arguments, with 
critical readings which link hunger to political and economic outcomes. Secondly, the 
analytical scope of the widely-used term of food security is contrasted with the notion of food 
                                                 
85 Projections of food demand are very sensitive to underlying interconnected assumptions of population and 
economic growth, inequality, composition food demand, climate change and bioenergy expansion. See Valin 
et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion of economic modeling for food demand projections.   
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sovereignty. Finally, the third argument focuses on issues that have come out of the 
operationalisation of food security, which are linked to the support of capital-driven policies 
and institutions. In the second section of the chapter, I address the 2007/8 food crisis as a 
structural outcome of the capitalist dominated food system. I trace the crisis back to the 
destruction of the domestic production capacities grounded in the campesino economy in 
favour of a globally integrated food provision that creates trade dependence for national food 
supply. In the third section of the chapter, I analyse how the state juggles the balancing act 
of the conditions for the advance of capital in the food sector while simultaneously trying to 
contain its negative impacts.  
  
I conclude that a capital dominated food system is inherently prone to hunger. The 
disconnection of a globally organised provision of food driven by capital and the local 
experience of hunger is manifested foremost in the role of the campesino economy in the 
food system. While the advance of capital destroys the campesino economy, it 
simultaneously needs to ensure the transfer of the campesino surplus for stabilising domestic 
food consumption. The prevalence of hunger in rural areas, notably striking among 
Indigenous people and women, reflects the contradictory location of the campesino in the 
food system.    
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The political economy of hunger   
Inevitable scarcity or structural deprivation? 
There are at least two views for explaining hunger. On the one hand, an interpretation 
functional for corporate agribusiness driven food provision which corresponds to ‘free trade’ 
arguments. In this view, hunger is based on the assumption of the inevitability of scarcity, 
and argued through supply or demand factors. On the other hand, hunger is viewed as a 
structural deprivation – an inherent outcome of a capital dominated food system. Following 
Matthaei (1984), underlying the first interpretation, it is possible to identify two arguments. 
The first describes hunger from a Malthusian logic of excessive demand caused by population 
growth outstripping food supply in the context of limited resources (see Mayhew, 2014). In 
this reading, excessive demand explains food scarcity. The second argument can be derived 
from Neoclassical economics and defines the fundamental economic problem as how to 
allocate inherent scarce resources to meet unlimited wants. This view tends to argue for a 
decline of food supply as the underlying cause for food scarcity. It often focuses on 
‘exogenous’ events for the cause of supply disruptions such as adverse climatic events (e.g., 
floods or droughts) that can destroy crops.  
 
Importantly, both arguments appear functional to the interests of corporate agribusiness as 
hunger is abstracted from history and social relations. Thus, the ‘inevitability of scarcity’ 
interpretation conceives hunger as detached from its social and economic setting. In this 
view, food access and availability always meet. As a result, hunger is problematised as a ratio 
of population growth to food production, solved by a more efficient allocation of ‘scarce 
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resources’, increased productivity or reduction in population growth. It corresponds with a 
defence of ‘free trade’ that conveys a view of hunger as a ‘technical problem’ of food 
shortage. ‘Efficient’ allocation through the price mechanism and principle of ‘comparative 
advantage’ based on the continuous expansion of international markets will solve the 
problem of hunger. Thus, hunger can be averted simply by increasing capital-driven large-
scale industrial production, and liberalisation of international exchange to remove any 
barriers prohibiting efficient resource allocation. In this view, the expected positive outcomes 
of trade and investment liberalisation include: increases in rural economic growth and 
poverty reduction; affordable food prices; improved access to imported agricultural 
technology; and cash to buy inputs. In this line, the recommendation is to avoid policies 
which target self-sufficiency and increases in food production as these distort the free 
movement of capital (e.g., Gillson & Fouad, 2014; Nash, 2005).  
 
Similar to the ‘free trade’ arguments examined in Chapter 4, the assumption of scarcity within 
the liberalisation argument is better seen as the ideological support for further capital 
accumulation in the food system. This is exposed by the fact that there is no actual overall 
shortage of food in the world today. In recent years, world food supply has outstripped the 
necessary calorie intake per capita and enough food is produced to provide 2870 calories a 
day for every person in the world in 2011. This marks an increase of about 18% for personal 
intake, despite an increase in the world’s population by almost 4 billion since the 1960s 
(FAO, 2015a). Thus, overall food availability is not the problem for the persistence of hunger. 
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It could be argued that increased liberalisation precisely causes overall enough food supply. 
Yet, as I argued in the previous chapter, the campesino economy which accounts for a large 
share of food provision is adversely impacted by this liberalisation policies. Even the FAO 
(2003a) is cautious about the success of liberalisation in food trade and investment. In their 
review of the impacts of the WTO AoA on 23 countries, the international institution 
concluded that sustainable food security might depend on whether the provision of food is 
sourced from domestic production or imports. In cases where food provision is heavily 
dependent on cheaper imports as a result of increased liberalisation, it should be seen to what 
extent domestic food production was displaced in the process. In this regard, as illustrated in 
Chapter 4 with the case of Mexico under NAFTA, ‘free trade’ has been destructive for the 
campesinos and extended forms of traditional food supply, promoting instead food for 
exports.  
 
Another way to look at hunger is to consider how the capital dominated food system 
structurally constrains access to food. In this reading, the focus of analysis shifts from a 
discourse of scarcity which is addressed through increased productivity and liberalisation, to 
that of capital imposed food deprivation related to the concentration of economic wealth and 
political power. Through this interpretation, and corresponding to our account in Chapter 3, 
it is possible to connect effective food access to the historical rise of capitalism, class struggle 
and outcomes of economic inequality and political disempowerment. Lack of ‘entitlement’, 
unequal distribution of land and the destruction of traditional social forms become all 
explanatory variables for the persistence of hunger. This permits an understanding of the 
specific property regimes and government policies that favour export crops over domestic 
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supply and urban demands over rural requirements in a different light. Yet, famines have 
existed not only before the rise of capitalism, but also in ‘non-capitalist societies’ (China, 
Soviet Union, and North Korea). The fact that hunger predates and occurs outside capital’s 
domain is important because it forces us to ponder what is distinct about the capitalist shaped 
system of food provision.  
 
While historically the main source of food insecurity was nature, the cause shifted with the 
rise of capitalism. In this regard, Polanyi’s insight that the ‘market economy’, or capitalism 
in Marx’s term, signalled a rupture with prevailing ordering principles is important. For the 
‘rise of the market to a ruling force in the economy’, as Polanyi stressed (1977, p. 43), ‘can 
be traced by noting the extent to which land and food were mobilised through exchange and 
labour was turned into a commodity to be purchased in the market’. The expansion of the 
‘self-regulated market’ required the commodification of labour, land and money. They had 
to be transformed into commodities to keep the buying and selling process of a market 
economy. From this view, the reason for famines in India under British rule can be traced 
through the rise of the rule of the market over nature, food and labour (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 75, 
167–168).  
 
Another argument against the ‘inevitability of scarcity’ vision underlying the promotion of 
trade and investment liberalisation for the expansion of capital comes from Sen (1981). The 
author demonstrated that the famines in Bengal in 1943, Ethiopia in 1973 and 1974, the 
Bangladesh famine of 1974, and famines in the Sahel region in the 1970s were not caused by 
199 
 
decline in food supply rooted in natural disaster. Sen showed that famines were occurring as 
food continued to be exported. Sen argued the reason for this was an ‘entitlement failure’, or 
lack of purchasing power in a capital-driven market economy. Thus, the decline of food 
supply due to natural disasters, as George (1986, p. 46) concludes, ‘can help to create the 
conditions under which famine thrives – but they do not create the human action and inaction 
that insures that the wealthy alone will eat’. In addition to the rise of capitalist markets 
(Polanyi) and the lack of ‘entitlements’ (Sen), hunger and famines can also be explained as 
an outcome of class struggle. In David’s (2001, p. 21) words when analysing the Victorian-
period famines, ‘class and class struggle shape the genesis and the outcomes of the property-
hunger equation’. The previous arguments all help to explain how the capital dominated food 
system structurally constrains access to food due to the concentration of economic wealth 
and political power. From this perspective an illustrative historical account for Latin America 
is undertaken by de Castro (1984), who traced the main reason for hunger in Brazil due to 
economic and political concentration back to colonial times and lasting feudal agrarian 
structures of unequal land distribution and monoculture.  
 
In short, corporate capital-driven food provision uses ideological arguments based on the 
inevitability of scarcity to explain and solve the existence of hunger. In this way, agribusiness 
continues to promote the expansion of trade and investment liberalisation for improved 
expansion of capital. Interpretations focusing on structural arguments, such as the rise of the 
capitalist market, economic inequality and outcomes of political struggles are, however better 
placed to explain the persistence of hunger in midst of abundance of food. In this view, the 
focus of analysis shifts from a discourse of scarcity addressed through increased productivity 
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and liberalisation to that of capital imposed food deprivation related to the concentration of 
economic wealth and political power.  
 
In the previous section I have tended to use the term hunger as an umbrella term for different 
expressions such as undernourishment, stunting or malnutrition. However, today hunger is 
mostly debated through the notion of food security in international institutions and national 
agencies. Due to its importance in public and political debate in the next section, I briefly 
explore the concept of food security by contrasting it with the challenge coming from food 
sovereignty.   
 
 
Food security and the emergence of food sovereignty  
In this section, I argue that while the FAO’s understanding of food security avoids questions 
regarding the fundamentals of the capital dominated food provision in which ‘hunger’ tends 
to be endogenous, food sovereignty offers a challenge to capital circulation and accumulation 
in agrarian structures. In what follows, I firstly present the FAO’s vision of food security, 
and then contrast it with the notion of food sovereignty. The discussion on food sovereignty 
is limited to the aim of revealing the shortcomings of food security (for a recent 
comprehensive review see Edelman et al. (2015)).  
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There exist various conceptualisations and estimations of hunger, food insecurity and notions 
of malnutrition and undernourishment. Depending on the definition, these concepts often 
overlap to a certain degree or are directly characterised as a subset of one another (e.g, 
Habicht, Pelto, Frongillo, & Rose, 2004; WFP, 2009). Food security, however, tends to be 
the most frequently used term with about 200 definitions (M. Smith, Pointing, & Maxwell, 
1993). The most common acceptance follows the FAO’s characterisation ratified at the 1996 
World Food Summit in Rome (FAO, 1996): 
 
Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels [is 
achieved] when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life.  
 
The limits in the analytical scope of food security are best understood when contrasted with 
food sovereignty, because the latter considers political as well as economic differences. Food 
sovereignty was introduced at the international level by La Via Campesina (LVC) at the same 
World Food Summit in 1996 in which food security was promoted. LVC is a transnational 
‘peasant’ centred movement that comprises of about 164 local and national organisations 
from all over the world. As of 2013, it comprised campesino organisations from 20 Latin 
American countries. It was founded in 1993 in Belgium to resist the push for a globally 
integrated food system as advocated through the WTO. LVC is opposed to the increasing 
dispossession of land, knowledge and diversity of live forms (McMichael, 2009, p. 4). Its 
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main goal is to push for an alternative food system based on the notion of food sovereignty 
(Holt-Giménez et al., 2010, p. 204). Although the definition of food sovereignty has changed 
over the years (see Windfuhr & Jonsén, 2005), following the Declaration of the Forum for 
Food Sovereignty in Nyéléni (2007), food sovereignty is defined as:         
 
the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and 
consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets 
and corporations. 
 
As asserted, food sovereignty is a concept in progress and presents its own problematics ‘as 
a mobilising frame, policy objective and plan of action’ (Edelman et al., 2014, p. 912). It has 
evolved with political movements, alliance building, member diversity and concrete power 
relations in food negotiations. As noted by Wittman et al., (2010, p. 10), it thus has changed 
with the ‘praxis/theory interplay’. This is why the concept of food sovereignty often presents 
inconsistencies (Patel, 2009, pp. 666–667) and vague assertions. For instance, the concept is 
ambiguous in relation to the level of sovereignty (Edelman, 2013a), the role of trade in food 
(Burnett & Murphy, 2013), and the coherence of its transformative project related to the 
differences within ‘global peasantries’ (Bernstein, 2013). Further questions relate to the role 
of food sovereignty and its implications in: food-deficit countries; urban and industrial 
agriculture; land property relations; and for a post-capitalist society (Edelman et al., 2014).  
203 
 
 
In contrast to the ‘peasant’ movement’s notion of food sovereignty which has developed 
through practice, food security is considerably different in its conception. This is the case as 
it emerged from behind the walls of the FAO’s lofty white building close to the Circo 
Massimo and Colosseum in Rome. Following the FAO’s definition and presentation in its 
various reports, food security aims for a ‘neutral’, ‘purer’, ‘technically’ informed indicator, 
which is isolated of political influences. When just focusing on its definition, it is safe to 
claim that food security entails a priority of food availability over food self-sufficiency 
(Patnaik, 1996, p. 2446) and contains a notion of access which has critical pre-eminence over 
production. Food sovereignty, however, goes much further and poses social control over the 
food system as priority and could be considered as a prerequisite for food security (Patel, 
2009, pp. 664–665). When considered at its best, food sovereignty based on ‘peasant 
agriculture’ and agrarian reforms is able address the multiple and interconnected socio-
ecological crises of food, climate, energy and the economy (Desmarais, Wiebe, & Wittman, 
2010; Rosset, 2011).   
 
In sum and to reiterate, the FAO’s understanding circumvents issues regarding the 
fundamentals of the capital dominated food system. Instead, it tends to focus on the four 
pillars of food security, namely food availability, access, utilisation and stability, without 
engaging with the underlying structural causes driven by capital. This is illustrated in its 2015 
report, where the FAO (2015, pp. 33–35) points to ‘the complexity of the relationship 
between trade and food security by listing the possible effects of trade, both positive and 
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negative’. In this regard, food sovereignty offers a challenge to capital circulation and 
accumulation in agrarian structure by placing the social control of the campesino and the 
local community at the centre of the food system.  
 
Since it has major implications for our understanding of hunger, in the next section the 
critique of food security is extended to the efforts of quantification, as these numbers are then 
used to assess the working of the food system, specific policies and institutions.  
 
 
Measuring hunger 
In the previous sections, it has been concluded that hunger is better explained by placing it 
within its historical context which is connected to economic inequality and political 
disempowerment rising out of capitalism and class struggle. In addition, I have exposed the 
limits of the dominant use of food security. However, another fundamental problem is how 
to quantify the number of people suffering from lack of food intake. This is important because 
it is not just about revealing the size, but it also entails a vision of possible ways to organise 
the provision of food, and the role of campesinos and capital. This is exemplified by a recent 
revision, in 2012, of the FAO’s methodology to estimate hunger. 
 
For its quasi-monopoly in the production of cross-country food security statistics, the FAO’s 
authoritative position in accounting for the number of hungry people in the world is not easily 
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disputed.86 As a result, when counting the number of food deprived people, the FAO’s 
estimate of the Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) might be the most widely used 
figure.87  
 
After FAO’s 2012 revision of previous estimates, the new methodology does not allow for a 
direct comparison with figures presented in preceding editions. Instead of procurement or 
food consumption, FAO’s figures are based on food availability drawn from national food 
balance sheets. The revised methodology now includes calorie losses during distribution and 
revised threshold levels for defining caloric undernourishment. It maintains, however, energy 
requirements corresponding to a sedentary lifestyle which is less likely for poor people and 
does not consider the dietary quality. Numbers should be regarded therefore as conservative 
estimates (FAO, 2012d).  
 
What were the immediate implications stemming from the overhaul of the FAO’s 
methodology? As a result of its new assessment, the organisation’s estimate for the 
undernourished reversed its previous trends. The rising tendency observable between 1995 
and 2009 was transformed into a steady fall until 2007-2009. As a proportion of the total 
population, the percentage went down from 18.6% in 1990-2001 to 12.5% in 2010-2012 
(FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2012, p. 46). Particularly perplexing is that following the new 
                                                 
86 The US Department of Agriculture might be the other big player in the production of international agriculture 
and food statistics.  
87 FAO recognises that food insecurity is not effectively accounted for by one sole indicator. Various food 
security indicators may be revised at: <www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess–fs/ess–fadata/en/#.VBGLpvldV–e>. 
They are classified under the categories of availability, access, stability and utilisation. 
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methodology, even the 2007/2008 food crisis linked to price spikes did not increase hunger 
numbers. This contradicts even the FAO’s own estimates based on their previous 
methodology. While at first estimating an additional 115 million people pushed into chronic 
hunger because of the food crisis (FAO, 2009b, p. 6), the FAO now reversed their conclusion 
for the period to a decrease by 73 million, to 852 million for the 2007-09 period (FAO, 2012d, 
p. 3). The FAO (2012d, p. 2) defends itself by arguing that their hunger estimates ‘do not 
capture the impact of short-term price spikes’ and that the complementary economic models 
which were used confirm that ‘[n]either world price spikes nor economic shocks in developed 
countries were transmitted to developing countries’. 
  
The apparent success of decreasing hunger numbers allows critiques that question the 
fundamentals of the global food system to be more easily dismissed. If hunger did not 
increase even during the food crisis contradicting FAO’s previous account, then actual 
policies seem to work. For example, in Latin America the food insecure people went down 
from 54 million to 50 million between the periods of 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 (FAO, 
2012b). This does not only shed doubt on Latin America’s progress in fighting hunger in the 
last decade (FAO et al., 2015). Moreover this justifies neglecting policies related to a greater 
social control and those which are more ecologically friendly (Moore Lappé et al., 2013, pp. 
251–254). According to the new data, it is possible to conclude that the impact of integration 
of food into the global trading system88, the increase of financial instruments in food 
                                                 
88 Within the WTO AoA, food security is addressed in the area of non-trade concerns.  
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commodity markets or the disregard of policies for rural development were positive for the 
reduction of hunger. But then what was the 2007/8 food crisis all about? 
 
To sum up, this section demonstrated the underlying ideological defence of hunger for the 
continuous expansion of capital in the provision of food. In this view, the existence of hunger 
is compatible with a corporate capital-driven food system that promotes further liberalisation 
of trade and investment. The section also discussed the limits of food security, which is 
considered the most widely used indicator for addressing hunger in the world. By contrasting 
food security with food sovereignty, this section pointed to how the concept of food security 
is used to avoid the underlying structural causes of hunger. The section concluded by 
extending the theoretical critique of hunger and food security to its operationalisation taking 
advantage of a recent overhaul of the FAO’s methodology. I argued that beyond the question 
whether the new numbers reflect perhaps a more accurate expression for hunger in the world, 
the new methodology conceals and supports the current workings of the food system such as 
its capital biased policies and institutions.        
  
In the next section I explore the persistence of hunger and the 2007/8 food crisis as linked to 
the capital oriented food system. More specifically, I look at how corporate capital has shaped 
trade dependence in ‘food security’.   
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The capital integrated food system and the 2007/08 food crisis   
The fragile equilibrium and the role of the campesino as stabiliser in food supply 
One way to illustrate how the capital dominated food system works is to look at the 2007/08 
food crisis. It is a useful example as it condensed a systemic contradiction that sought 
resolution at one specific moment. Thus, rather than debating the short-term factors that 
might have contributed most significantly to the price spike, what interests me is to highlight 
the crisis as an outcome of the long-standing fundamentals of the food system based on the 
role of capital and the campesino.   
 
The 2007/08 food crisis was triggered by rapidly increasing food prices from mid-2007. The 
FAO Food Price Index, which groups the most important food prices, increased by about 
137% compared to the average 2000-2002 level and was 75% over the 2006 level. Between 
2006 and 2008, the prices of cereals – considered the main staple crop (including maize, rice 
and wheat) and which provide 60% of the world’s food energy consumption – increased by 
126%. In the same period, the prices of dairy products increased by 88%. Although prices 
were below the 2007/08 spike during the first half of 2016, they have still not returned to the 
levels before the crisis.  
 
Two key global consequences of the food crisis were massive protests and accelerated land 
grabbing. Protests over soaring food prices proved especially serious for ‘developing 
countries’ where household expenditure on food was 60% to 80% of their income. This is 
compared to ‘industrialised countries’ where food accounts for only 10% to 20% of 
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household expenditure (FAO, 2008b, p. 15). In this regard, ‘food riots’ in about thirty 
countries reflected how the capital-driven food system ‘communicated price fluctuations far 
more directly into the heart of poor communities’ (Patel & McMichael, 2009, pp. 9, 31). In 
the midst of the rising importance of natural resources to the level of capital profitability 
another global manifestation was the wave of land grabs causing new dispossession of small-
scale producers and Indigenous population in the ‘global south’ (Borras & Franco, 2012; 
McMichael, 2012; Rosset, 2011).  
 
Before highlighting the underlying roots or structural causes of the food crises, I briefly 
enumerate the proximate causes (Holt-Giménez, 2008, pp. 3–4; Mittal, 2009). As no single 
variable determines price fluctuations, the proximate causes can be summarised by a 
combination of dynamic and interconnected factors such as: climate change; productivity 
decrease; increasing competition for land use by food, feed and energy; and speculation (de 
Schutter, 2008). Partly overlapping, another way to list the proximate factors is to classify 
them, as Holt-Giménez (2008) has done, in the following manner: a) droughts in main wheat-
producing countries and climate change impacts (likely to stay for the near future); b) high 
oil prices for its impact on the food system channelled through fertiliser and transport costs; 
c) rising meat demand in developing countries and higher feeding costs; d) increased demand 
for cereals for agrofuels; e) speculation connected to the financial crisis that shifted money 
to food in the stock market and; f) the decline of global grain stocks to the lowest levels in 
three decades (see FAO, 2008a, p. 3). 
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The explanations change when studying the long-standing reasons of the food crisis as an 
essential expression of the capital dominated food system. Drawing on my analysis in 
previous chapters, it is possible to argue that the hunger-prone nature of the food system is 
built upon the concentration of economic and political power in corporate agribusiness. This 
includes agribusiness’ strength in shaping the international trading system to facilitate greater 
mobility of capital, combined with national Washington Consensus type of policies that 
neglect rural development and the campesinos as main actors in the food system.  
 
However, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, campesinos can be considered as 
an overall stabiliser for the food system given their important contribution in food provision, 
especially for the poor. As corporate agribusiness tends to focus on trade, the campesinos 
become critical providers for the domestic food market by contributing a fundamental share 
in overall food provision. This allows capital to seek profit in food trade while undermining 
campesinos’ existence and capital’s own basis for expansion. However, as the 2007/08 food 
crisis showed, this fragile equilibrium may be disrupted by a ‘fortuitous’ combination of 
proximate causes as outlined above. This contradiction becomes more apparent in the next 
section, where the trade dependence of food security is discussed. 
 
Campesinos were no doubt also adversely impacted during the food crisis. However, in their 
review of the literature that emerged after the food price spike of 2007/2008, Wiggins and 
Keats (2013) ) assert that even after five years, the effects of the spike are not totally clear as 
variations in food prices are only one factor affecting food security and income. The authors 
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note, that in addition to changes in food prices, the impacts on food security and income 
during this period were also affected at the international level through rising fuel costs and 
the beginning of the financial crises in Europe and the US. At the national level, food security 
and income were affected through the performance of the national economy and the 
capability and disposition of governments to provide social protection, public goods and 
services. Furthermore, the degree of transmission of international prices to the domestic level 
also depends on: the level of market integration linked to transport costs; the level of 
consumption of traded staples; the existence of trade policies and domestic price 
interventions; the option to domestically substitute the imported food; and the degree of 
market competition in importing and processing (Abbot, 2009; Timmer, 2008).89 
Determining  which countries in Latin America were most affected by the food price spike 
of 2007/2008 is therefore extremely complicated. Nevertheless, what seems to be clear is that 
household vulnerability to rising international food prices goes beyond the position of the 
country as a net importer or exporter of a certain product. 
 
As de Janvry and Sadoulet (2010) demonstrate in the case of Guatemala (an exporter of 
nontraditional agricultural and food products but with increasing import dependency on 
staple foods), the price transmission of the 2007/2008 international food price spike was 
                                                 
89 FAO (2008d) summarises the actions taken by Latin American governments in the context of the international 
food price spike of 2007/2008. The institution asserts that 14 countries attempted to compensate the loss of 
purchasing power through income transfers, tax cuts and food distribution. Domestic food production was 
promoted by 12 countries through various policies, including input subsidies and public-private agreements. 
Another 9 countries tried to control domestic food prices directly, and, 11 countries implemented trade 
measures, such as export taxes and lowering taxes.    
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limited in the short-term and greater in the long-term. De Janvry and Sadoulet’s most 
importing finding was that higher international food prices mostly benefitted large farms in 
Guatemala, while most marginal, small and medium farmers were adversely affected despite 
being producers. These findings are consistent with my previous argument that international 
trade is driven by agribusiness, while campesinos mostly produce for own consumption and 
local markets. Similarly, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2010, 2011) propose that strengthening 
subsistence farming can be considered as a viable policy option to avert food crisis. The 
authors extend their proposal to non-farm households in rural and peri-urban areas through 
the provision of land. In this vein, the campesino can serve as sort of a food buffer during a 
food crisis. In Latin America, 80% of agrarian units are family driven specialised on essential 
crops. This argument also builds on the previous chapter on the campesino, where I debated 
the re–discovery of the campesino as family agriculture by international and national 
institutions to address issues arising out of food insecurity.  
 
At the country level, countries reliant on imports for basic food intake are especially 
vulnerable. A result of the 2007/2008 international food price spike was the rise in food costs, 
especially for the most important regional imports such as wheat and corn. In this regard, in 
June 2008, the FAO (2008c, p. 1) summed up the food crisis through its link with countries’ 
estimated food import bill in the following way: 
 
Perhaps one estimate sums up best the overall impact of the higher prices: the USD 1 035 
billion that the world is forecast to spend on importing food in 2008. This means an 
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additional USD 215 billion on top of the record bill registered in 2007. Food is no longer 
the cheap commodity that it once was.    
 
Other examples that show the difficulties of disentangling the impact of the international 
price spike are the cases of Argentina and Brazil. Both are important regional net-exporters 
of agricultural and food products. While Brazil continued to export products in combination 
with implementing social protection policies (this point is examined in more detail later in 
this chapter when examining the compensatory state), Argentina imposed export taxes to 
secure the domestic supply of food. As a result, food security in Brazil during the 
international price spike did not worsen, while Argentina deteriorated its food security 
situation (Bento de Souza Ferreira Filho & de Freitas Vian, 2012; Nogues, 2012).  
 
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to briefly discuss the notion of ‘cheap food’ 
mentioned in the previous quote. Food has been cheap in some countries and for some people 
due to concrete historical reasons. The case of the US is particularly illuminating.90 Today, 
US households spend the smallest fraction on food of any country. Even the poor in the US 
spend a lower fraction of income on food than the average amount spent in the other high-
income countries. The fact that food has been comparatively cheap in the US also suggests 
                                                 
90 In 1901, the average US household still spent 43% of its income on food and alcohol. The current cheap US 
food regime was an outcome of the rise and expansion of capitalism in the US. The country achieved cheap 
food built upon dispossession of Indigenous people, territorial expansion, migration and slavery, mechanisation 
and transport improvements between east and west, and decades of specific policies targeted for the supply for 
cheap commodities (see Zepeda, 2007). In 1929, in the US almost 20% of total food consumption was still 
produced at home. Today, not even 2% is produced at home (USDA Economic Research Service, 2015).  
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its importance from the perspective of capital, as cheap food means one could pay lower 
wages and therefore increase profit margins. In 2014, a comparison of 86 countries showed 
that US consumers spent the lowest share of their income on food (6.5 %) (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2015). This contrasts with the share of income spent on food for 13 Latin 
American countries listed as varying between 15.5 percent in Chile and 40.4 percent in 
Guatemala. When taking into account that Latin America is the most unequal continent in 
the world in terms of the Gini index, the weight of food spending in total expenditures in the 
case of the poor becomes particularly important.     
 
In short, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the expansion of capital in the food system has 
required a globally integrated food system. Increased food trade has also built stronger 
interdependence in food provision. A result is that small disruptions at one place accumulate 
over the entire system and can impact globally, particularly hitting the poor. In this regard, 
the consequences of trade dependence for national food provision have been 
disproportionally large. It has been more so for food importing countries without a strong 
campesino economy. Next, I examine in more detail how this trade dependency has been 
structured at the expense of domestic food capabilities over time in Latin America.  
 
 
The trade dependence of food security 
In this section, I examine how Latin American countries have become increasingly trade 
dependent in order to meet national food needs over time. Increasing trade dependence, 
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Patnaik (1996) argues, displaces national food production in at least two different ways: it 
happens either by competing cheaper imports, or by land displacement used for cash exports. 
Both dynamics tend to displace campesinos as key food providers. The outcome is increased 
food insecurity, because the capital-oriented food system tends to marginalise campesinos 
and create import dependence for basic food grains.  
 
Between 1986 and 2009, D’Odorico et al. (2014) estimate, traded food calories more than 
doubled, reaching about 23% of the produced food for human consumption. In the same line, 
Porkka et al. (2013) point out that many countries are increasingly trade dependent for 
securing their national food availability. The authors found that for the period 1965-2005, 
improved national food supply was achieved through increased global food trade at the 
expense of self-sufficiency rates.9192 As a consequence, in addition to population growth, the 
population living in net food importing countries went up from 2.4 billion people (72%) in 
1965, to about 5.1 billion people (80%) in 2005. The population in countries sourcing most 
of their daily dietary intake from imports (importing more than 1500 kcal/cap/day) has more 
than tripled over the same period (Porkka et al., 2013, pp. 4–5).  
 
                                                 
91 The authors based their calculation on dietary energy data taken from the FAO. The international organisation 
considers ‘national apparent food consumption’ taken from national food balance sheets, in terms of 
kcal/person/day as the key variable for assessing average national food intake. The undernourished population 
is defined as lying below a minimum daily energy requirement to perform light activity adjusted for a country’s 
sex and age distribution. It is set at 2500 kcal/person/day. The estimation is further specified by defining a 
minimum acceptable body weight for a given height and activity levels for sex-age groups. Limitations for the 
estimations include the absence of the nutritious quality of calorie intake and critically assuming that national 
calorie availability is equal to consumed calories. In 2010, for the world as a whole, per capita food availability 
was 5359 kcal on a daily basis (FAO, 2013b, p. 174).  
92 For a discussion on the different notions of food self-sufficiency see Clapp (2015b).  
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Latin America has proved to be an illustrative case on how food trade patterns have changed 
over the years. Its productive structure has changed to such an extent that today the region is 
a significant player in world food trade. By 2020, the region is estimated to consolidate itself 
as the main net supplier of agriculture and fish products in the world (OECD & FAO, 2013). 
In addition to being an important player in the exports of non-food commodities, such as 
minerals and metals, the region holds an even larger share in the international trade of 
agricultural products (Chaherli & Nash, 2013, p. 3). 
 
A good way to look at how trade in food has changed over the years in Latin America is to 
examine the evolution of grain trade, considered the sine qua non when accounting for food 
consumption. Corresponding to the expected outcome of liberalisation policies and greater 
integration of agriculture in the international trade system, both exports and imports have 
risen significantly since the 1990s. As can be observed in Figure 6.1, regional grain imports 
increased more than twelve times between 1960 and 2015, while exports went up by sixteen 
times during the same period (USDA, 2015).93  
                                                 
93 Corn, wheat and rice are frequently considered as proxies for overall food consumption. 
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Figure 6.1: Grain imports and exports for Latin America, 1960-2015 
 
Source: USDA, 2015. Years are defined as actual marketing years: 1960/61, 1962/63 and so on.  
 
 
Changes in food traded over time have varied widely between countries in Latin America. 
As can be observed in the Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2 of the Appendix, between 1965 and 
2005 several countries in the region changed their productive food structures in terms of the 
relevance of national food production and trade for national food availability.94 Over the 
period, 10 out of 19 countries examined in the region changed from being a net food importer 
into being a net food exporter. Without going into a detailed analysis for each country, two 
overall tendencies from this data are particularly revealing. On the one hand, there are 
                                                 
94 Calculated in terms of the difference between national food production and food availability measured in 
kcal/cap/d. Based on FAO data sourced from Porkka et al. (2013).  
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countries that became increasingly dependent on food imports to meet their national food 
requirements. On the other hand, there are countries that over the period became important 
food exporters. Regarding the first case, dependency on food imports is particularly visible 
in Latin American food insecure countries, which have to import about half of its grain 
supplies, even more than food insecure countries in Asia or Sub Saharan Africa (Meade, & 
Rosen, 2013, p. 9). Beyond food insecurity at the country level and with regards to the 
increasing food import dependence, two countries seem especially interesting: Mexico and 
Peru. It is particularly relevant for Mexico as it is not considered a food insecure country at 
the national level. Both were self-sufficient at the national level in 1965, with Mexico 
producing 2,732 and Peru 3,659 kcal/cap/d respectively. However, after years of 
liberalisation policies (as examined in more detail for Mexico in a previous chapter), in 2005 
both significantly rely on food imports to meet their national food needs. This is the case as 
Mexico produces just 1,370 and Peru 1,967 kcal/cap/d. Ironically, these are also the very two 
countries in Latin America that are arguably most famous for their respective national 
cuisine.  
 
Otero et al. (2013) present further evidence for Mexico’s increased import dependency 
between 1985 and 2007. The authors show that while in 1985 Mexico was import dependent, 
that is, imports of over 20% of domestic supply, for just four of their top 25 basic 
consumption crops, by 2007 the country had to import 10 of these crops. As a result, Mexico 
had to import over 56% of its food sources by the end of the period, including four of their 
five major consumption crops.     
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On the other hand, over the 1965 and 2005 period, Latin American countries which displayed 
the most drastic increases in domestic food production (in terms of dietary energy supply) 
were also those that have increased their food exports most significantly. Thus, a large 
amount is exported and is not consumed domestically. Countries that increased their total 
domestic output most significantly between 1965 and 2005 were Paraguay (77%), Uruguay 
(62%), Argentina (53%) and Brazil (55%). These are also the four most important regional 
exporters – Argentina (11,229 kcal/cap/d), Paraguay (7,047 kcal/cap/d), Uruguay (5,230 
kcal/cap/d) and Brazil (2,161 kcal/cap/d). ‘Free trade’ arguments, derived from the principle 
of comparative advantage, would claim that foreign exchange derived from exports would 
be subsequently used to meet food import requirements. However, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, and also noted by Patnaik (1996, p. 2446), this claim is incorrect. Most exports are 
undertaken by large transnational agribusiness companies which tend to either repatriate their 
profits or import manufactured machines.95 Consequently, the assumed benefits from the 
principle of comparative advantage do not in practice stay within the national economy. 
Moreover, even if benefits were to stay in the country, they would not go directly to meeting 
important requirements for food insecure people.      
       
                                                 
95 There is limited detailed data available from national or international sources on transnational agribusiness’ 
investment that breaks the information down further, such as regarding the contribution to capital formation or 
profit repatriation (UNCTAD, 2009). For further, more general, evidence and discussion, see for example 
Akkermans (2017), Bruno and Campos (2013) or Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985).  
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In addition, the statistics used obscure the fact that a large proportion of food production is 
used for animal feed and not human food. Once more, this is particularly the case with the 
major exporting countries just mentioned above. The case of soy exports illustrates this 
situation very well. An increasing proportion of land is not dedicated to the production of 
food, but goes into soy exports for animal feed. At the regional level, while the two main 
imported products are food crops, namely wheat and corn, soy is the most important regional 
export (FAO, 2014d).96 The three most important regional soy exporters are Brazil, Argentina 
and Paraguay. Together, Brazil and Argentina represent about 80% of world soy exports. In 
the case of Brazil, which is the second largest world exporter, land for soy production exceeds 
all remaining land used for grain crops. The case of Argentina is even more extreme. There, 
the land dedicated for soy production is twice as much as the land used for all grains 
combined (Brown, 2012).  
 
Importantly, the expansion of cash exports tends to include the destruction of food production 
for national provision. However, it is not the only reason for the displacement of land for 
national food provision. A review of a FAO (2012a) study on recent ‘land grabs’ in 17 
countries in Latin America revealed that other key reasons included energy/fuel (biofuels) 
and global capital demands for new natural resources. In some regions, this process has been 
driven by translatinas (Latin American transnational companies) from Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Costa Rica. Although these land grabs have expelled 
                                                 
96 This is strongly linked to a demand shift driven by China’s decision in 1995 to favour grain production for 
human consumption and import soy (Brown, 2012). 
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people from their land, this process has not been the only experience throughout the region. 
Integration of campesinos, Indigenous people and agrarian workers ‘into the emerging 
commercial farms, commodity chain, and industrial plantations are more common’. 
Critically, ‘[m]any of the land grabs are in agriculture frontiers and (former) cattle ranches’ 
(Borras Jr et al., 2012, p. 847).  
 
The previous analysis has shown that increased food trade, in both exports and imports, can 
reconfigure national productive structures. The examination has been based on national data. 
However, with most of countries in the region just hovering above the threshold defined by 
the FAO of 2500 per capita per day national average for minimum intake, inequality becomes 
a key factor for food access. This is particularly relevant for Latin America as it is the most 
unequal continent on the world. Despite recent improvements in inequality from 0.55 to 0.50 
in the Gini Index97 between 2000 to 2012 (FAO, 2014d), the region is still worse than the 
poorest region in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa (as reproduced in FAO, 2013, p. 34). Thus, 
the aggregate used by the FAO in determining national average food consumption masks 
uneven food situations at the individual and household level across the continent.  
 
An example for the variations masked by national average food consumption is well 
illustrated by the cases of Chile and Mexico. In 2005, both countries demonstrated sufficient 
national food availability with a calorie intake of close to 3000.  However, according to an 
                                                 
97 It is a measure of income distribution and varies between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). 
Canada has a Gini coefficient of 33.7 and Norway of 26.8 for example  
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OECD survey, despite aggregate data demonstrating that there is sufficient food supply, up 
to about 27.8% of people in Chile and 38.3% in Mexico were not able to afford food in 
2011/2012 (OECD, 2014, p. 28). The previous situation is further exacerbated for Indigenous 
people and women in rural areas (FAO, 2014d).   
 
To sum up, capital-driven food provision has changed the structure of national food 
availability over the last 40 years in Latin America. National food provision is now 
increasingly trade dependent. This process has reinforced the persistence of food insecurity 
issues by destroying national domestic food structures based on the campesino economy. In 
the next section, with the aim of analysing the role of the state, I examine more closely the 
apparent paradox of Brazil as the second largest net food exporter in the world (after the US), 
with perhaps the world’s most famous anti-hunger programme.  
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Balancing social demands and capital accumulation 
The rise of the compensatory state 
 
The persistence of hunger and the 2007/08 food crisis are good places to begin analysing 
how Latin American states operate within the capital dominated food system. It illustrates 
the ways that capital and labour can shape the priorities of public policies, and public policies 
can be deployed to serve capital’s interests. I explore the tension between social demands 
and capital accumulation by critically engaging with Gudynas’ concept of the ‘compensatory 
state’ which he embeds within the concept of a ‘new extractivism’. ‘New extractivism’ is a 
concept developed from a pattern that has been observed among ‘leftist’ or ‘progressive’ led 
governments in South America in the context of high commodity prices (Gudynas, 2009, 
2012).98 Gudynas elaborates his notion of the ‘compensatory state’ to capture the functional 
role of the state in further consolidating capital accumulation over new areas of mining, gas, 
oil, forestry and agriculture. That is, the ‘new extractivism’. In Gudynas’ analysis, 
agricultural extractivism is characterised by monoculture, intensive use of chemical and 
technical inputs, low added value and a focus on commodity export. In short, it corresponds 
to the way I have previously characterised the capitalist mode of food production led by 
corporations. This form of food provision has been expanded under the ‘new extractive’ 
drive.  
 
In this interpretation, ‘progressive’ states in South America have re-invigorated the former 
model of extractivism based on the appropriation of nature and the integration in the global 
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economy through the export of primary products. The previous model was dominated by 
economic interactions among the private sector. However, in contrast to previous periods of 
extractivism, states play a more active economic role and attain legitimacy redistributing 
some of the surplus through social programmes. The ‘compensatory state’ in this view thus 
operates by facilitating the expansion of capital accumulation over natural resources while 
simultaneously compensating social demands through increased social spending. 
‘Progressive’ governed states work in this way on the one hand with large corporations, while 
on the other containing potential social unrest with increased social spending. These social 
programmes tend to be financed by improved fiscal terms, which were the result of state-
private sector re-negotiation over extractive taxes and royalties, direct ownership, or joint 
ventures between public and private sectors.  
 
In contrast to the limited state involvement during the Washington Consensus driven 
extractivism, the state is now more implicated in the economic process. This marks a 
consensus shift, termed by Svampa (2012) as a new ‘commodity consensus’, grounded on 
the exports of primary products. This suggests also an implicit historical change concerning 
how to achieve higher levels of development. Under this ‘new extractivism’, the subordinated 
international integration of South America as a primary commodity provider is no longer 
questioned. 
 
As capital accumulates through ‘extractivism’, it penetrates over new territories often 
inhabited by indigenous communities and campesinos. The social and environmental 
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conflicts emerging from these encounters have been one visible result of this process.  
Conflicts over control and access to natural resources concentrating on campesino and 
indigenous territories tend to be the most violent and radicalised (see Calderón Gutierrez, 
2011). These conflicts have also their own territorial specificities (see Composto & Navarro, 
2014). ‘Leftist’ governments seemed trapped. On the one hand, the compensatory state 
promotes further liberalisation for the penetration of capital through weaker environmental 
and labour laws to build up national ‘comparative advantages’. On the other hand, the state 
attempts to respond to increased social demands through social programmes.  
 
Key here is, of course, that these programmes have a political importance which set them 
apart from previous ‘trickle-down’ Washington Consensus derived policies. They symbolise 
to certain extent the ‘left’ in power. Gudynas concludes that these social programmes 
legitimise both the accumulation of capital over new unexplored areas and left governments. 
Underwriting this interpretation is thus a binary reading of a state that favours capital and 
betrays to some extent the social base which brought them to power.  
 
 
Compensating food exports with zero hunger 
 
Brazil provides a good example to examine the role of the compensatory state in capital 
accumulation through ‘extractive’ activities. Firstly, it demonstrates that ‘natural 
comparative advantages’ are actually constructed. The country doubled the amount of 
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domestic food production in forty years. In 2005, Brazil produced enough food to feed twice 
its population (5,235 kcal/cap/d) (see Porkka et al., 2013). However, a large amount of this 
food did not stay in the country, as during the same period, Brazil transitioned from being a 
net food importer to a net food exporter.  
 
Secondly, despite the existence of sufficient overall food supply in the country, the 
government under Lula da Silva introduced perhaps the world’s most famous national 
strategy to combat food insecurity in 2003: Zero Hunger (Fome Zero in Portuguese). Similar 
programmes have been later adopted by many other countries in Latin America and 
elsewhere. In short, the project was not conceived merely as a restricted social programme, 
but as a larger attempt for development centred on the elimination of hunger and social 
inclusion. It initially encompassed more than thirty different initiatives and shifted its 
emphasis during the years. The focus has been on four key interrelated projects: 1) 
Conditional cash transfers; 2) Government procurement: aiming to support family based 
agriculture; 3) School meals; 4) Credit and technical support for small producers (see da 
Silva, Del Grossi, & de França, 2012).  
 
The compensatory state in Brazil is thus expressed through the increase in social expenditure 
to address hunger related problems and the rise in agribusiness. The latter has been achieved 
through policies and subsidies which have allowed Brazilian agribusiness to transform the 
country into one of the most important agriculture exporters in the world. In other words, 
alongside implementing arguably the most famous anti-hunger programme based on 
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supporting campesinos and domestic food supply, the government has been promoting large-
scale industrial agriculture at different levels. This is not to deny the many achievements of 
the hunger zero project. These include turning the struggle against hunger into a state-led 
national priority, implementing wide and integral social and economic programmes 
favouring the campesinos, and adjusting the legal framework for implementing a national 
policy for food security. But it is striking how contradictory this project has been when 
looking at other dimensions of Brazilian agriculture. Hence, instead of reversing the 
historical concentration of land, the government promoted the expansion of corporate 
agribusiness over new territories.  Instead of effective land distribution for campesinos, the 
government has ‘compensated’ them with social programmes. While some land were 
distributed among landless campesinos, as Pomar  (2009, p. 124) noted, the overall net 
outcome was the increased dispossession of campesinos.99 
 
Closer political ties with social rural movements compared with previous governments 
allowed the PT led government to build upon agribusiness without touching the fundamentals 
of the unequal distribution of land. It hereby prioritised the export oriented agribusiness over 
the campesino economy (Stedile, 2009). In this regard, the Zero Hunger programme has been 
specially tailored towards rural people experiencing displacement within the expansion areas 
of agribusiness. In this way, the government was able to contain the expectations for deep 
land reforms by distributing land of the Amazonian basin among campesinos. At the same 
                                                 
99 Pomar is a supporter of the PT-led (Partido dos Trabalhadores) government which first came to power with 
Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and then Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). The PT sees their agrarian policies largely as 
inclusive.    
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time, they were able to allocate new lands for the expansion of agribusiness. This is 
particularly well illustrated in areas of capital-driven soy production. Importantly, the 
government was able to promote the de-mobilisation of social rural movements and partly 
discourage pressure for ongoing agrarian reforms and land occupations (Barreira, 2014).   
 
Therefore, although the Hunger Zero programme might have been able to deliver improved 
material wealth for many, it also has been a critical tool to pacify social movements around 
land reform. Despite conflicts over land not having been as high as 10 years ago, repression 
continues to be strong. Assassinations over specific land conflicts rose in 2015 to the highest 
point in 10 years with 47 dead people. The same year also marked the highest number of 
disputes over land in terms of hectares involved (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2016). In this 
regard, Cassel’s and Patel’s (2003, p. 36) conclusion still holds: ‘‘[t]he Brazilian experience 
of agricultural liberalisation is, above all, differentiated by class. Those with sufficient land 
holdings, money and power to access the government’s strong support for key agricultural 
crops have done well out of liberalisation’. The Hunger Zero programme has done little to 
change these principles.   
 
In brief, Brazil produces enough food to feed everybody in the country. However, as a large 
part of it is exported and land is re-prioritised for the needs of agribusiness in cultivating 
competing products such as biofuels or soy for animal feed abroad, hunger has remained a 
big problem. In this context, the Brazilian government implemented the Hunger Zero 
programme to reduce food insecurity, while also sustaining capital-driven use of land 
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including food exports. The Hunger Zero programme therefore illustrates the workings of 
the compensatory state. It is a state that displays increased levels of social and economic 
intervention. This is expressed, on the one hand, by favouring capital’s control and access 
over new territories; and on the other, by compensating the lack of fundamental land 
redistribution for campesinos through integral social programmes. These programmes 
certainly improved an array of social indicators, including the drastic reduction in the 
prevalence of hunger (da Silva et al., 2012). Yet, at the same time, this process co-opted rural 
social movements that, at least initially, sympathised with the ‘progressive’ government. The 
current decline of international commodity prices further challenges the sustainability and 
political coherence of ‘compensatory’ policies.  
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the destruction of human nature – expressed through the 
prevalence of hunger – as an inherent feature of capital dominated food provision. I 
proceeded in the first section by defending a concept of hunger rooted in food access 
deprivation. This has been impacted by economic and political reasons linked to capital 
circulation and accumulation. This discussion was developed in three arguments. Firstly, it 
addressed the ideological argument that defends the ‘inherence of scarcity’ to justify the 
existence of hunger. This argument is often used to support further liberalisation for the 
expansion of a capital-driven food system. Secondly, I criticised the concept of food security 
which deliberately skirts around structural reasons for the persistence of hunger such as the 
nature of capital dominated food system. This critique was undertaken through the challenge 
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coming from food sovereignty. Thirdly, I extended my critique on food security to its 
methodology as it defends the current fundamentals of the capital-driven food system by 
supporting capital favouring policies and institutions.  
 
In the second section, I analysed the 2007/08 food crisis as it expressed a systemic 
contradiction at one specific moment. I linked the outcome to the long-standing underlying 
fundamentals by focusing especially on how capital-driven food provision has imposed a 
trade dependence on national food availability, which has displaced domestic food 
production capabilities. This process has reinforced the nexus between longstanding food 
insecurity issues and the destruction of the campesino economy. This is the case because the 
campesinos function as a stabiliser for the overall food system due to their importance as 
national food providers for domestic consumption – most importantly for the poor. However, 
as capital expands through trade, it displaces campesinos through cheaper food imports and 
competing land use, including the export of cash crops, but also for mining and energy 
projects. In this process of adapting and conflicting dynamics, the provision of food is 
inherently unstable and prone to episodes of hunger crises as expressed in the 2007/08 price 
spike.  
 
In the last section I addressed the role of the state, as it tries to balance the expansion of 
capital, while simultaneously compensating the social demands through specifically tailored 
anti-hunger programmes. That is to say, the state attempts to remediate hunger while at the 
same time ‘indirectly’ underwriting hunger through their support to the capital-driven food 
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system. In this process, the state effectively co-opted social demands for improved land 
distribution. This compensation mechanism is now put in question with the overall decline 
in commodity prices and smaller fiscal budgets.   
 
The destruction of humans, here examined through the prevalence of hunger, is an inherent 
dynamic of the capital dominated food system. Underlying agribusiness driven food 
provision, is the view to solve hunger through increased productivity and liberalisation. 
However, recent figures have shown that productivity is not the problem. In contrast, the 
prevalence of hunger in midst of sufficient overall supply questions the solution centred on 
increased international market liberalisation to mediate food distribution. Even countries that 
display impressive figures in terms of national food availability are susceptible to hunger as 
illustrated by the Brazilian example.  
 
With the advance of capital in food provision, rural productive structures have been 
reconfigured and the campesino supply has come under continuous threat. An outcome has 
been more pervasive food insecurity in rural areas. The latter situation is further exacerbated 
for the ‘most vulnerable’ groups such as women and Indigenous population, both having a 
particular importance within rural communities (FAO, 2014d, pp. 138–151). Food insecurity 
has been subordinated to capital-driven trade. It has transformed food provision as part of a 
globally integrated chain disconnected from the local experience of hunger and the 
campesino economy. This re-scaling of food provision has exacerbated the persistence of 
hunger especially in rural areas. In spite of the fact that they inhabit the same biophysical 
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space where food is produced and that they have historically subsisted on agrarian activities, 
the rural population has ironically become the most food insecure population as a result of 
the advance of capital.  
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7. Capitalist food provision and the destruction of 
extra-human nature 
 
Introduction 
This chapter moves towards a critical appraisal of how the capital dominated system of food 
provision is encroaching on life itself. Thus, after looking at the destruction of human nature 
through hunger in the previous chapter, I now turn to the destruction of extra-human nature.  
The capital dominated food system is not only inherently prone to hunger, but also threatens 
the ecosystems that sustain life on Earth. As examined in previous parts of the thesis, capital 
tends to shape the food system through industrial production and long-distance trade. This 
also entails a specific way of organising nature, or as Moore notes, ‘[c]apitalism does not 
have an ecological regime; it is an ecological regime’ (Moore, 2011, p. 2). Since capital 
assumes nature to be ‘external, controllable, reducible’, Moore asserts that ‘the biological 
and geological conditions of capitalism’s process’ are changing (2015a, pp. 2–3). The 
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which capital circulation and accumulation 
throughout the food system impacts on nature and its own possibilities of expansion.  
 
The continent is in many aspects a unique case for examining how the expansion of corporate 
agribusiness has transformed natural conditions. On the one hand, Latin America has suffered 
increasing degradation of unique ecosystems. It has seen the destruction of the planet’s 
highest biodiversity for agriculture through extractive economic sectors and human 
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settlement (UNEP, 2012). On the other hand, the continent is still regarded as playing a 
substantial role in meeting world’s future food requirements. This is largely due to its so-
called inherent ‘comparative advantage’ based precisely on its unique ecological conditions 
(e.g., Chaherli & Nash, 2013).  
 
Building on the argument of the metabolic rift discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter examines 
corporate agribusiness and its ecological implications, and how food reflects this tension 
between nature and capital. In order to examine nature in how it relates to the capital shaped 
food system, the conceptual focus of this chapter shifts to a view of food as grounded in the 
metabolic rift – to describe the rupture in the relationship between human and non-human 
nature. Within Marxist literature, the metabolic rift perspective offers an analytical 
foundation for an ecological critique of capitalist production, which is based on the insight 
that human beings and nature interact through human labour (e.g., Burkett, 2006; Foster, 
2000; Moore, 2015; O’Connor, 1998; Smith, 1984). For the present analysis, this chapter 
draws on a selected number of Moore’s interpretations, but does not closely follow his 
ambitious world-ecology perspective (Moore, 2015a).100 Yet, in addition to using a selection 
of Moore’s insights to address the specific role of food as a connecter between nature and 
                                                 
100 For the sake of clarity, I repeat what I asserted in Chapter 2 regarding the Moore-Foster debate. Moore (2011, 
2015) criticises previous insights from ecological Marxism to rely on Cartesian dualism. In his view, this binary 
of Nature/Society has been fundamental for the rise of capitalism. Instead, he emphasis the level of relations 
between ‘nature’ and ‘society’ as the priority of analysis. Foster and Clark (2016) have recently responded; they 
accused Moore of basically legitimising ‘green capitalism’ and abandoning the metabolic rift perspective 
altogether. The authors argue that from a materialist-dialectical approach, the isolation of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ 
is necessary for studying one specific ‘moment’. This does not however mean to completely subsume society 
or nature within the other. For the development of this chapter I consider that it is not necessary to take a position 
in regards to the unfolding debate.  
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capital, I highlight additional dimensions which I consider relevant for a metabolic rift 
approach in the Latin American context.   
 
The chapter is comprised of four sections. The first two sections elaborate upon the 
conceptual tools that were first discussed in Chapter 2, while the latter two sections ground 
the conceptual discussion concretely in empirical examples of the metabolic rift. In 
particular, the latter sections discuss the tensions between agribusiness and its own 
reproduction, and signs of the limits of growth. The first section analyses how capital and 
nature interact, as connected through food. It highlights how food links the metabolic 
character and capitalist value production in a special way. These two dynamics are discussed 
through an analysis of the corporate agribusiness driven metabolic rift. The second section 
asserts that, to comprehend trajectories that are rather specific to the Latin American context, 
the metabolic rift perspective should be complemented with views that account for distinctive 
ecological thoughts. These include foremost indigenous and campesino perspectives of local 
knowledge production and practices.  
 
After introducing the shift in the conceptual focus, the third and largest section studies how 
and to what extent, agribusiness driven industrial food provision impacts on nature and its 
own possibilities for future capital accumulation. This examination is undertaken by 
proposing to look at capital’s drive over nature through capitalism’s process of agrarian 
frontier expansion, and yield and cropping intensification. As a consequence of this process, 
I register the limits of accumulation for further capital accumulation. This is illustrated in the 
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fourth and final section through three cases: climate change, the massive death of bees and 
genetic modified genes.  
   
I conclude that the food system is also a contested ecological regime in which boundaries are 
simultaneously natural and social. This process has distinct features in Latin America, such 
as the degradation of human nature along racist lines or indigenous cosmovisions that 
highlight the unity between nature and humans in the metabolic exchange in food production. 
Despite the limits of accumulation for capitalism’s ongoing expansion, capital’s dual 
capacity to destroy and innovate for new cycles of accumulation should not be 
underestimated.  
 
 
Connecting nature and capital through food  
In order to understand how agribusiness attacks the boundaries of life, I briefly examine how 
food is conceptually linked to nature and capital, as ‘anchored in the “metabolic rift”’ 
(McMichael, 2009, p. 161). Marx characterised labour in the process of capitalist production 
as having a dual character. On one side, labour power and nature interact in a metabolic 
process, and on the other side, it is labour, not nature, which creates value and surplus value 
when producing commodities to be sold in the capitalist market (Altvater, 1993, p. 188). In 
the process of capitalist production, this dual character is fragmented – a process that Marx 
identified as an irreparable rift in the metabolism between humanity and nature. Despite this 
separation, it is important to conceptualise the process of capital accumulation – as Moore 
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(2015a) has proposed – as a singular process with two distinctive but coproducing 
expressions. In other words, nature is constitutive of capital, and capital impacts on nature in 
a dynamic and interdependent way.  
 
Food illuminates the dual character of labour well. Firstly, the metabolic exchange between 
labour power and nature is articulated; on the one hand, by the human need to eat to live; and 
on the other hand, through food’s inherent natural condition. Secondly, as already asserted, 
value production in capital-driven food provision entails recurrent patterns of dispossession. 
In the subsequent process of expanded reproduction, it also requires the subordination of 
nature’s inherent distinctiveness to a homogenous economic process. For instance, food 
traded in stock markets, such as wheat, corn or soybean are ‘abstracted’ (Castree, 2003) from 
their specificities in order to be treated as homogenous products.  
 
Regarding the first point, the metabolic exchange between human and extra-human nature is 
a permanent condition reaffirmed by the human need to eat to live. It is a constant reminder 
of how the socio-ecological relation is an integral part of the ecosystem, understood as the 
‘dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and the non-living 
environment interacting as a functional unit’ (United Nations, 1992, p. 3). Food is a critical 
‘means for life’; it is literally Lebensmittel, the German word for food, and provides the 
energy needed for the capacity to work. Labour power, that embodies this capacity as a 
natural force, requires energy intake provided by food, which again depends on extra-human 
nature. The capacity of food as energy is grounded on ‘the efficiency of green plants as 
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energy converters’ and their ‘unique capacity to change radiated solar energy into stored 
chemical energy that is biologically useful for humans and other animals’ (Pimentel & 
Pimentel, 2008, p. 12). How humans organise this capacity to provide food is the link that 
connects labour power and nature in a special manner. It is this process – in which we obtain 
seeds, plants, cultivate, harvest, process, distribute and finally consume and dispose food – 
that impacts on nature and labour power in an interdependent way.  
 
In relation to the second point, the special role of food is not just expressed through its impact 
on the metabolic character but also in the production of value.101 As Alvater (1993, p. 191) 
notes, it is labour power which transforms nature into a commodity because ‘nature’ is not 
‘productive of value, for its creations are by nature not commodities’. I argue that there are 
two main ways or moments in which socio-ecological contradictions arise in agribusiness 
dominated food production. Firstly, and in line with the overall argument of this thesis, these 
contradictions emerge through ongoing accumulation by dispossession (ABD). Secondly, 
they emerge through the process of producing value, and the consequent subordination of 
nature’s distinctiveness, its inherent diversity and heterogeneity to the homogeneity and 
standardisation implicit in capitalist production and exchange. Both these contradictions, 
systemic dispossession and integration of food provision within the dominion of capital 
circulation, are rooted in the relations of production and the international division of labour. 
                                                 
101 Here we have to be careful not to fall into energy reductionism. For a further critique in how it relates to 
Marx’s labour theory of value, please see Bellamy Foster and Burkett (2004). 
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This is well illustrated by corporate capital-driven food provision which is organised through 
global value chains. 
   
In short, I argue that given the particularities of food, the expansion of capital through 
agribusiness affects nature in a special way. Firstly, the metabolic exchange between labour 
power and nature is expressed; on the one hand, by the fact that humans cannot exist without 
food; and on the other hand, by the fact that food is intrinsically related to nature’s cycles 
and ecosystems. This is despite the efforts by humans to control nature such as the example 
of genetically modified seeds. Secondly, in capital dominated food provision, the metabolic 
rift is engendered by systemic dispossession and the subordination of nature’s essential 
diversity and heterogeneity to the homogeneity and standardisation required for capital’s 
expansion. While the former fragments the unity between human and non-human nature and 
tends to function as a temporal prior for expanded reproduction; the latter consolidates the 
rift through a system of value exchange based on the exchange of homogenous and 
standardised commodities. In this respect, and as examined before, the displacement of 
campesinos and long-distance trade are two common examples. Next, I turn to examine how 
the impact of corporate agribusiness deepens the metabolic rift.  
 
 
The agribusiness driven rift  
Corporate agribusiness features strongly in the metabolic rift. Firstly, in terms of the 
metabolic exchange through the rise of industrial agro-food production that has transformed 
240 
 
nature in radical ways. Large scale monoculture farms – which rely on synthetic fertilisers 
and pesticides, and heavy machinery – have had an important impact on nature. This process 
has required deforestation and has sped up soil erosion and compaction (Foster & Magdoff, 
2000). In addition, industrial food production translated the metabolic exchange between 
human and extra-human nature into a highly energy dependent interaction. From being a 
historical source of energy, food produced today is based on huge energy deficit, particularly 
due to a high dependency on fossil fuels. In the last few decades, the latter has progressively 
worsened as a result of the increasing demand for livestock production (see Pimentel & 
Pimentel, 2008). However, although productivity (in terms of the rate of output per unit of 
input) of agriculture has decreased with respect to energy flows, it has increased in terms of 
commodity production (Juan Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 3). 
 
Secondly, in regards to the production of value, the fact that food is largely sold as a 
commodity in the capitalist market is unsurprising. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish 
between the different processes of production. The tension between nature’s distinctiveness 
and the process of homogenisation, uniformisation and standardisation in food exchange and 
food production differs with the type of producer and the market. Food produced in an 
industrial manner, which are traded on the Chicago stock exchange, has been abstracted from 
its social, spatial and temporal context in different degrees and ways to the campesino food 
brought to the weekly local street food market. In this regard, as indicated in Chapters 2 and 
5, the local campesino market can be understood within livelihood strategies that place it, to 
some extent, in a contradictory and adjusting position to capital. Although the campesino 
does not generally produce food for the world market, they are to various degrees still 
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connected to capital and capitalist markets, which impose structural limits to their complete 
autonomy.    
 
In summary, food connects the metabolic character and production of value in a special way. 
Industrial food production and international trade, reflected in the dominance of agribusiness, 
is grounded in the metabolic rift. The contradictions – arising from the expansion of 
agribusiness capital – have to be understood within a continuous push for dispossession, and 
the elimination of nature’s distinctiveness for value production. In order to examine how this 
dynamic unfolds in Latin America, I will account for some additional features relevant for 
understanding the agribusiness driven metabolic rift in the continent in the next section.    
 
 
Rethinking the metabolic rift in Latin America   
Turning now to how the metabolic rift is rooted in Latin America’s unique trajectory, I 
asserted at the beginning of this dissertation that I place my conceptual framework within the 
Marxist tradition. However, I also consider an epistemological openness for knowledge that 
originates from Latin America and is critical to understanding Latin America’s trajectory. 
Given this approach, the campesino economy proves especially relevant for the recognition 
of local practices and knowledge when there are strong indigenous linkages (e.g., Almeyra, 
Bórquez, Pereira, & Gonçalves, 2014; Composto & Navarro, 2014). Although Latin America 
conforms to certain patterns in global capitalist food provision such as the international 
division of labour, there are specific particularities that are unique only to Latin America. 
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Drawing on Martinez-Alier et al. (2015, pp. 41–42), I argue that these particularities can be 
represented by four distinctive ‘ecological thoughts’. I propose to articulate these four 
‘ecological thoughts’ within the ‘metabolic rift’ perspective previously outlined. As this 
chapter centres on the ecological impact of corporate agribusiness, these distinctive 
‘ecological thoughts’ become more evident in the next chapter when examining the key role 
of the campesino resisting capital. However, for an accurate understanding of the capital-
driven rift, it was considered necessary to include them here.     
 
Although not all of these ‘ecological thoughts’ are necessarily unique to Latin America, I 
contend that it is possible to identify at least four main overlapping lines of arguments in the 
reading of food as the nexus between capital and nature. These four arguments are: 1) a 
temporal-spatial matrix which considers Indigenous peoples’ perspectives; 2) the continent’s 
low population relative to its enormous natural resource wealth was never a fertile setting for 
scarcity driven arguments of inequality; 3) the persistence of the ‘coloniality of power’ in the 
organisation and structure of power according to the ‘colonial axis’ against Indigenous 
people, mestizos and blacks (Quijano, 2000, p. 568); and 4) the emergence and/or persistence 
of ecological concepts that originated in the region. As I go on to chart, these four features 
combined, allow an understanding of food provision which is anchored in the metabolic rift 
specific to Latin America.   
 
Firstly, a Latin American interpretation of the metabolic rift needs to encompass a temporal-
spatial matrix which integrates indigenous perspectives. That is, Indigenous peoples tend to 
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have differing viewpoints on time and space, which question the ‘Western’ linear 
chronological understanding of time. This is particularly important in some rural areas and 
expressed, for example, in some cosmovisions (e.g. Aymara, Kogi, Maya and Mapuche). 
These temporal and spatial understandings tend to reassert the unity between nature and 
humans in the metabolic exchange in food production. This is in contrast to a fragmented 
version of time (i.e. separating the histories of nature, human and capital) (e.g., Chakrabarty, 
2009). However, this is not a call to collapse the distinctiveness of ‘social history’ or capital’s 
history (Moore, 2011; Vitale, 1983). In addition, it strengthens the argument that opposes the 
expansion of value production and exchange through capital’s organisation of time as the 
subordination of the temporal dimension to socially necessary abstract labour time (Bonefeld, 
2014, p. 147). Therefore, the examination of the dynamics of corporate agribusiness has to 
consider its concrete spatial-temporal implications.  
 
From a historical perspective and in relation to the concrete spatio-temporal account, 
although the ‘planet’ preceded human nature and the capitalist system, it is precisely because 
of the distinctiveness of the capitalist system in terms of the ‘metabolic rift’ where we have 
to place agribusiness food provision. This chronological cut, does not mean however that the 
Indigenous population stopped making history as a result of colonisation and the rise of 
capital (Vitale, 1983). Without pretending to romanticise the past, for over 90% of human 
history, hunter-gatherers placed themselves in relation to nature in a rather adaptive way 
being substantially constrained by the prevailing ecosystems. This balance was definitively 
broken with the colonisation and the rise of capital upon the ecosystem (Vitale, 1983). In 
terms of food production, it was particularly exacerbated with the expansion of the ‘Green 
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Revolution’ over the last 60 years. It accelerated the expansion of capital through industrial 
centred food production. The latter process definitively contributed to the break in the 
equilibrium of the ecosystem and the capital-driven productive process.   
 
This brings me to the second argument related to the low population density with regards to 
natural wealth that helped to shape the distinct ecological thoughts in the continent. Today, 
9% of the world’s population lives in Latin America. It is the wealthiest region in terms of 
land, forests, biodiversity and hydrobiological resources. Latin America occupies 16% of 
global land surface, has 31% of the world’s freshwater sources, and includes five of the 
world’s most biodiverse countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru). The 
Amazon alone is the most biodiverse place in the world. While 40% of the world’s most 
biodiverse ecosystems are located in South America with more than 25% of the world’s 
forests; the Central American region comprise of 10% of the world’s most biodiverse areas 
and only occupies 0.5% of land surface (Bovarnick & Alpizar, 2010, p. 16; FAO, 2014e; 
UNEP, 2012).  
 
In this regard, the abundance of natural resources meant that debates on inequality with 
assumptions based on scarcity did not correspond to the Latin American reality and thus 
never took foot. Against a Malthusian logic, the metabolic link between humans and nature, 
or the socio-ecological perspective in Latin America needs to be historically grounded in the 
demographic disaster that followed colonisation. Estimations on the higher end of the 
spectrum account for a decline from about 70-88 million to 3.5 million people in the first 150 
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years (Ribeiro & Gomes, 1992, pp. 85–86).102 Despite this tragedy, the continent is still home 
to over 1000 Indigenous nations, of which an estimated 200 live in ‘voluntary isolation’ 
(CEPAL, 2014). It is also the most unequal continent, where poverty and wealth are highly 
correlated with ‘race’.   
 
 
The previous explanation is linked to the third point termed, following Quijano (2000), 
‘coloniality of power’, that characterise the persistence of accumulation of material, social 
and cultural privileges until today. The concept allows understanding how the deepening of 
the metabolic rift by capital in Latin America has been strongly rooted upon a ‘racist’ 
capitalist social division of labour. A ‘darker’ skin means simultaneously a higher likelihood 
of taking human nature as a sink; that is, how capital degrades human nature and imposes 
higher degrees of exploitation. The systematic and continuous pillage of ‘free or cheap 
nature’ includes Indigenous people, blacks and mestizos (e.g., Lechini, 2008). It is in this 
historical root of world political and economic inequality that human nature is devalued and 
degraded along ‘racist’ lines.  
 
The fourth and last argument refers to the persistence of particular ideas and knowledge 
production in which resistance to the expansion of capital conveys frequent reminders to the 
                                                 
102 The authors refer here to the major ‘civilization’ in Central America and the Andes. Estimations of the actual 
population at the arrival of Columbus and subsequent deaths by disease and/or killing are highly contested 
(Amores Carredano, 2006; Cook, 1998).  
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‘agroecological proud’ (Joan Martinez-Alier et al., 2015) and indigenous cosmovisions. This 
point, related to the first idea concerning the spatio-temporal matrix, is typically linked to 
notions of Mother Earth as a sacred living ‘entity’. It is present in some constitutions (e.g. 
Ecuador and Bolivia). This view is connected to various concepts that include but are not 
limited to: 1) environmental rationality – derived from the ecological conditions of the 
productive process, democratic values and principles of cultural diversity (Leff, 2004, p. 
198); 2) ecological debt – which can be understood as ‘Northern’ countries indebted to 
‘Southern’ countries because of a combination of ecological unequal exchange and cheap 
polluting (Joan Martinez-Alier, 2003, pp. 213–251); 3) nature’s rights – Ecuador became the 
first country to include a related code in the Constitution; 4) post-extractivism – a claim 
towards an indispensable extractivism away from a development subordinated to exports and 
deteriorating ‘socio-environmental’ quality of life (Gudynas, 2011); and 5) Harmonious 
Coexistence – Buen Vivir in Spanish derived originally from sumaqamaña  in Aymara and 
sumajkawsay in Quechua – that involves a vision of development in harmonious coexistence 
with nature away from dominating patterns of capital accumulation. Most of these concepts 
bear contested meanings. It is, however, not the aim here to discuss each of these concepts in 
depth as it would take me beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
To summarise the main argument of this section; capital structures human’s metabolic 
relation to nature and production in concrete ways. In this regard, although the metabolic rift 
perspective is an important analytical framework, I argue that it is more useful to read it in 
combination with specific Latin American dimensions as outlined above. The next and 
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longest section of this chapter examines: to what extent agribusiness dominated food 
provision has been encroaching on life itself in Latin America.  
 
 
Corporate agribusiness and the assault on nature  
Nature and agriculture are closely interrelated through metabolic exchange. While the nature 
is the basis for agriculture, agriculture can either conserve or destroy nature. As I show here, 
the advance of capital in agriculture tends to destroy nature. This process can be synthesised 
in two distinctive but articulated moments: expansion and intensification. On the one hand, 
the expansion of capital pushes the agrarian frontier further upon primitive nature; and on the 
other hand, capital intensifies the use of petro-chemical inputs. Whether capital advances 
through expansion or intensification has to be understood within the general process of two 
interrelated process of capital accumulation: value and negative-value. Negative-value, as 
Moore (2015b, p. 22) has expressed, refers to the ‘accumulation of biophysical limits to 
capital’ and arise in the capitalisation process. It arises through the contradiction produced 
between nature-as-tap and nature-as-sink – that is, as presupposed value resource for capital 
and denied waste (N. Fraser, 2014, p. 63). Both as Moore (2015b, p. 5) wrote, are ‘paired, 
but spatially and temporally, uneven processes of extracting nature’s “free gifts” (including 
human work) and toxifying the biosphere (including humans)’. My use of negative-value is 
as a pragmatic provisional concept for this chapter. In a figurative representation, the 
reproduction process of corporate agribusiness capital, linked to nature, can be illustrated as 
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in Figure 7.1. The process has to be understood as a non-linear interdependent and 
indeterminate cycle.  
Figure 7.1: Corporate agribusiness reproduction cycle through nature 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
In what follows, I proceed as shown in the figure above. I first examine the accumulation of 
capital through the expansion of the agrarian frontier and intensification. Next, I study the 
degradation of nature and its negative-value. Finally, and in a separate section, I finish by 
illustrating three cases of accumulation of barriers to capital.  
Agribusiness
-Expansion of agricultural 
frontier
-Intensification
Degradation of nature
Negative-Value
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Closing frontiers for agribusiness 
In Latin America, the agrarian frontier tends to be covered by primary forests. In this regard, 
I propose that there are at least three main and often overlapping frontier processes which 
can be analytically separated by the type of food producer occupying primary forests. There 
are: 1) indigenous communities that engage in deforestation and live on border areas (e.g. 
Petén in Guatemala, Darién in Panama and Colombia, or Amazonas region which crosses 
several countries); 2) campesinos who were dispossessed by agribusiness and other 
extractive industries who are being pushed towards less capitalised places103; and 3) corporate 
agribusiness directly taking over new areas (e.g. cattle industry moving deeper into the 
Amazon basin in Brazil; soy production driving into the Chaco region in Argentina, Bolivia 
and Paraguay).  
 
In terms of capital accumulation, these frontiers have only just become visible. From the 
view of people that inhabit these places, so-called ‘frontiers societies’, these are surely not 
frontiers. In terms of deforestation, compared to agribusiness production both indigenous 
communities and campesino ‘pioneers’ operate on relatively smaller scales. Although 
indigenous communities do use slash-and-burn agriculture, they tend to use the land in a 
                                                 
103 As explained in Chapter 5, the separation between Indigenous people and campesinos is, to some extent, 
rather arbitrary because many campesinos are Indigenous people themselves. A common distinction in countries 
like, Bolivia and Peru is to refer to Indigenous people living at the Amazonas region as indios, while those 
working the land in non-Amazonas areas are considered campesinos.  
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heterogeneous manner (e.g. Milpa system in Mesoamerica). On the other hand, campesinos 
may deforest in the same way for temporal ‘subsistence’ production and then move on.104  
 
These three types of agrarian frontier processes can temporarily overlap as agribusiness 
requires new spaces to be opened for capital accumulation. These dynamics of receding 
frontiers vary as they become spaces of interaction and struggles against displacement, over 
distribution or forms of integration. In this process, features of systemic dispossession reveal 
itself once more as a fundamental mechanism for the advance of capital. The tension between 
the continuous pressure for the expansion of natural resource extraction, including agrarian 
activities, includes therefore a predominant drive towards dispossession of the population, 
mostly Indigenous people and campesinos, who inhabit these ‘new underexploited’ frontiers 
(A. Bartra & Otero, 2008; Borras Jr et al., 2012; CLACSO, 2012; Latta & Wittman, 2012). 
These processes can also include direct assassinations. In 2015 alone, 50 ‘environmental’ 
activists were killed in Brazil, 26 in Colombia, 12 in Peru, 12 in Nicaragua, 10 in Guatemala 
and 4 in Mexico. As the case of Brazil illustrates, most of these killings were related to 
resistance against the appropriation of nature by capital for agrarian expansion and illegal 
logging. Indigenous groups living on capital’s ‘frontier’ spaces are particularly vulnerable in 
this process (see Global Witness, 2016).   
 
                                                 
104 Slash-and-burn agriculture in tropical forest is not temporally sustainable as soil quality becomes too poor 
to keep on planting crops. However, some indigenous methods of rotations, such as the Milpa system, have 
been more suitable for longer periods (El-Hage Scialabba & Hattam, 2003).     
251 
 
Deforestation – an indicator of expanding frontiers – predates and was reinforced with the 
rise of agribusiness. In this regard, the penetration over new territories in Latin America is 
closely connected to historical food export cycles (e.g. coffee, bananas, and cattle in Central 
America or coffee, palm oil and cattle in Brazil), and the state’s capacity to enable or limit 
provision for further accumulation. When nature at the frontier becomes increasingly 
valorised by capital, the state tends to shape shifting agrarian borders by promoting, for 
instance, land-tenure, infrastructure (e.g. roads, railways, irrigations, dams,) or indigenous 
reserves (for a description see Pasos, Girot, Laforge, Torrealba, & Kaimowitz, 1994). 
Deforestation also occurred prior to the colonisation of Latin America. However, without 
falling into a romanticised pre-colonial view of ecological harmony, the speed of 
deforestation more than doubled during the twentieth century (Williams, 2006). Between 
1990 and 2010, Latin America lost about 9% of its total forest area (FAO, 2012c, p. 16). 
Between 2005 and 2010, the region lost about 4 million ha of forests per year, mainly in 
South America. This represented over 70% of the world’s deforestation for that period 
(CEPAL et al., 2013, p. 15).  
 
Land-use change, related to deforestation for the purpose of agriculture, is one of the main 
causes of climate change on a global scale (FAO, 2016c). This process has been largely 
driven by capital-driven corporate agriculture. Between 1980 and 2000, agribusiness land 
conversion comprised of about 50% deforestation, whereas small-scale farming represented 
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about 12% in the continent (FAO, 2002, p. 306).105 This percentage rose to 70% in the next 
ten years between 2000 and 2010 (FAO, 2016b). Pasture land for livestock production has 
been the most important driving force behind the expansion of agribusiness in land use 
change over the last 50 years. For example, Central America lost about 40% of its tropical 
forest area in the last 40 years to pasture areas for cattle (FAO, 2006a). Over the past 20 years 
South America lost about 30% of its intact landscapes, the largest amount by continent, 
mostly due to extractive industrial production, including importantly agriculture related 
activities (Watson et al., 2016). As frontiers become more scarce and costly to penetrate, 
intensification becomes more important. In this regard, FAO (2003b, p. 14) estimates that by 
2030, 80% of required food will have to come from further intensification in form of higher 
yields and cropping intensities.  
 
 
Intensification of agricultural practices  
The history of intensification in food production has perhaps illustrated more than anything 
the struggle by humans and capital to control nature. It is in this sense that the twentieth 
century represented a significant shift from ‘traditional’ farming systems, established on 
natural cycles of production, to increasing command of nature.106 Paramount here is capital’s 
control of time and space. The outcome has been the intensification of crop production 
                                                 
105 Interestingly this process is different in other parts of the world. For instance, in Africa small-scale 
agriculture dominates deforestation with about 60% for the same period analysed.  
106 The notion of ‘traditional systems’ is not meant to undermine the sophisticated production system of some 
pre-Colombian cultures, which can still be observed today in irrigation systems.    
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deepening the metabolic rift. Underwriting this appropriation of nature by capital has been 
the application of a combination of biochemistry and engineering to food production. It has 
included labour-saving technologies based on heavy farm equipment and machinery, use of 
chemicals in pest control and fertilisers, and high fossil fuel power dependence. The global 
process of intensification began with the Green Revolution in the 1950s, which came hand 
in hand with the agribusiness expansion in Latin America (Cullather, 2010, Chapter 2). 
Capitalist farming, characterised by monoculture large-scale production, developed in 
conjunction with the increase in agro-chemicals, modified seeds, machinery and increased 
energy inputs.  
 
To be sure, campesino production has not been exempted from agribusiness’ attempt to 
integrate and create input dependency for their production. However, at least in Latin 
America, the increase in agrochemicals, machinery and energy inputs is linked strongly to 
large-scale monoculture for exports (e.g. for fertilizer use in Latin America see FAO, 2006b) 
and not campesino production. However, three interrelated problems place the continuous 
intensification of capitalist agriculture at a critical juncture in relation to further capital 
accumulation. Firstly, the reduction of yield productivity, based on Green Revolution 
innovations, since the 1990s (Ray, Mueller, West, & Foley, 2013). Secondly, an inefficient 
production in terms of the use and output of energy; and thirdly, the negative consequences 
of longstanding toxification (Altieri & Rosset, 1996; Carson, 2002; Tilman, 1998). Both, the 
closing of the agrarian frontier and the limits of intensification, point to increasing barriers 
for capital accumulation in food provision.  
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The increasing degradation of nature: Accumulating barriers to capital 
In this section, after presenting two distinctive ways in which capitalist food production 
impacts on nature, I explain how this degradation accumulates in the system. The final 
section illustrates three cases in which the accumulation of negative-value limits the 
possibilities of further agribusiness capital accumulation. Capital dominated food provision 
impacts on nature in several different ways; some more direct and others in rather indirect 
ways. It is almost impossible to completely disentangle the chain reaction of nature due to 
the impacts of capitalist food provision. If we add the temporal and spatial matrix of capital, 
human and extra-human nature, things complicate even further. A possible simplified 
categorisation of the impacts may be observed in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: Sources of negative-value  
 Strategy of agribusiness accumulation 
Expansion of agrarian frontiers Intensification of inputs  
Direct 
Impact  
 
Deforestation and conversion of 
natural habitat (e.g., 
desertification). 
Degradation of natural habitat and 
human health.  
Indirect 
Impact 
Climate change, invasive species. Wastewater, loss in pollination, 
human health risk (e.g., fertiliser 
pollution in food and drinking water). 
Source: Own elaboration 
A detailed examination, concerning each of these impacts, requires more than this section. 
However, a general overview which illustrates the damaging and accumulating negative 
impacts of capitalist agriculture is possible. In this regard, the Millennium Ecosystem 
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Assessment (MEA)107 is considered to provide the most comprehensive evaluation of the 
global environment. Moreover, the study also serves to highlight important impacts of 
capitalist farming on the degradation of nature. On a global scale MEA (2005, pp. 2–4) 
reports that industrial agriculture has required more conversion of cropland between 1950 
and 1980 ‘than in the 150 years between 1700 and 1850’. The increase in crop production 
also required an exponential increase in water usage, to such an extent that today 70% of 
water is used in agriculture. The industrial process which transformed agribusiness into the 
dominant player in food provision also became the primary driver of atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide which has increased by 60% since 1959.  
 
The MEA study divides its analysis into 19 categories of ‘ecosystem services’. These include 
water, air and food. The harmful impact of capitalist food provision becomes even clearer in 
looking at the change in ‘ecosystem services’ reported in the MEA. Over the past 50 years, 
out of 19 ecosystem services assessed by the MEA, four increased their production. Three of 
them comprised of direct food production (crops, livestock and aquaculture) and the fourth 
referred to increases in carbon sequestration (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, p. 
6). All of the 15 remaining ‘services’ suffered degradation. A major reason cited was the 
acceleration of industrial food provision which contributed to the: degradation and increase 
                                                 
107In 2000, the United Nations coordinated a consortium of several governments, universities, international 
agencies, businesses and non-profit groups to carry out an assessment of the Earth’s ecosystems. The results 
were published in 2006. Ecosystem services were defined as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. A 
rather unfortunate concept that to some extent reflects the subordination of nature to human demands. Three 
categories of services were evaluated: Provisioning Services (e.g. food, fiber, genetic resources); Regulating 
Services (e.g. water regulation, pest regulation, climate regulation) and Cultural Services (e.g. Spiritual and 
religious values).  
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in water use, reduction of biodiversity and reduction of forests, and release of greenhouse 
gases (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, p. 47). It is possible to recognise capital’s 
twin move of frontier expansion and intensification examined earlier underlying the 
degradation of all of these ‘ecological services’.  
 
Following Polanyi, as previously asserted in Chapter 6, another way to look at the rise of 
capitalism is to look at the increasing extent nature has been traded in the capitalist market. 
In this regard, the MEA (2005, p. 5,39) reports about the increase of extractive raw materials 
and primary products placed in the capitalist market between 1960 and 2000. The assessment 
registered increases of: 250% in food production (or 400% if only developing countries were 
considered); 200% in water use; 300% in pulp and paper from wood; 200% in hydropower 
capacity and more than 50% in timber production.  
 
These transformations have a distinctive expression in Latin America. In the last 50 years, 
the region has doubled its greenhouse gas emissions from agrarian activities. Between 1960 
and 2000, the region rose to be the main carbon emitting area due to changes in land use in 
the world. It was only in 2000 that the region was surpassed by the South and Southeast Asian 
region in carbon emissions (Houghton, 2008). Once forests had been cleared, cattle farming 
became the main single agrarian source for carbon emission, accounting for about 88%. The 
possibilities of reversing this tendency have been weakened by the loss of primary forest as 
this reduces carbon absorption (FAO, 2014f).   
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As asserted earlier in this chapter, agribusiness driven food provision entails homogenisation 
and standardisation. Therefore, another way to examine how capitalist driven agriculture has 
impacted on nature is by looking at the erosion of food item diversity. Since agricultural 
production began around 12,000 years ago, about 7,000 plant species have been cultivated 
for food consumption. At present, only 15 plant species and 8 animals provide circa 90% of 
our food supply (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009). Although, biodiversity is the 
basis for agriculture and ecosystems, agribusiness food provision has importantly contributed 
to the erosion of genetic diversity in cultivated plants, and farmed and domesticated animals. 
Underlying this loss has been the destruction of traditional farming practices and knowledge 
linked to Indigenous people and the campesino economy.108 
 
As argued in Chapter 4, corporate agribusiness is also characterised by its global value-chains 
that entail a long trade-specific form of value exchange. By distancing consumption and 
production patterns, the consolidation of agribusiness dominated trade chains has deepened 
the ‘metabolic rift’. This rupture is deepened by long-distance trade, as it implies increased 
‘material-ecological flows that transform ecological relations between regions, especially the 
core and the periphery’ (Clark & Foster, 2012, p. 68). Indeed, trade reflects a high correlation 
between food consumption and the destruction of nature. Trade dependence in food provision 
does not only impact on humans through persistent hunger as argued in the previous chapter, 
but also accelerates the degradation of ecosystem far away from the place of consumption. 
                                                 
108 See Pardo and Pizarro (2014) for a research on Chile. The authors gather ‘lost’ acenstral plant species for 
food supply.     
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As expansion and intensification of agriculture are closely related to international trade in 
food, it is not surprising that consumption in developed countries, mainly the US, Europe and 
Japan, is linked to increasing threats to the biodiversity of countries where food is sourced 
(see Lenzen et al., 2012).   
 
Capitalist food production can also impact on human nature more directly. In terms of 
fatalities and injuries, the agricultural sector is one of the most hazardous places to work in. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2000) reports that the sector accounts for over 
half of work related deaths in the world. Handling agricultural machinery and agrochemicals 
increases the risk of injuries. The ILO also informs that work at food export sites has been 
linked to increased human health risks. These risks are higher for daily paid labourers, 
seasonal migrant workers, women and child labourers. 
   
Moving on from production and exchange to consumption, it is possible to find evidence that 
capitalist driven food provision is not just hazardous for labour working directly in food 
production, but also for those who consume food. The effect of agro-chemicals on human 
health has been defended on the grounds that small quantities of exposure are safe. As long 
as the contrary is not proven true, food is considered safe for human consumption. Industrial 
chemicals have been widely used based on the assumptions made in that argument. In this 
way, human safety considerations have been subordinated to the interests of agribusiness. In 
agribusiness dominated production, the transmission of food safety regulations is linked 
strongly to trade. Latin American food exports rely heavily on the chemical safety 
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requirements of their final markets, such as the US and Europe.109 A common illustration for 
food related safety concerns is linked to genetically modified food (GMO). This type of food 
has been widely contested, with some research suggesting the presence of pesticides 
associated with genetically modified foods in maternal, fetal and non-pregnant women’s 
blood (Aris & Leblanc, 2011).    
 
The previous section demonstrated how the negative impacts on nature and human nature 
have been growing with the rise of capital in food provision. The next section presents three 
illustrative cases in which the accumulation of negative-value – that is, the accumulation of 
barriers in the capitalisation process – limits the possibilities of further agribusiness capital 
accumulation.    
 
 
Nature: the unstable business partner 
As illustrated in Table 7.1, capital undermines its own basis for expansion by limiting its 
capacity for accumulation through the destruction of nature. In this section, I will demonstrate 
how this dynamic unfolds through three examples. The three cases I briefly analyse here are: 
                                                 
109 With the increase of food trade and elimination of tariff barriers, minimum international safety standards 
have become more contested. Food safety issues are standardised at the Codex Alimentarius coordinated by the 
FAO and World Health Organisation (WHO). The Codex sets the minimum for international trade as 
incorporated in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement) in the WTO. Thus, 
countries that want to apply stricter measures than those set by the Codex are in general required to scientifically 
justify it. The burden is thus on the advocates for health concerns.   
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climate change, the disappearance of bees (colony collapse disorder), and the emergence of 
herbicide resistant weeds. 
 
Too hot for food 
Increasing temperatures are already affecting food production. As opposed to its previous 
analysis from 2007, the latest report on climate change released by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) noted the predominance of negative impacts.110 The 
panel found that aggregate global rates of growth of yields for staple crops, such as wheat 
and maize, are already declining. The report claims that without adaptation, compared to late-
twentieth-century levels, major crop production, such as wheat, rice and maize, are projected 
to fall with temperature increases above 2 degrees Celsius or more. The IPCC indicated the 
likelihood of higher food prices due to changes in temperatures and precipitations. It also 
pointed to higher risks to food security in terms of food access and utilisation.  
 
If emission trends continue in the same manner, limits may be reached for several crops by 
2050. In this regard, the assessment warns against barriers and limits to adaptation and 
concludes that ‘there may be a threshold of global warming beyond which current agricultural 
practices can no longer support large human civilizations’ (IPCC, 2014, p. 736). The IPPC 
report has been reinforced by the conclusion of the FAO’s (2016c) latest flagship that focuses 
on the impact of climate change on agriculture and food security. The international food 
                                                 
110 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 under the auspicious of 
the United Nations. 
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institution highlights the double challenge of eradicating hunger within the imperative of 
transitioning to sustainable food production. Just for its large numbers, FAO considers the 
role of ‘smallholder farm families’ a key part of adapting to climate change and the 
eradication of hunger.  
 
Latin America is particularly impacted by climate change due to its reliance on climate-
dependent food production. As analysed previously, changes in land use due to deforestation 
and land degradation are linked to increasingly extensive and intensive large-scale 
agriculture. This process has exacerbated negative impacts of climate change in the region. 
Evidence from Central America, northeast Brazil, and parts of the Andean region already 
have shown negative impacts of climate change on ‘crop yields, food security, and local 
economies’ (IPCC, 2014, Chapter 27). The future looks even worse as the panel expects 
increases of water stress and projects temperature increases in midst of increasingly extreme 
variations of precipitations in Latin America. During the period from 2000 to 2013, Central 
America and South America experienced 613 climatological and hydro-meteorological 
extreme events (IPCC, 2014).  
 
In short, temperature increases and draught related stress are already causing reduced yields. 
Increasing water stress may require additional irrigation and struggles over water access. 
Planting and harvesting are expected to move to new areas because of shifts in seasonal 
rainfall patterns and more extreme climate events. Climate change also may increase 
struggles over arable land, as suitable growing temperatures shift crops to higher latitudes 
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with lower soil fertility. Rising temperatures are also likely to change insects’ and pests’ 
behaviour, creating new threats for food production management. Changing climate 
illustrates how the continuous expansion of agribusiness capital has already begun to impact 
on its prospects for further circulation and accumulation. This situation is exacerbated and 
grounded by agribusiness’ tendency to be organised through global value chains. In this 
sense, trade dependence in food provision increases the negative impacts due to climate 
losses (see Wenz & Levermann, 2016).         
 
 
The last dance?111 
Another case that reveals the limits of further capital accumulation in food provision is the 
massive numbers of deaths among bees. Bees play a fundamental role to the yield and quality 
of food provision through the pollination of plants (Klein et al., 2007). Pollination is 
undertaken in two ways: by commercially managed bees and wild organisms; mainly bees 
but also butterflies, moths and flies. Out of 100 crop species that provide about 90% of food 
in the world, the FAO (2005) estimates 71% of food is bee-pollinated (by both commercial 
and wild bees). Although important staples such as wheat and rice are wind pollinated – 
fruits, seeds, vegetables and oil crops are dependent on bee pollination (Ellis, Myers, & 
Ricketts, 2015). In a reductionist monetary view, the contribution of bee pollination to the 
                                                 
111 Scientists have demonstrated that bees -in the eyes of humans- use dance language to communicate and 
inform each other about direction and distance to food resources.  
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production of food crops is estimated to be about 9.5% of the total value of world food 
production for human consumption (Gallai, Salles, Settele, & Vaissière, 2009) 
 
The possibility to control the natural pollination process is therefore an excellent business 
opportunity. Benjamin and McCallum (2009) and Kosek (2011) explain how pollination has 
become a large business, particularly in the US. Capitalist driven large monoculture 
production requires armies of pollinators. For this purpose, most agribusiness farms rent the 
honeybee Apis mellifera because they live in large colonies, and thus have more ‘workers’, 
fly longer distances and tolerate transport better. Moreover, they pollinate almost any plant. 
In order to be able to work longer and harder they are fed with corn syrup and protein 
supplements.  
 
Nevertheless, something went wrong with corporate driven bee business. In the US, since 
2006, an average annual bee loss of about 29% has been recorded. In addition, for the first 
time, summer losses exceed winter losses for commercial pollination services which raised 
further questions (Kaplan, 2015)(Miller, 2014). The massive bee hive collapse has been 
termed Colony Collapse Disorder (CCD). Importantly, the collapse of domesticated bees is 
not just circumscribed by commercially managed hives, but seems to be spreading infections 
to wild pollinating bees (Fürst, McMahon, Osborne, Paxton, & Brown, 2014). If a bee specie 
die out, the symbiotic relationship between flowers and bees may cause important 
biodiversity loss due to producing less seeds (Brosi & Briggs, 2013). The massive death of 
bees has been recognised by some as ‘an environmental crisis, bigger than climate change’ 
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(Benjamin & McCallum, 2009, p. 6). In Latin America, economic losses for pollinator-
dependent crop categories are estimated to impact on mostly edible oil crops, stimulant crops 
and nuts (Gallai et al., 2009, p. 815). A study on Brazil estimated the contribution of 
pollinators for dependent crops to be about 30% (Giannini, Cordeiro, Freitas, Saraiva, & 
Imperatriz-Fonseca, 2015).  
 
Massive bee disappearances are not new. Between 1868 and 1978, at least nineteen large 
number die-offs occurred (Underwood & van Engelsdorp, 2007). However, the current 
phenomena is particularly worrying because evidence increasingly shows that it is related to 
the dominant way food is produced today. Although there is no scientific consensus about 
the main cause, the deaths have been attributed to a combination of factors. These factors 
include parasites, agricultural chemicals and poor nutrition, which attack honeybee’s immune 
system. Despite initial efforts not to denounce industrial agriculture production, attention has 
been shifting from the parasite Varroa mite to increasing apprehensions of pesticides effects 
more directly related with capitalist food production (see USDA, 2012).  
 
It therefore appears that the main reason for bee deaths is attributed to capital-driven 
industrial agriculture, particularly to the use of agrochemicals. The most widely used 
insecticide, neonicotinoid, has been shown time and again to be the main cause of massive 
bee deaths. Some of the latest explanations are: impacts on neurological functions related to 
the insecticide (Lu, Warchol, & Callahan, 2014); and on damaging the immune system for 
consequent parasites infections (Pettis et al., 2013). As a result, in December 2013, the 
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European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) promoted the first continent-wide ban of the use of 
three neonicotinoids for two years. An extreme case of overuse of pesticides is China. In 
Sichuan province, farmers have been forced to hand pollinate fruit-trees. However, this does 
not seem like a good business model given that cheap human labour – which costs capital – 
is being used to substitute free labour from bees (Benjamin & McCallum, 2009, pp. 239–
240). However, the hand method has been also used in other countries as a complementary 
way of pollination (for an example for Colombia see Calle, Guariguata, Giraldo, & Chará, 
2010).  
 
It is not just agrochemicals, but also monoculture which impact on bees. In contrast to large 
monoculture farming, several studies on Latin America, as the FAO (2014g, p. 23) reports, 
have shown that different land uses based on diverse cropping patterns and biological 
corridors provide critical habitat for bees and quality of crops. In addition to agrochemicals 
and mono-cropping, the deaths of bees are also linked increasingly to genetically modified 
(GM) crops. Due to the lack of independent analysis, the ‘direct’ impact of GM crops on bees 
is still highly contentious. However, the correlated effects are less disputable. These include 
the widespread use of specific pesticides and the elimination of flowering weeds for bee 
forage, as well as killing off the host plants of other indigenous pollinators and beneficial 
insects. As I will address in the next section, genetically modified crops might not only 
undermine the possibilities of agribusiness’ expansion by massively killing bees, but also by 
creating resistant weeds.  
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Noxious weeds 
The last example for illustrating the potential irreparable rift in the metabolic exchange 
caused by agribusiness is the expansion of genetically modified organisms (GMO). 
Genetically engineered foods were developed in the 1980s and hit grocery store shelves from 
the mid-1990s onwards. In less than 20 years, in 2014, GM crops had taken over 1.8 billion 
hectares throughout 28 countries – a 100-fold increase from 1996.112 GM crop production has 
spread with the corporate US based agribusiness in developing countries, whereas in the EU 
it is minor and falling. Four cash crops account for virtually all GM production: soybean, 
corn, cotton, and canola. The GM crop variety is however expanding. Importantly, in 2014, 
the US approved the cultivation of the globally fourth most important staple crop, potato, 
while Brazil approved a new type of soybean and a virus resistant bean. In terms of cultivated 
areas, 77% of the worlds GM crops are cultivated in three countries. After the US (40%), 
Brazil (23%) and Argentina (13%) are respectively the second and third largest world 
producers. Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia have also become major players in GM crop 
production. In Latin America, the rise of GM crops has been mostly in soybean production, 
and then followed by corn. Other countries in the region open to GM crop production are: 
Mexico, Colombia, Chile (just for seeds) , Honduras, Cuba and Costa Rica (Clive, 2014).  
 
                                                 
112 This includes not just food but also cotton.  
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Based on promises of greater crop yields, pest and drought resistance, GM foods were ‘aid-
washed’ by allegedly helping to feed the world’s growing hungry population. However, 
profit in the GM industry has mainly involved two traits, namely herbicide tolerance (63%) 
and insect resistance (18%) (S. K. Basu et al., 2010, p. 10). The development and application 
of drought-tolerant crops and nutritious plants that require less or no pesticides and fertilisers 
have been largely marginal.  
 
After almost 20 years of market and crop expansion, increasing doubts are beginning to 
overshadow even the initial claims of the GM crops. Although evidence, as already indicated 
is heavily disputed, an increasing number of  studies is beginning to question the claims of 
increased yields with some even showing that GM crops decrease yields (Heinemann, 
Massaro, Coray, Agapito-Tenfen, & Wen, 2014). However, what GM crops certainly have 
spurred, is the increase in the use of glyphosate. Glyphosate is an herbicide linked to crops 
that have been genetically modified to survive the herbicides. The most common are 
Roundup Ready seeds from Monsanto that are immune to the company’s Roundup herbicide 
glyphosate (Benbrook, 2012).  
 
After an initial period in which GM technologies allowed farmers to largely eliminate weeds 
and pests from their fields, the huge use of glyphosate in industrial agriculture has led to the 
emergence of resistant weeds. Only in the US, 14 resistant glyphosate-weeds have been 
reported (Fernandez-Cornejo & Osteen, 2015) and more in other parts of the world  
(International Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds, 2015). In the case of the US, about 50% 
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of farms surveyed by a market research company have reported glyphosate-resistant weeds 
(K. Fraser, 2013). In addition to glyphosate-resistant weeds, the United Nations’ 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified glyphosate as likely to be 
carcinogenic for humans (IARC, 2015). 
 
It is likely that Monsanto, recently bought by Bayer, and its competitors will find short-term 
solutions based on new and likely heavier use of chemicals. This will, however, only serve 
for an additional round of capital accumulation, as nature again shifts the limits for capital- 
driven food production more definitively. In this regard, capital’s assumption of nature as 
external and free is increasingly making the rift in the metabolic exchange irreparable.   
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Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated how the agribusiness dominated system of food production 
and exchange reduces and degrades life itself. I did so by shifting the conceptual focus 
towards the metabolic exchange between human and non-human nature in food provision 
and the consequent rift produced by capital circulation and accumulation. I highlighted the 
systemic feature of dispossession as well as the elimination of nature’s diversity for 
equivalence driven exchange in this process. To place this dynamic within the Latin 
American context, I articulated the metabolic rift perspective within four distinctive 
ecological arguments. This served to highlight, for example, how capital degrades human 
nature along racist lines and that some Indigenous campesinos reassert the unity between 
nature and human through the metabolic interaction in food production from the perspective 
of distinct cosmovisions. In the third and longest section of this chapter I established how 
agribusiness has been destroying nature. The section advanced showing the degradation of 
nature by analytically dividing capital’s expansion over the agrarian frontier and the 
intensification in food production that originated in the Green Revolution.  
 
Subsequently, it was revealed how the increasing destruction of nature by agribusiness tends 
to create limits for further capital accumulation. In other words, capital’s destruction of nature 
is placing limits on its own reproduction. The chapter finished with empirical evidence based 
on three cases (climate change, the massive collapse in the bee population and the emergence 
of resistant herbicides) to show how the rift in the metabolic exchange produced by capitalist 
food provision threatens to disrupt the recursive cycle of capital accumulation. In short, this 
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chapter demonstrated that capital-driven food provision tends to push the boundaries of 
nature against its own possibilities of expansion and beyond.   
   
The metabolic rift interpretation allows an understanding of the mutual constituency of the 
nature-social dynamic. Nature is not just an ‘external’ input for the capitalist production 
process, but also shapes the conditions for social and economic dynamics. The political 
economy of the food system is thus intrinsically bound to the interactive rhythms of nature 
and human actions. This framing permits the acceptance that the food system is a contested 
ecological regime in which boundaries are simultaneously social and natural. As the case of 
capital-driven food provision demonstrated, the metabolic exchange between human and 
extra-human nature has been fundamentally disrupted. The accumulative transformation of 
the natural condition through capital’s expansion has hereby affected how future social and 
productive relations are organised. It raises then the question of how to effectively organise 
the food system while meeting human requirements of food intake within the limits of nature. 
 
This chapter has served to show the implications of corporate agribusiness on global 
thresholds in matter and energy.  However, as I have argued previously, corporate capital 
does not exhaust the provision of food, as campesinos still provide a critical proportion of 
food provision. Moreover, in terms of the metabolic interaction of society and nature in food 
provision, half of the world’s total labour force works in agriculture and most of landholdings 
are small-scale and family based. An overall crude reflection of the contradictory significance 
of labour power invested in food and the ‘value’ of food is represented by the fact that while 
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about 40% of world’s labour force produces food and agricultural products, it is just valorised 
at about 3% of world GDP (FAO, 2013a). This is important, not just for the exchange value 
produced, but also for the transformation of matter and energy. It opens up a place of 
discussion for an ‘alternative’ system of food provision that simultaneously addresses the 
destruction of human and extra-human nature caused by a capital. The aim of the next 
concluding chapter is precisely that.   
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8. Resisting capital throughout the food system 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I reassert the importance of food provision which is not subordinated to 
capital circulation and accumulation. I do so by focusing on empirical examples of food 
provision that have a non-capitalist content; that is, an economic circulation that avoids the 
exploitation of labour and the capitalist market as the central mechanism of socio-economic 
coordination. The goal is thus to point to existing practices that contribute to removing capital 
as the central mediator throughout the economic cycle. Before turning to this point, I briefly 
review the progress and broad argument of the previous chapters.  
 
So far, I have traced the historical trajectory and contemporary characteristics of the food 
system in Latin America. I explained how today’s dominant capitalist food provision arose 
out of a historical process that resulted in an uneven combination of transitional modes of 
production. This process was particularly slow to take root in rural areas. Underwriting the 
continuous expansion of capital over natural resources and the provision of food, 
accumulation by dispossession (ABD) has featured strongly. Mechanisms of dispossession, 
such as the appropriation of ancestral knowledge or separating people from their land, have 
been critical to further expanded reproduction and for the penetration of non-capitalist 
territories, including its socio-economic aspects. In this dynamic, the distinction of capital as 
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a process and capitalism as a wider set of configurations has been conceptually important to 
understand resistance and capital accumulation in agrarian change. I followed Harvey (2015, 
p. 7) by asserting that while ‘capital’ as a process of circulation and accumulation is open to 
resistance and non-capitalist spaces, ‘capitalism’ as a broader category refers to a ‘social 
formation in which processes of capital circulation and accumulation are hegemonic and 
dominant’. 
 
I demonstrated how the food system can be interpreted as being driven by two primary forms 
of provision. Firstly, the capitalist driven provision as expressed by agribusiness as 
corporations and smaller entrepreneurial farming, and secondly, by the campesino. In the 
case of agribusiness, I examined how the corporate driven food system is arranged in highly 
concentrated global value-chains, whose key features are industrial production and long-
distance trade. In this context, I also highlighted the distinctive role of domestic capital and 
translatinas in recent land distributions.  
 
The campesino includes a bundle of complementary work activities centred on direct food 
production, but can also comprise occasional wage labour, selling of crafts and other forms 
of appropriation of nature. The campesino economy employs mostly family work, but may 
also source complementary sporadic labour through community based arrangements or 
through wage labour. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, my understanding of the 
campesino is grounded in the mode of production (MOP) approach. In this sense, the 
campesino is a secondary mode of production. The campesino economy does not have an 
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independent existence separate from the primary mode (be it historically the communal, 
slave, feudal or capitalist). However, at the same time, it is not specific to any dominant mode 
within a social formation. As such, the campesino cannot be understood as purely determined 
by the dominant process of capital circulation and accumulation. Many campesinos inhabit 
complex and overlapping capitalist and non-capitalist spaces that are within capitalism but 
not completely determined by capital’s dominant form. The campesino economy, with its 
strong social and ecological linkages, reveals this non-capitalist dimension through the non-
commodified aspects in social reproduction and production. This can be illustrated by the 
importance of women and the community in social reproduction or the more ‘sustainable’ 
interaction with nature in production. 
 
As I have demonstrated, food provision is not completely monopolised by agribusiness, 
because the campesino still provides a substantial share for domestic food supply and holds 
most farming units on a global scale. The ultimate arrangement is a dynamic relational space 
of struggle. However, this fragile balance is being threatened by the continuous expansion of 
capital over new territories. It is having destructive consequences on human nature, as 
demonstrated through the persistence of hunger, and on extra-human nature as expressed 
through the deepening in the metabolic rift. I have explained how this dynamic is 
unsustainable for humans and the ecosystem because it tends to erode the social and natural 
bases of production and reproduction.  
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After the above short review, I now turn to the content of this penultimate chapter which 
examines alternatives to the dominant arrangement in food provision. The objective is to 
avoid concluding with an overly pessimistic narrative, a common feature in critical political 
economy, and to outline a more emancipatory and open-ended path. The aim of this chapter 
is not to provide a detailed analysis of non-capitalist food provision in all its forms and 
variations as it would be beyond the scope of this chapter. It has also not been my goal to 
present a recipe of success, a manual of procedures or to propose an abstract alternative. With 
that in mind, I analyse how experiences linked to non-capitalist food provision continue to 
represent alternatives and resistance to capital-driven food provision. The emphasis is thus 
to rely on concrete examples which challenge the dominant economic structure of food 
arrangement rather than developing a ‘pure’ ideal project. I am interested in concrete efforts 
in transforming the dominant paradigm or the ‘viability’, in Wright’s words (2010), of non-
capitalist food provision. As I have asserted throughout this dissertation, this body of 
knowledge, experiences and practices is likely to be found in Indigenous people and 
campesinos. This again validates my earlier claim to consider Latin America as a site of 
knowledge production.  
 
I propose to examine non-capitalist food provision through four different moments of the 
economic cycle – production, distribution, exchange and consumption. Although the four 
distinct moments are treated analytically separated, they have to be understood in terms of 
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its reciprocal influences and totality as a food system.113 Production is defined by the 
articulation of labour power, the means of production and the use of nature. Distribution is 
understood as the appropriation of value and the determination of the actor’s position in the 
food system. Exchange is related to the moment of concrete circulation and the role of 
intermediation, trade and markets. Lastly, consumption is linked to the exercise of effective 
demand and the act of eating. Analytically, the reproduction of the food system consists of 
various moments in which the production process is considered the core. This is the case as 
it tends to determine the social relations, the relations with nature and the subsequent 
moments.  
 
Although my analytical approach privileges the economic sphere, the close link between the 
economic and political dimension reveals itself throughout the underlying dynamics of 
dispossession and resistance when considering capital as a process. In this regard, even 
though the political dimension is considered critical, my aim in this chapter is not to outline 
a political strategy for transformation. This would require a shift in focus and additional 
scope. As the various social movements in Latin America have illustrated, it is not enough 
to reconfigure the economic practices and resources in a different way.114 It is also necessary 
                                                 
113See Harnecker (1976, pp. 196–200) to review a more detailed but still brief theoretical discussion on the 
interrelation and mutual constitution of the different moments.  
114 Historically, the campesinos have been major players among social movements in Latin America 
(Bruckmann & Dos Santos, 2008). The movements arise from diverse dynamics, and include, for example, the 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil, the Zapatistas in Mexico, the ‘cocaleros’ in 
Bolivia, and the Movimiento Nacional Campesino Indigena (MNCI) in Argentina. At the same time, there are 
platforms for regional and global articulation among the movements, such as Coordinadora de Organizaciones 
del Campo (CLOC) and of course Via Campesina (Mançano Fernandes & Stedile, 2012). 
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to politically challenge capital and the state to rearrange control over nature and productive 
resources.  
 
This chapter is organised in two broad sections. In the first section, I outline my approach for 
studying the campesino’s challenge to the capital-driven food provision. I begin by 
reasserting the critical role of the campesino for non-capitalist food provision. Next, I 
emphasise the importance of concrete practices for studying non-capitalist aspects. In order 
to facilitate the subsequent examination, I finish this section by contrasting the main ‘ideal’ 
tenets of non-capitalist food provision with respect to the previous discussed dominant 
capitalist form. In the second section, I analyse non-capitalist forms of food provision through 
four economic moments (production, distribution, exchange and consumption). I argue that 
a non-capitalist driven food system should be based on campesino production which is 
grounded on their closer social and ecological nexus. I particularly reassert the necessity to 
close the capital-driven metabolic rift. I next examine the importance of the redistribution of 
the control and access over land, and wider surplus for a non-capitalist campesino driven 
economy. Subsequently, I study the exchange which is of particular importance for the 
campesino centred on direct production. In particular, I examine the role of shorter exchange 
circuits compared to the corporate model of large grocery stores and long-distance trade. I 
finish this section by asserting that food consumption is a critical political act that reinforces 
the other moments of the economic cycle.    
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The main conclusion of the chapter is that although recent and long-standing experiences do 
not appear sufficient to signal a break within the dominant form of circulation and 
accumulation; they do point to viable possible alternatives in pursuing an emancipatory food 
system. In this vein, there is positive evidence pointing to the possibility of a structural 
transformation in the food system. However, in addition to the political challenge I referred 
to earlier, as I examine towards the end of this chapter, essential questions regarding the 
consolidation of a possible non-capitalist provision persist. These include: challenges 
regarding the potential for scaling-up campesino driven food provision; the role of markets 
in terms of prices and resource allocation; the social valorisation of food; the formation of 
consciousness to conceive demand as a political act; the political struggles as they relate to 
legal and institutional changes; and the risk of repeating practices determined by capital.   
 
 
Reducing capital’s dominance in food provision   
Reasserting the critical role of the campesino in non-capitalist food provision  
Building upon the progress and arguments of the previous chapters, this concluding chapter 
reasserts the importance of the campesino as a potential alternative to the capital dominated 
food system. In Latin America, many experiences of non-capitalist processes are situated in 
the context of food provision. As explained throughout this dissertation, many of these 
practices are related to the campesino, who often occupies the socio-economic boundaries of 
capital. In the same sense, and as argued in Chapter 2, the campesino as a secondary mode 
of production is neither intrinsically capitalist nor non-capitalist. As demonstrated in Chapter 
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5 on the campesino, their specific location is historically contingent. In short, the campesino 
is not specific to the dominant mode of accumulation. This does not mean that capital has no 
impact on the campesino or that the campesino economy does not affect capital circulation 
and accumulation. The food system is configured as a relational dynamic space where the 
specific constellation is constantly disputed.  
 
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to briefly repeat some of the arguments previously 
discussed in Chapter 2. The capitalist mode of production is characterised by the centrality 
of wage labour from which surplus value is extracted and by the capitalist market as a central 
mechanism of social and economic coordination for the buying and selling of commodities. 
Within capitalism, the capitalist mode of production is considered the dominant mode but 
not the only one. Different types of unwaged or ‘free’ labour associated with ‘pre-capitalist’ 
modes of production still exist (e.g.; modern slavery, paid prison workers). Additionally, 
many people live on non-wage incomes. Moreover, the capitalist market is not ubiquitous 
and various aspects of production and social reproduction are not commodified.  
 
For the purpose of envisioning a more open ended and emancipatory path, my understanding 
of non-capital-driven food provision is defined by the collective and democratic control over 
production, distribution and appropriation of the surplus that circumvents labour exploitation 
and the capitalist market as the central mechanism of socio-economic coordination. From the 
standpoint of a negative definition regarding capital, the non-capitalist is where the 
campesino economy opposes the concentration of capital in food provision.  
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The boundaries between the capitalist and non-capitalist are considered porous, fluid and 
contested; as capital expands and people oppose commodification. This is further 
complicated by the extra-human nature accumulating limits to the expansion of capital. From 
a functional perspective, the non-commodified aspects such as the gendered division of 
labour in social reproduction or the appropriation of ‘free nature’ can be interpreted to some 
extent as functional for further capital accumulation. However, when considering the 
potential of an alternative to capital-driven food provision, the non-commodified aspects can 
be regarded as linked to non-capitalist alternatives. This is particularly relevant when looking 
at the multifunctional character of the campesino economy, which is related to social and 
ecological linkages. It is connected to non-exploitative relations of production and has more 
sustainable ties with nature.          
 
Importantly for the present chapter, this collective body of non-capitalist practices by the 
campesino are therefore expressed not just in a ‘reductionist’ productive dimension, but tend 
be bound closely to the community. The latter is understood in its original sense of reciprocity 
and complementary (Esposito, 2010). In addition, as explained earlier, throughout the 
continent many campesinos are Indigenous people, which continue to reflect ongoing social 
and economic practices and knowledge, but also disadvantage that originated from colonial 
times. 
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In summary, the concrete campesino economy tends not to be located in a purely capitalist 
or non-capitalist mode of production and highlights mixed features of production. Although 
the campesino might operate at particular moments of the economic cycle in a non-capitalist 
sense; in other settings, the campesino engages more directly with capital dominated 
structures. The non-capitalist is therefore analysed in relation to a specific moment or 
practice. In this sense, the campesino may interact with the capitalist market in order to sell 
their surplus and buy inputs. Nevertheless, they tend to operate at the margin of the capitalist 
logic for accumulation and profit maximisation. As direct producers, their close nexus with 
nature and porters of traditional forms of production means that they bear the potential to 
challenge the dominant capitalist modes of food provision. They thus represent a force that 
can simultaneously face the degradation of nature (e.g., climate change, erosion of 
biodiversity) and contribute to the food supply in an alternative way. They can be considered 
in this sense as potential actors who oppose the concentration of economic power in the food 
system. This does not mean, however, that the campesino is considered an inherent bearer of 
non-capitalist practices that abolish the law of value. The concrete alternative is mainly 
shaped by the ups and downs of campesino struggles. These are certainly not all anti-
capitalist. The goal is to reach a balanced view between an overly idealised campesino’s role 
in undermining the dominance of capital, and an overly pessimistic interpretation that denies 
any alternative to capitalist food provision. I conclude by arguing that the campesino cannot 
simply be reduced to a ‘social class’, a social group, people living and/or working in rural 
areas, but includes examples of practical translation for different ways of organising the food 
system.  
 
282 
 
Practice as resistance 
My approach in this chapter privileges the examination of concrete examples of non-
capitalist practices. In order to articulate the campesino practice as a more open ended and 
emancipatory path, I draw inspiration from the Brazilian writer Paulo Freire. In analysing 
education in Latin America, Freire (1970/2005, p. 55) recognised that an emancipatory 
education, which he famously termed the ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’, has two interrelated 
moments. In the first moment, the oppressed becomes aware of the oppressing world and 
importantly becomes committed, through praxis, to the transformation of society. In the 
second moment of the transformed reality, this pedagogy becomes the pedagogy of humans 
in the constant process of emancipation.  
 
What interests me, in terms of the campesino as an emancipatory possibility, is the 
importance of concrete ongoing practical experiences, that combined with ‘consciousness’, 
might become an act of liberation and challenge. This chapter does not engage with the 
process of ‘consciousness’, though equally important, but with the concrete practice. The 
latter is crucial as it contains knowledge that has existed before and during capitalism. In this 
sense, it contains within itself, at least partially, an ‘ideal’ of non-capitalist food provision. 
However, under the domain of capital, this practice and experience is limited and blocked. 
To become an emancipatory force, it also requires, as Freire notes, an awareness of the 
structures of oppression. The advantage of the campesino, in this regard, is his ‘double 
experience’ in so far as the campesino is situated to some extent in intersecting worlds – 
within and outside of the domain of capital. Based on this understanding and without 
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conferring any deterministic forecast, I argue that the historical trajectory of the campesino 
experience and knowledge contains the seeds for transformative struggles.     
  
Therefore, in this chapter, I discuss the challenge to the dominant capitalist form of 
production, distribution, exchange and consumption as grounded in ongoing campesino 
centred experiences. I claim that these experiences include the practical translation of an 
‘ideal’ and the acquisition and consolidation of concrete knowledge linked to processes of 
food provision. This is expressed through concrete efforts to circumvent the corporate 
controlled economic food cycle, which is reflected in capitalist market concentration, 
exclusion and intensified exploitation associated with dominant forms of capital circulation 
and accumulation.  
 
Although my analysis of the non-capitalist focuses on concrete examples within the four 
moments of the economic cycle, I first briefly contrast the main ‘ideal’ tenets of the capital-
driven and the campesino’s more open ended and emancipatory path. This builds on the 
insights attained from previous chapters. The aim is to facilitate the subsequent empirical 
analysis.  
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Contrasting the ‘ideal’ type in both food models 
As already asserted, the actual food system is a relational space where hybrid and dynamic 
forms of food provision develop. However, it is possible to reduce the food system into two 
competing ‘ideal’ models: capital and non-capital-driven food provision (Table 8.1). The 
concrete campesino economy is located at the intersection of these ideal models. The 
following table thus outlines a ‘pure’ contrast of both models.    
 
Table 8.1: Contrasting ideal models: capital versus non-capital-driven food provision 
 Capital-driven food provision Non-capital-driven food provision 
Main actor Large corporations Campesino agriculture 
Main form of 
production 
Industrial production Potential for agroecological 
production 
Distribution: position in 
capital accumulation 
Commanding Resistance  
Ownership and control 
of surplus 
Private Campesino/Community  
Priority production  Export oriented Local provision  
Exchange Long distance & large grocery stores Short-distance & priority for the 
local dimension 
Leitmotif - Food Pursuit of profit: food as any other 
commodity 
Food as a human right  
Value conception Entrepreneurial  Direct producers rooted in 
community and nature 
Development via Firm upgrading and integrating the Democratic control over the 
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export-chain economic process 
Hunger Result of scarcity because of low 
productivity or natural events. 
Solutions based on increased 
productivity and ‘comparative 
advantage’ in trade 
Because of poverty and inequality, 
solutions based on direct command 
and local production  
Relation to nature External. Enclosures and 
extractivism 
Closer nexus to nature  
Role of the State Support liberalisation in favour of 
large corporations. Campesinos 
regarded as potential entrepreneurs or 
poverty prone people.  
Allows state support in the form of 
subsidies for campesinos (e.g. 
procurement, price support, 
irrigation, research) but control 
remains with producers. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As summarised in the previous table and examined in more detail in previous chapters, on 
the one hand, there is the dominant capitalist system of food provision that is dominated by 
agribusiness. It is characterised by industrial production, which is highly energy and 
agrochemical intensive. Based on private ownership and control over surplus extraction, 
agribusiness exerts a commanding position in the distributive outcome in the process of 
capital accumulation. The inherent drive for profit treats food as any other commodity. 
Organised through global value-chains, production is consequently mostly oriented towards 
export to higher income countries through long-distance trade. Value is considered to be 
created by entrepreneurs and development is achieved by climbing up the export-chain and 
firm-upgrading. In the process of capital accumulation, hunger and the destruction of nature 
are explicated as the consequence of scarcity, low productivity and externality. 
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On the other hand, a more open ended and emancipatory campesino path (I will go through 
this in greater detail in the next section) considers production in agroecological terms with a 
focus on local provision. It is understood as a form of resistance which entails a kind of 
development that is in opposition to the dominant agribusiness-led model. In this view, direct 
producers and the community have the priority in terms of wider economic control. 
Following the table just outlined, the campesino path has to be thought of as a challenge to 
political and economic structures that moves away from the globalised dominant capitalist 
food production. It is a strategy based on the revalorisation of social criteria, natural and 
proximity scale which also requires the transformation of institutional settings. 
 
The interplay of forces between these two ‘ideal’ types is expressed in specific food 
arrangements with the food system as a relational space. Struggle and resistance are therefore 
inscribed to the actual food system. In practice, therefore, more hybrid forms are visible. For 
example, campesinos can employ chemical intensive production, while industrial farming 
can produce organic food. Thus, the empirical substance of non-capitalist food provision may 
take diverse forms throughout the economic cycle. Although I will not explore this claim in 
more detail, I argue that the concrete response depends on at least four dimensions: 1) degrees 
of capitalist market dependence in terms of the interaction with the capitalist market as actors 
of production, exchange and consumption; 2) the international division of labour and its 
relation to shifts in global cropping patterns and new methods of production; 3) the 
campesino’s relationship with the state, for example, as beneficiaries and/or victims of public 
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policies (e.g. irrigation subsidies, or land dispossession for mining activities, construction of 
dams etc.); and 4) on its collective commitment and communal grounding.   
 
So far, I have argued for the critical role of the campesino for non-capitalist food provision. 
I explained my practice centred approach to examine the non-capitalist content in campesino 
driven food provision. In order to facilitate the empirical analysis that follows, I contrasted 
the main ideal features of capital and campesino driven food provision. Next, I examine non-
capitalist experiences and practices in the food system as an alternative to the agribusiness-
led system over four distinct moments of the economic cycle: production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption. The aim is to demonstrate that there exist concrete practices and 
knowledge that are linked to the campesino economy which are able to remove capital as the 
central mediator throughout the economic cycle. In other words, there exists evidence that 
the campesino driven provision contributes to a reduction of capital’s dominance in the food 
system.  
 
 
Production: Closing the metabolic rift and stabilising food provision115 
This section argues that an agroecology approach centred on the campesino economy can 
help to overcome the ecological destruction and food insecurity issues linked to capitalist 
                                                 
115 Various examples of campesino driven food provision linked to non-capitalist aspects can be found in the 
journal Otra Economía (The Other Economy) that seeks to renew the debate on the social, solidarity and 
cooperative economy. The journal aims to promote research at the intersection of the academia and social 
movements. See http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/otraeconomia.  
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driven food production. It hereby addresses what was discussed in the opening section of this 
dissertation, where I presented these two fundamental issues as linked to the capitalist mode 
of production. The campesino centred agroecology provision challenges the agribusiness led 
form of production by placing the emphasis on its closer nexus to natural cycles and non-
widely recognised productivity.  
 
Agroecology has emerged in the last three decades as an alternative against the destruction 
of nature by capital-driven industrial food production. The agroecological approach supports 
a non-capitalist form of food provision by offering a productive alternative centred on the 
critical role of the campesinos. It developed out of the interaction between agrarian scientists, 
campesinos and indigenous producers which established a scientific underpinning for a non-
capital-driven food provision and reified campesino’s knowledge, practices and identity.  
 
One of the best-known agroecologist scholars is Miguel Altieri. In his understanding, 
agroecology proposes to study agrarian processes from an ecological perspective. The 
approach aims for the optimisation of the whole agrosystem by looking at socioeconomic 
relations, as well as energy transformation, biological processes and mineral cycles. It 
interprets sustainability in terms of the flexible achievement of three intersecting goals: 1) 
economical (equality and economic viability, use of local resources, stable production); 2) 
environmental (biodiversity, ecosystemic functions and productive stability); and 3) social 
(food self-sufficiency, satisfaction of local necessities and integrated rural development). 
These three objectives are linked together through a low impact use of technology. 
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Importantly, corresponding to my interpretation of non-capitalist food provision, 
agroecology recognises the campesino as the main actor of change due to its emphasis on 
local production systems rooted in cultural and ecological traditions. Agroecological inspired 
projects therefore aim to strengthen ancestral local campesino knowledge combined with 
new viable techniques (Altieri & Nicholls, 2000, pp. 14–33).  
 
An agrecological production approach reinforces our understanding of the campesino as a 
potential actor of resistance and viable alternative to dominant industrial production. It also 
strengthens my argument to consider the campesino as more than merely an extinct historical 
category, as theorised by some authors. Due to their close nexus to nature and accumulated 
knowledge, the campesinos are placed in an advantageous position for a sustainable 
reproduction of the natural base of the food system. There have been several examples in 
Latin America in rescuing ancient indigenous agrarian knowledge to balance contemporary 
productive and ecological goals. These include chinampa agriculture in Mexico, which 
‘involves the construction of raised farming bed in shallow lakes or marshes’; the use of 
ethnobotanical ancestral knowledge of Huilliche Indians in Chile to slow the loss of genetic 
diversity; the restoration and building of terraces in the Peruvian Andes that date back to the 
Inca and pre-Inca periods for the farming of steep slopes; and the Waru-Waru elevated earth 
platforms that allow farming at high altitudes, also in Peru (see Altieri & Nicholls, 2008, pp. 
476–477).  
 
290 
 
Within the framework of agroecological production, the metabolic rift is addressed from an 
approach that comprises multiple components. These are grounded in the campesino who 
offers a more integrated possibility of metabolic exchange with nature. Campesino 
production tends to reduce chemical inputs, use of fossil energy, and privileges for instance 
soil with vegetation as opposed to the barren and dry soil seen typically in industrial farms. 
Moreover, the priority of localised production processes in agroecology also entails the 
reduction of import related carbon emissions. The emphasis on crop diversification in 
agroecology is also important to improve the ecological fundamentals of the food system by 
reducing plagues and improving nutrients. The rotation of crops and the priority of 
organically managed soil entail improved capacity for carbon sequestration which is critical 
for climate change mitigation (see Altieri & Nicholls, 2000; Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2012).  
 
Based on a review of available scientific literature on the right to food by the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur in 2010, De Schutter presented his conclusions on the potential benefits 
of a shift to agroecological forms of production (de Schutter, 2010). The report demonstrates 
at least two aspects. First, agroecology is endorsed by a growing part of the scientific 
community (Wezel & Soldat, 2009) and international organisations such as the FAO, the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) (FAO, 
2015b; IAASTD, 2016; UNEP, 2009). Second, De Schutter reports that agroecology, if 
adequately supported, can double food production within 10 years in certain regions while 
reducing rural poverty and mitigating climate change. Among the evidence presented, the 
rapporteur refers to a study that examined 286 agroecological projects and found a 79% 
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average increase in yields (Pretty et al., 2006). A more recent study of 40 agricultural projects 
that involved 10.4 million producers demonstrated not only an average crop yield increase 
of 113%, but also environmental benefits. These included carbon sequestration and 
reductions in soil erosion and pesticide use (Pretty, Toulmin, & Williams, 2011). More 
specifically for Latin America, Altieri (2004) noted that yield increased between 20% and 
330%, while there were also advances in dietary diversity and food security.  
 
At the country level, Cuba – which in recent years introduced a large-scale shift to 
agroecology – is a good example. After the break-up of the socialist bloc, Cuban campesinos 
have been able to increase food production without relying on agrochemical, fuel and feed 
imports. This rapid and successful conversion to agroecology was achieved mainly due to 
the broad-based participation in decision-making and management of food production. In 
this process, the participatory social dynamics supported by the Campesino-to-Campesino 
Agroecology Movement and wider political and institutional integration were key aspects of 
the transformation (Nelson, Scott, Cukier, & Galán, 2009; Rosset, Machín Sosa, Roque 
Jaime, & Ávila Lozano, 2011; J. Wright, 2009, 2010).  
 
A significant part of the international literature on agroecology comes from Latin America 
and is not represented in formal academic literature (Tomich et al., 2011). This is an obstacle 
to the adequate diffusion and validation of agroecological experiences and initiatives. In 
Spanish, a great number of agroecological projects in Latin America are documented by the 
Latin American Scientific Society of Agroecology (its Spanish acronym is SOCLA). A look 
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at the reports of the 2013 and 2015 SOCLA Congresses which have been held every two 
years since 2007, reveal additional hundreds of contemporary agroecological experiences. 
As indicated in the introduction, although the priority here is to present concrete alternatives 
to the dominant arrangement of food provision, a detailed analysis of different experiences 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the experiences documented by SOCLA can 
be categorised into six dimensions: 1) the existence of diverse agricultural production 
systems; 2) adaptations to specific ecological territories including urban and peri-urban 
spaces; 3) problems deriving from ‘economic sustainability’ and challenges stemming from 
certification requirements, distribution and ‘marketisation’; 4) illustrations of environmental 
sustainable productions; 5) knowledge accumulation based on cases such as the rescuing of 
traditional practices or direct education; and 6) connecting agroecology to social movements, 
the state and more broadly rural development (SOCLA, 2013, 2015).  
 
 
Productivity and hunger 
Corporate industrial agriculture, commonly characterised by large-scale and capital-intensive 
operations, has been defended as being more productive than small-scale units which are 
typically associated with the campesino economy. Capital-driven agriculture in this vein has 
been assumed to be synonymous with higher productivity. This argument has been critical 
for defending capital-driven food provision in an increasingly urban world in face of resource 
‘scarcity’. Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence challenges this view by arguing the 
opposite namely that small-scale integrated food production proportionally produces more 
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output than large-scale monocrops (Altieri & Nicholls, 2008, p. 474; Rosset et al., 2011). In 
addition, capital-driven productivity in agriculture, in terms of energy flows, is increasingly 
negative (Juan Martinez-Alier, 1987). Although industrial monocropping has achieved 
increased levels of productivity in some countries, in terms of commodity production, as 
examined in the previous two chapters, it also has tended to destroy human and extra-human 
nature. Instead, agroecology has the advantage in that it seems to be able to tackle food 
insecurity at the same time as the degradation of nature (Chappell & LaValle, 2009). In other 
words, agroecology provides a scientific and campesino-grounded production model that can 
stabilise the provision of food and be understood as an attempt to bridge the metabolic rift; 
that is, the fragmentation of the natural and social processes of production caused by capital 
driven food provision (as analysed in Chapter 7).  
 
 
Urban Agriculture 
Latin America is a highly urbanised region. About 79% of people live in cities (FAO, 2014b). 
To some extent, this has been directly caused by the historical destruction of campesino 
livelihood strategies. It necessarily raises the question of how small-scale campesino 
production may meet urban food demand. In this regard, urban and peri-urban food 
production seems to be a critical additional requirement for non-capitalist food provision. In 
addition to agroecology appearing to be a good approach in addressing food production on 
small-scale units, it also seems suitable for production on urban land. Thus, urban agriculture 
would hereby add to overall food availability, while also contributing to reducing the 
294 
 
destruction of nature by providing fresher produce with less reliance on long distance 
transport, and thus energy use. It also reduces the number of merchants and the distance 
between final consumers and producers. Moreover, urban agriculture may also have 
implications for urban land planning, and improve food security by providing sustainable 
access and lower prices for poor people.  
 
The FAO (2014c) conducted an extensive study to examine the state of urban and peri-urban 
agriculture in Latin America. The report includes 23 country surveys, data on food production 
for 110 cities and towns, and 13 specific case studies of major cities, including Havana, 
Mexico City, Tegucigalpa, Managua, Quito, Lima, El Alto, Belo Horizonte and Rosario. The 
study concludes that urban and peri-urban agriculture is widespread reaching 40% in Cuba. 
Drawing from a previous analysis, the report also informs that in Nicaragua and Guatemala, 
for example, the savings in food expenditure and the selling of food products account for 
more than 20% of households’ income. The FAO concludes that urban agriculture throughout 
Latin America takes different forms appropriated to small spaces. The most common are 
school gardens and backyard family horticulture. Other activities observed are production of 
flowers and the raising of small animals for meat and eggs.     
 
Perhaps one of the most notable cases in Latin America is Rosario in Argentina, where almost 
800 urban or peri-urban gardens have been providing food for about 40,000 people (Mougeot, 
2006; Zeeuw & Drechsel, 2015). Particularly interesting is how Rosario’s urban agriculture 
grew out of a small agroecological project conceived by a group of agricultural engineers 
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that sought to address the food insecurity of marginalised people in the 1980s. In 2011, set 
against the backdrop of Argentina’s severe economic and social crises, the local government 
transformed urban agriculture into a public policy (Sanchez Miñarro, 2013). The experience 
of Rosario also highlights the importance of women’s participation in urban agriculture. 
Women comprise about 70% of all producers. However, participation declines with an 
increase in farm size, reproducing more general patterns of gender inequality. In addition, 
urban agriculture has also provided employment and income opportunities for those excluded 
from the formal job market, such as older adults and people with disabilities (Mazzuca, 
Ponce, & Terrile, 2009).            
 
Cuba is not only an example of large-scale transformation to agroecology, but it also 
represents a recent success story in expanding urban agriculture through providing ready 
fresh food and shortening the distribution chain. For instance, in Havana the advance in food 
production has been attained by two national policies, one for urban and the other for peri-
urban agriculture. The estimated land size of urban and peri-urban agriculture in Havana is 
about half of the area of the province of Havana, involving approximately 90,000 residents. 
The government has implemented special measures to facilitate access to suitable urban land. 
Despite the active commitment of the national government, the high level of local autonomy 
has been considered central for addressing food security issues (FAO, 2014c, pp. 10–18). In 
this vein, Cuba is also is an example of how urban agriculture may improve local nutrition 
levels by offering fresh produce, reducing transport and pollution, decentralising supply and 
offering new sources of employment (Companioni, 2014, pp. 89–90).  
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In summary, in contrast to capital promoted industrial food production which tends to destroy 
the conditions of its reproduction, campesino centred agroecology appears better suited to 
contributing to overall food supply. Despite some reservations, agroecology appears to 
propose a food production system which mitigates and adapts better to problems which are 
causing the continuous destruction of human and extra-human nature. Moreover, 
agroecology is better suited to small-scale production in urban and peri-urban areas, and can 
complement campesino driven food supply. Thus, an agroecology approach centred on the 
campesino economy seems well suited to support a non-capitalist driven food production that 
closes the metabolic rift and stabilises the food system.   
 
 
Distribution: towards campesino control 
In its review, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recognised that rural 
populations should have increased access to productive resources in order to reduce their 
vulnerability to climate change (Dasgupta et al., 2014). The report also asserts the value of 
traditional and local knowledge for mitigating the impacts of climate change. Thus, although 
in rather diplomatic language, the IPCC study actually provides arguments for transformation 
of the distributive character of the food system, including agrarian reforms. In this regard, 
this section addresses the potential of non-capitalist food provision as it relates to the moment 
of distribution of the economic cycle.     
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Distribution has already been defined as the appropriation of value, and determines the 
actor’s position in the food system. In this regard, an alternative distribution linked to non-
capitalist driven provision needs to focus on restructuring control over the production process 
by campesinos vis-a-vis agribusiness. Most efforts of redistribution are about struggles over 
control and access to land and wider social control over surplus. A transformation of the 
productive food structures – in line with a move towards a more agroecological process of 
food production – would propose to move the use and allocation of surplus towards the 
campesino control. However, the overall tendency is that capital continues to displace 
campesinos towards less fertile land and enclose the more fertile areas for profitable 
commercial agriculture. This is illustrated today again through some of the ‘land grabbing’ 
dynamics.  
 
The opposing locations of campesinos and agribusiness in the food system are illustrated to 
some extent by its inverse contribution to GDP in agriculture, and the number and size of 
landholdings. While campesinos (when defined as family agriculture by FAO) in Latin 
America hold about 80% of landholdings on just 23% of total agrarian land, its contribution 
to the agricultural GDP is lower than 50% (FAO, 2014a). As argued before, this location has 
been the outcome of a long historical processes of uneven capitalist development in Latin 
America that also included radical new distributions. The conquest of Latin America, the 
colonial plunder, or the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and subsequent 
liberalising policies – are all representative of these radical distributive changes that favoured 
capital. This dynamic, has been countered by the historical and contemporary claim of 
campesino led land reforms, though often with limited results. The specificities of this 
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process have been examined extensively in the historical chapter and the chapters on 
agribusiness and the campesino (see Chapters 3 to 5). The outcome in short, today 
campesinos although still critical for overall food supply control just a small proportion of 
land and surplus compared to agribusiness. The commanding position of capital over labour, 
natural resources and states, shapes the marginal position of campesinos in the distribution 
of wealth and benefits. 
 
Certainly, not all struggles are over the distribution of land and natural resources, some are 
placed within the attempt to integrate into the agribusiness dominated food chain in better 
terms. This often occurs in two typical ways. On the one hand, it is to deliver to a middle-
agent who pools and organises logistics to further allocate the produce. On the other hand, it 
is to associate with other producers in a cooperative in order to build up enough leverage to 
negotiate directly with retailers. Problems of coordination due to atomisation because of large 
campesino numbers tend to be one of the critical challenges. This is in contrast, to hierarchal 
and concentrated business structures, and economies of scale in agribusiness which have its 
own integrated merchants and wholesalers. Additional barriers to both ways of integration 
stem from the requirements of large volumes, standardisation and homogenisation of 
products. The final result of these integration processes tends to be an agribusiness driven 
chain in which campesinos occupy a subordinated position to capital in terms of contracts, 
payments and production requirements. Production risks are hereby outsourced to the 
weakest link. Despite state efforts to integrate the campesino in the food chain, most do not 
even pass the initial filter to integrate into these business chains (see Acosta, 2006; GTZ, 
2009; Quirós, 2010).  
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As we will see in the next section, a greater campesino control and command over production 
through a redistributive process also requires transformation in the exchange process. In other 
words, I argue that the aim of social and economic control of the production and distribution 
systems towards direct producers is to localise the food system and to promote shorter supply 
chains.  
 
  
Exchange: prioritising the local and short-circuits 
Exchange is a crucial moment in the economic process, particularly for direct producers. As 
an intermediary stage, it links production, distribution and consumption. In this sense, an 
analysis of exchange is especially important for campesinos. As asserted elsewhere, 
campesinos are exploited at several points of the economic process, not just as sporadic wage-
labour, but particularly as direct producers when they sell their products. Nevertheless, to 
control the intermediary role is not just essential for the survival of campesinos, but also for 
the pursuit of profit in agribusiness.  
 
In regard to the dimension of agribusiness driven exchange, so far, I have examined mostly 
the global value-chain which is organised through trade, and neglected the importance of 
large grocery stores. In this vein, the next section looks briefly first at how the agribusiness 
controlled exchange is characterised by corporate grocery stores and long-distance trade. I 
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then proceed to examine how a non-capitalist exchange in food may be organised around 
localised short-circuits.  
 
 
Characterising exchange in agribusiness 
As examined before, an agribusiness led food system entails not only industrial production, 
but also a form of exchange that creates distance between direct producers and consumers. 
The two main expressions of corporate agribusiness exchange are the rise of supermarkets in 
Latin America (T. A. Reardon, Berdegué, & Farrington, 2002; Traill, 2006) and long-
distance trade. Today, a large amount of food is sold in large grocery stores particularly in 
urban areas. It is the last point of the agribusiness food chain that started from seeds, to the 
manufacture of pesticides and fertilisers, to processing plants, transport and finally 
consumption. However, with the exception of Chile (65%), the percentage of large 
supermarkets still remains below 50% for the rest of Latin America (OECD, 2015, p. 5). 
Characterised by a tendency for market concentration (OECD, 2015, p. 9), and in line with 
my study on corporate agribusiness in Chapter 4, large grocery stores exert power over 
weaker links of the supply chain. Direct producers and consumers located at the extremes of 
the chain are particularly vulnerable.  
 
Another feature of the dominant form of exchange in agribusiness is long distance trade. 
Today most of this trade is organised through corporate controlled global value-chains 
(Milberg & Winkler, 2013). This aspect has been more closely examined in Chapter 4 and 6. 
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In regard to the moment of exchange, it is pertinent to assert that corporate driven exchange 
among countries and continents is not just carrying trade, but again an opportunity to control 
surplus and exert unequal power relations over direct producers. As explained in the 
historical Chapter 3 and the following Chapter 4 on corporate agribusiness, capital 
accumulation has proceeded over time through distinctive trade and investment liberalisation 
by pushing for the elimination of trade barriers.  
 
The impact of these liberalisation policies is not just expressed in the volume exchanged. 
This process has also been reflected by the conquest of capital’s frontiers with the 
construction of railroads and transport facilities, but also through new forms of production. 
In this regard, Friedman (1992, pp. 374–376) points out that long distance trade and durability 
of products reinforce each other. As distance of final consumption markets increases, food 
has to be made more durable through the standardisation of produce, mechanised production 
systems and biotechnological changes. I next proceed to examine how a non-capital-driven 
exchange centred on the campesino could look like.  
 
 
Reducing distance  
As I have argued in the historical Chapter 3, exchange of products and services in a reciprocal 
sense was common in some campesino communities in pre-Colombian Indigenous nations. 
Nevertheless, since commerce is the dominant form of food exchange today, I shall consider 
experiences that can undermine the economic concentration that characterises capitalist 
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dominated food circulation. In this regard, short-circuits, such as closer relationships between 
producers, distributers and consumers may be considered a coherent way of exchange. It is 
however not necessarily the only way of food allocation which potentially could encourage 
non-capitalist food provision. Subsequently, I shall examine how short-circuits constitute a 
possible response to the capital-driven exchange.  
 
Within non-capitalist provision of food, greater control by direct producers throughout the 
economic cycle is consistent with a shift in command over the food system towards the local 
level. Although local food systems are not necessarily a reflection of non-capitalist motives, 
shorter supply chains contest long distance trade and large grocery stores. It also re-asserts 
the value underlying direct contact between producers and consumers. The proximity of a 
circuit can be measured in terms of geographic distance, cultural links or the number of 
commercial intermediators between production and consumption (e.g., Midoux, 2013).116 
However, even more important than the number of links between producers and consumers 
is the potential articulation of new relationships, commitments and confidences which 
revalorise the local habitat. In this regard, short-circuits enable a distinct social relation of 
exchange around concrete producers and consumers. It thus constitutes a contribution 
towards a non-capitalist driven form of exchange. In short, based on Friedman  (1992), the 
non-capitalist provision of food would prioritise exchange, rooted in natural cycles of food 
                                                 
116For a brief discussion about the different definitions of short-circuits see CEPAL, FAO, & IICA (2014). 
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production durability and conditioned distance. It hereby re-asserts the local product, with 
knowledgeable producers and cultural, geographical and ecological linkages. 
 
Questions regarding the role of international trade in non-capitalist food provision are 
especially contentious, as international trade has been a critical mechanism for securing 
capital’s dominance in the food system. As seen before (Chapter 6), the result has been an 
increased tendency of trade-dependency in the provision of food. The question is further 
complicated as some countries, conditioned by their ecosystem and/or historically shaped by 
capital, face a greater bias towards importing food staples. A contribution towards the 
reduction of capital circulation and accumulation in the food system would not oppose 
international trade per se, but attempt to eradicate corporate control and sub-ordinate the role 
of international trade to the requirement of food deficit countries and local priorities, such as 
food insecurity. This is consistent with the view that La Via Campesina has mostly defended 
on trade.  
 
Another benefit of short distance in exchange is its contribution to overcoming the metabolic 
rift by reducing its reliance on fossil fuel and food waste. Long-distance trade directly 
impacts climate change through greater use of fossil fuels in transportation. This does not 
ignore that most of emissions are associated with the production and processing sectors, as 
acknowledged in the previous chapter based on the findings by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change.  In addition, research undertaken by the FAO (2011) estimates that close 
to one third of food is annually lost. Although it is difficult to be precise, within the capital-
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driven supply chain, long-distance trade is considered to increase the likelihood of food 
waste.  
 
There are several examples in Latin America of the creation and support of shorter supply 
chains that favour direct producers. A common illustration of this is the existence of local 
campesino markets which tend to have an informal origin. Many of these markets are 
particularly visible in places with large Indigenous population and traditions (e.g. Andean 
towns). Available information is mostly constrained to official governmental or NGO reports 
that document policies that seek to formalise and consolidate these markets. A recent 
example is taking place in Chile, where since 2016 the Agricultural Development Institute 
(INDAP, for its acronym in Spanish) has implemented a commercialisation policy called 
Mercados Campesinos. The policy is based on financial support to already existing informal 
campesino markets. Most of this support is to finance market facilities, packing sheds and 
storage. In a partial assessment undertaken by INDAP for its initial programme, the existence 
of 260 campesino markets were documented. Despite the governmental support, the 
producers retain high degrees of autonomy in the management of the market (INDAP, 2018, 
n.d.). Another example is the Huancaro market in Cusco, Peru. The origin of the campesino 
market was 300 campesino families who came together in 2004 to create a producer 
association and organise the Huancaro market. In 2013, the association was constituted by 
more than 5000 campesinos, of which 2000 sell their products every Saturday in the 
Huancaro market, located on the outskirts of Cusco. The market is visited by about 25,000 
consumers every Saturday. Since 2007, the producer association has received the support of 
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various non-governmental organisations and international institutions, such as Agronomists 
and Veterinarians Without Borders (AVSF), the European Union, and the French 
Development Agency. These organisations have supported the campesinos in several ways, 
including commercial skills and management training, post-harvest facilities and logistic and 
transport-oriented food processing. By selling directly to the consumers and circumventing 
intermediaries, the Huancaro market has allowed producers to obtain higher incomes that 
surpass the official minimum wage (Chauveau, Guittard, & Paz, 2014).        
 
Another example of shorter supply chains are urban street markets which compete with large 
grocery stores. In Chile, these urban street markets constitute a main way to connect the 
campesinos directly with the consumers. It is possible to identify at least three ways in which 
the campesino connects with the urban street market. A first is through wholesale markets 
where the campesino sells their products which are then channelled to urban street markets. 
A second is that urban street market sellers buy directly from the campesino, and the third is 
that the producer himself sells directly in the urban street market. There are 933 urban street 
markets in Chile which comprise more 66,000 sellers. It is estimated that about 70% of 
Chilean fruits and vegetables are sold through these urban street markets (CEPAL, 2013, 
Chapter XV; CEPAL, FAO, & IICA, 2014, pp. 3–4).  
 
Efforts to facilitate inclusive gastro-economic chains which link producers with chefs 
constitute an additional form of shorter supply-chains. In Peru, a project of inclusive gastro-
economic chains promoted by the Peruvian Gastronomic Society aims to reduce rural poverty 
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and malnutrition by strengthening the campesino economy. The project is based on the 
improvement of the facilities and management of two campesino markets and its enhanced 
connection with retail markets. It also comprises the establishment of distinct food products 
linked to historical cultural dimensions and superior nutritional and ecological value 
(CEPAL, 2013, Chapters XIII–XIV).  
 
Attempts to establish shorter supply-chains through direct links between campesinos and 
grocery stores in urban areas can be observed in Colombia and Haiti. In different ways, both 
efforts are based on the successful articulation of campesinos and non-governmental 
organisations. In the case of Nariño, Colombia, the project aims to benefit small vegetable 
producers. The project created a company called Empresa Alianza Hortofrutícola del Sur 
that is committed to buying a certain volume from local producers. The company then 
channels the food to urban supermarkets. In Haiti, the programme Lèt Agogo supports the 
production and processing of milk to the benefit of small producers. It was created by the 
local NGO Veterimed and articulates small producers, the brand Lèt Agogo and community 
businesses. The associated producers are the sole owners and obtain all the benefits. Each 
production unit is formed by between 50 and 150 families. About 65% of the money 
generated stays in the community (CEPAL, 2013, Chapter X and XII).        
 
Direct state involvement in promoting short-circuits in Latin America is also undertaken 
through public procurement. Many of the public procurement experiences are related to 
conditional cash-transfer programmes that source a proportion of food from local producers. 
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The seminal example comes from Brazil which is associated to its much copied national Zero 
Hunger Programme. I looked at this programme in more detail in Chapter 6 when I examine 
how the state attempts to balance the drive for food exports with the reduction of hunger. The 
Zero Hunger strategy includes two programmes that purchase food from family farmers: the 
Food Acquisition Programme (PAA, for its acronym in Portuguese) and the National School 
Feeding Program (PNAE, for its acronym in Portuguese). The PAA buys food produced by 
family farmers and family rural entrepreneurs and allocates it to food and nutrition insecure 
people. In 2012, the PAA beneficiated about 190,000 food producers (Joppert Swensson, 
2015, p. 64). Most evaluations of the PAA point to stronger collective organisations, 
increased incomes, and greater family farm production (Joppert Swensson, 2015, pp. 69–72).  
In contrast to the PAA, the PNAE must use a minimum of 30% of its budget for school meal 
procurement in the purchase of food from family farmers, irrespective of federal budget 
allocations. Despite PNAE’s legal framework, between 2010 and 2012 the rule to purchase 
at least 30% directly from family farmers and family rural entrepreneurs was not met (Joppert 
Swensson, 2015, pp. 67–68). Although the PNAE is located at the Ministry of Education, it 
benefits from being integrated into the Zero Hunger strategy. In this way it is able to improve 
food security together with educational outcomes (da Silva et al., 2012).   
 
In sum, more localised and shorter circuits contribute to removing capital as the dominant 
actor in mediating the provision of food. In this sense, it has to be taken as a critical part for 
countering the tendency of economic concentration by large corporations throughout 
different segments of the food system. It challenges capital-driven exchange based on grocery 
stores and long-distance trade, and builds up resistance to processes of dispossession in 
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support of campesinos and rural communities. Since the different parts of the economic cycle 
are interrelated, actions for curtailing the control and command of capital in the food system 
require circuits that shortens the distances between production and consumption. This is not 
just achieved from the perspective of producers, but requires also the active role of 
‘consumers’. This brings me to the examination of the last moment of the economic cycle, 
namely consumption.  
 
 
Consumption: eating as a political act 
The last moment of the economic food cycle – after production, distribution and exchange – 
is consumption. In proposing an alternative to the agribusiness dominated food cycle, every 
moment of the economic food cycle should aim towards – interdependence among 
agroecological production, the re-appropriation of socio-economic control in interest of rural 
communities and campesinos, short-circuit exchange, and consumption. In this way, every 
moment of the economic food cycle reinforces the other moments. However, as long as food 
consumption is shaped by agribusiness interests, what and how to produce, distribute and 
exchange, is also likely to be also controlled by corporations. In this regard, a transformation 
of the food system also requires a change in consumption.  
 
Corresponding with previous attempts to remove capital as the key mediator in other 
moments of the economic food cycle, consumption would need to place food production at 
the service of local communities. Eating would therefore be considered a political act with 
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concrete economic impact. This political act would privilege a food system that contributes 
to address the destruction of human nature and extra-human nature linked to the capitalist 
food system. 
 
Given the interdependence between distinct moments of the economic cycle, consumption 
re-orientated towards local needs, is also often accompanied by transformations in production 
and/or exchange. Consumption re-orientated towards local needs is vital for: the 
consolidation of local markets as meeting point for producers and consumers; the creation 
and sustainability of food cooperatives; the recovery, production and re-production of 
traditional seeds; and the preservation of traditional food and recipes outside standardised 
mass consumption (e.g., Escalona Aguilar, 2013; SOCLA, 2013, 2015). The articulation of 
consumption groups takes different forms, but are often directly articulated in relation to the 
producers. This is illustrated by the collective Mano a Mano in Mérida, Venezuela (‘Mano a 
Mano Intercambio Agroecológico’, n.d.) or in a more limited way by the consumer collective 
Cooperativa de Consumo Responsable La Manzana in Valdivia, Chile (Cooperativa de 
Consumo Responsable La Manzana, n.d.). 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has argued for the reduction of capital’s dominance in the food system by 
presenting ‘viable’ alternatives to agribusiness. A full discussion of the emancipatory 
possibilities of non-capitalist ways of food provision would have taken me beyond the scope 
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of this chapter. The purpose of the brief discussion here was to examine the way concrete 
campesino centred experiences and practices may re-arrange the economic food cycle as a 
challenge to the dominant capitalist mode. This was done through analysis of the four 
moments in the economic cycle – production, distribution, exchange and consumption. I 
illustrated campesino centred agroecological production as an alternative to the input 
intensive industrial food production. I argued that it contributes to bridging the metabolic rift 
by grounding the provision of food socially and ecologically, while also being able to be as 
productive as large scale-farming.  
 
Subsequently, I addressed distribution as a critical component in curtailing the command of 
capital because it reflects who accrues the wealth in the food system. As an historical 
outcome, the account of value distribution and control within the food chain helped to explain 
the economic subordinated position of campesinos, while re-legitimising its critical role in 
food provision. I asserted that an analysis of exchange is of particular relevance for a non-
capitalist form of provision, because it is strongly linked to the distinctive campesino process 
of production. Here, I emphasised the importance of the local dimension and short-circuit 
exchange versus corporate grocery stores and long-distance trade. The reinforcement of 
shorter distances raised the question of the role of international trade in the campesino 
economy. Finally, I explained how consumption has to be considered as a necessary political 
act which reinforces the other moments of the economic food cycle. In short, existing 
experiences that seek to remove capital from its dominant position in the food system could 
potentially transform all moments of the economic cycle. These potential transformations 
include: the production of food based on agroecological principles; the re-appropriation of 
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the socioeconomic control towards the community and direct producers; local markets and 
short-circuit exchange and; the exercise of an ‘effective demand’ with a high degree of 
consistency in relation to the various parts of the economic cycle.  
 
Although heterogeneous in their economic practices and organisations, it is possible to draw 
some conclusions in regard to the underlying structure of non-capitalist food provision driven 
by the campesino. However, as pointed out previously, these experiences should not to be 
idealised as they are subject to all the tensions and contradictions of a capitalist system in 
which the capitalist mode is dominant. Having said this, the possibilities of success of non-
capital-driven food provision tend to increase when this provision is embedded in local 
communities, territories and based upon collective confidence and commitment. Potential 
illustrations of non-capitalist practices tend to include campesino cooperatives or 
associations, local markets and urban food gardens which depend greatly on community 
solidarity. Several of these experiences display also a tendency for horizontally organised 
systems of producers and consumers, based on self-governing and autonomous collectives. 
Instead of the limited cost-benefit logic of capitalist driven markets, the resistant forms of 
organisation seek more inclusive and participatory dimensions and may aim to address 
immediate material needs by long-term commitments to sustainability, collaboration and 
social justice.  
 
The focus on non-capitalist food provision of this chapter complements and informs the 
findings of the earlier chapters. This chapter demonstrated that practices, experiences and 
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knowledge of non-capitalist food provision have persisted until today. However, the 
examination of non-capitalist provision throughout the economic cycle also raises significant 
questions regarding the consolidation of any sustainable challenge to the dominance of 
capital in the food system. From my analysis, at least six interrelated challenges can be 
recognised. The first challenge is how to scale up local food systems without losing the close 
link between production and consumption. This is a key challenge that affects all four 
moments of the economic cycle. It raises questions of how to coordinate campesino 
production in order to feed an increasingly urban population, or how to secure food for people 
in countries with a production deficit. This would probably also require a corresponding 
change in the international arrangement of the food system. In this regard, Akram-Lodhi 
(2013, pp. 166–167) argues for the need to replace the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as 
proposed by John Maynard Keynes and Hans Singer with an International Trade 
Organisation. This organisation would manage trade and control speculative capital with the 
objective of stabilizing global commodity prices and attaining full employment.  
 
A second fundamental problem is related with the role of markets and its relation to prices 
and resource allocation. I do not aim to address this problem in full here as it exceeds the 
scope of this chapter but just to indicate its critical importance.117 To some extent, the moment 
of exchange most clearly reveals the working of the market. This connects closely with the 
proposition of commercialisation through short-circuits as they still rely on market exchange. 
At this point, it is worth remembering Polanyi’s argument that not all markets can be 
                                                 
117In this regard, there is a lot of literature, which comes from the socialist market economy debates.  
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characterised as capitalist markets, that is, by the competitive pursuit of individual profit. 
Non-capitalist exchange may in contrast rely on markets as a space of exchange rooted in 
community and solidarity. However, this cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, the stability 
of the non-capitalist in market exchange has to be continuously reproduced. It is in this sense 
that struggles for re-localisation of exchange are also a struggle for curtailing the priority of 
competition and profit maximisation in food circulation.  
 
Closely related with the previous argument, the third point touches on the heart of the struggle 
in determining how food and life are valued and thus arranged through labour and capital. In 
our restricted case, if we accept that food is traded as a commodity and we propose short-
circuit as a way to curtail corporate power, there are still the issues of a ‘just’ price and how 
to value food production. This points to the importance, as highlighted by Moore (2014, p. 
5), of ‘radical ontological politics’, which underwrites the transformation of the food system 
in terms of the social valorisation of food.   
 
Fourthly, and related with the previous point, although my focus in this chapter has been on 
the ‘economic dimension’, as emphasised throughout this dissertation, there is an intrinsic 
link with the political dimension. As such the non-capitalist also includes more ‘genuine’ 
forms of democracy that require a political strategy. This is particularly visible when 
addressing the importance of the local level. While the non-capitalist, as elaborated here, 
asserts the importance of the local level, it simultaneously raises the question of local 
institutional settings such as the legal use of urban land for food production, communal 
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ownership with equal rights to apply for government schemes, access to transport and 
communication facilities or irrigation and water rights. All these questions include a critical 
political dimension that impacts on the economic process.  
 
Connected to the previous argument is the fifth challenge, which is to conceive demand as a 
political act. It relates to practices of consumption conceived as a form of resistance and the 
formation of consciousness. Although I acknowledge the importance of the latter, I did not 
deal with this process in detail as it would have meant a shift in focus. For instance, the 
convenience of buying all produce under one roof, sometimes even cheaper, places each act 
of food consumption under the continuous ‘choice’ of validating the reproduction of the 
dominating capitalist food system or bet for a break. A similar argument could also be made 
for the direct producer, who could prefer to maximise profits once able to compete in the 
capitalist market.  
 
In regard to the previous challenge, the sixth and final point highlights that experiences of 
resistance to capital-driven food provision encompass contradictory practices. The latent risk 
is to repeat the logic of capital in creating these new alternatives. Although initially there 
might be a ‘conscious’ effort to differentiate from prevailing structural determinants, it is a 
persistent struggle to overcome the logic inherent in labour exploitation and the capitalist 
market. As I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the campesino expresses these 
struggles and contradictory practices in many ways. However, despite the prediction of the 
campesinos’ disappearance with the rise of capitalism by some European Marxists and 
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current unfavourable conditions, they continue to be critical actors within the food system, 
and can be critical in any alternative arrangement in Latin America.      
 
As argued in this chapter, expanding non-capitalist moments of food provision can challenge 
the dominance of corporate control in the food system. However, it does not of course equate 
to the end of global capital accumulation or the transcendence of the logic of capital in all 
moments of the economic cycle. Displacement of campesinos, marginalisation and forced 
migration would still occur due to multiple factors which link the global capital process with 
the local campesino experience. Therefore, although the experiences of campesino centred 
non-capitalist food provision are not enough to mark a rupture in the dominating and 
expanding capitalist food system, they do signal to a viable path towards transition to a 
potential rupture. The next final chapter briefly reviews the contribution this dissertation has 
made to an understanding of the contemporary food system stemming from a political 
economy perspective originating from the Marxist tradition.   
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9. Conclusion 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the contribution, limitation and implication this thesis has made. This 
thesis examined the system of food provision in Latin America in the context of expanding 
capital accumulation that brought to the fore the interconnected crises of hunger and 
ecological destruction. It identified and analysed two main actors in the provision of food, 
namely agribusiness represented by corporations, and campesinos. Capital circulation and 
accumulation define corporate agribusiness, which in turn is characterised by industrial 
agriculture; intensive in energy and chemical inputs, and is arranged around highly 
concentrated global value-chains and distinctive regional patterns of land concentration. The 
campesino is defined by a bundle of activities that is centred on direct food production. It 
employs mostly family work and has existed before and during the dominance of capital. In 
this regard, the campesino is understood as not completely determined by the dominant 
process of capital circulation and accumulation, and is located in the interrelated spaces of 
capitalist and non-capitalist practices.  
  
The thesis demonstrated that the campesino is still critical for the domestic provision of food 
in Latin America. The food system can be interpreted as having a dual character constituted 
by capital and campesino provision that displays adapting and conflicting expressions. This 
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has created a fragile balance which is threatened by the continuous expansion of capital over 
new territories. In this sense, the study also sought to understand two contradictions which 
emerged as capital penetrated agrarian structures. Firstly, the destruction of human nature 
through hunger in the midst of sufficient overall food supply. Secondly, the destruction of 
extra-human nature which undermines capital’s own ability for expanded reproduction, as 
portrayed by the deepening of the metabolic rift. The study demonstrated how hunger and 
ecological destruction are endogenous to the capital dominated food system, and argued that 
this dynamic is unsustainable because it erodes the social and natural bases of production and 
reproduction. Capital’s tendency towards concentration impacts unevenly across different 
social groups and ecological spaces. This advance through ‘socio-ecological formations’ 
degrades nature and is linked particularly, but not exclusively, to rural communities. The 
reasons behind why particular groups and geographic areas are more vulnerable to capital’s 
destruction relates to the division of labour, political disempowerment and unequal 
distribution of economic resources. The historical and empirical analysis contributed to an 
understanding of how this socio-ecological crisis driven by capital has manifested unequally.  
 
Elaborating upon these contradictions, the penultimate chapter of this dissertation concludes 
by exploring a more emancipatory and open-ended path for food provision. The examination 
is centred on concrete experiences that aim to reduce capital’s influence over the food system, 
and avoids excessive idealism. The food system, which is understood as a contested space, 
is open to different ways of food provision with the campesino centred provision offering 
many experiences and a wide body of knowledge that challenge the dominant capitalist form 
of food provision. I argued that campesino activities that seek to remove capital from its 
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dominant position in the food system: can arrange production around agroecological 
principles; pursue a greater appropriation of the socioeconomic control towards the 
community and direct producers; privilege local markets and short-circuit exchange; and 
require effective demand as a political act.  
 
 
Contribution 
This thesis has proposed a comprehensive analysis of the food system in Latin America. It 
has placed this analysis within a conceptual framework from the Marxist tradition that 
accounts for global dynamics of capital accumulation while also considering distinctive 
processes in the continent. In this regard, it has contributed to Marxist critiques of the political 
economy of capitalism based on two critical themes that run throughout this dissertation. 
These two claims are: (1) the rejection of any epistemological closure derived from particular 
Marxist interpretations, often derived from the Global North for understanding Latin 
America; and (2) non-capitalist aspects and its interaction with capital as a process are 
important to understanding capitalism as a global system. I briefly present five interrelated 
contributions that this dissertation has made.  
 
My conceptual framework has drawn on historical Marxist debates and knowledge that 
originated from Latin America. The first contribution is linked to the decision to situate the 
systemic features of dispossession within Marxist debates of coexistence of modes of 
production. The coexistence of modes of production has recently been declared a mistaken 
319 
 
approach (see Banaji, 2012). However, treating the rise of capital through the lens of the 
transition and articulation of modes of production has facilitated the articulation of three 
points: (1) the slow consolidation of capitalist social relations in agrarian structures different 
to manufacturing in Latin America; that (2) non-capitalist food production still makes 
significant contributions to internal food supply in Latin America; and that (3) capital 
transformed agriculture in a process that is unlike England and other Western experiences.  
 
Secondly, some Marxist scholars, such as notably Bernstein, have argued that the peasantry 
no longer exists. However, this dissertation has shown that capital penetration in agrarian 
structures in Latin America was distinct from the experience in Europe; where the dissolution 
of the peasantry was considered a necessary condition for the rise of capital. Without 
neglecting increased processes of differentiation, conceptualising the direct food producer as 
a secondary mode of production, and calling them campesinos, suggests a different 
understanding of the historical uneven and combined development in rural Latin America. 
Furthermore, it allows an understanding of the empirical findings that re-legitimise the 
importance of the contemporary campesino economy, ongoing struggles over land and the 
possibility of a food provision outside of the domain of capital. I would particularly like to 
acknowledge my debt to other Latin American academics who share a similar position 
(particularly Bartra, 2006, 2010), but also to English ‘speaking’ academics that I am 
sympathetic to and who have rescued and validated the role of ‘peasants’ in the Global South 
(e.g., Cristobal Kay, Saturnino Borras, Philip McMichael, Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Annette 
Desmarais and Raj Patel to name just a few).  
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Thirdly, I recognised the need to update the conceptual content of the mode of production 
(MOP) approach with an emphasis on the nature-social relationship. This was certainly an 
issue less pressing forty years ago but, as the recent release of Marx’s ecological notebook 
proved, it already was of fundamental concern in his understanding of the rise of capital. In 
this regard, the theoretical case for complementing the mode of production approach with a 
metabolic rift perspective has illuminated important aspects of capital circulation and 
accumulation throughout the food system. It has proved particularly important when 
examining the contradiction that arises when capital destroys its own natural bases for further 
expansion. Again, this dissertation has emphasised the need to consider distinctive ecological 
thoughts that have emerged from Latin America in order to reveal how the capitalist 
provision of food is conditioned by, and impacts on, the social interaction with nature. 
  
Fourthly, this dissertation builds on a long tradition within Latin America, that began at least 
with the Peruvian Marxist Mariategui, that proposes an understanding of capitalism also from 
its non-capitalist dimension. This approach allows an understanding of the uneven and 
combined historical capitalist development in Latin America. Moreover, as demonstrated, a 
large part of the contemporary food system is still linked to non-capitalist spaces of 
production and reproduction. It has proved to be important for studying the role of the 
campesino economy, located in a shifting intersection between capitalist and non-capitalist 
spaces.   
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Fifthly, by highlighting the relevance of distinct epistemological dimensions in discussing 
Latin America, this dissertation also has referred to distinct conceptions about the world. The 
experiences, struggles and knowledge contained in the campesino economy have an implicit 
ontological aspect. Because the campesino is not just a productive economic sector, it also 
entails a particular relation with nature, modes of life and understanding of the world. In this 
regard, the previous epistemological related claims are also linked to an ontological 
dimension, and a call for a radical political ontology. Thus, campesino struggles over 
territories and their role as producers are also ontological struggles for a different 
understanding of biological and social diversity intrinsic to nature.  
 
 
Limitations and scope for further analysis 
This dissertation focused on commonly observed patterns of capital accumulation in the food 
system throughout Latin America. The theoretical framework proposed has served to 
understand historical and contemporary issues related to agrarian change in the context of 
capital expansion. However, by focusing on the continent as a whole, additional empirical 
research that maps agrarian change between and within countries comes up as an immediate 
research task. In this regard, and building upon the understanding of the food system in this 
thesis, I next present a potential research agenda for further research on the topic that focuses 
on four interrelated aspects that are conveniently divided in terms of: the campesino, the 
socio-ecological relation as connected through food, capital, and the state.  
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Firstly, more specific research on the campesino unit is needed to answer questions related 
to differentiation and diversification of livelihood strategies that range from survival to 
aspects of capital accumulation. The latter would contribute to an improved understanding 
of the role of the campesino in the food system and its specific relation to capital in terms of 
its functionality, redundancy or resistance. In this regard, research that clarifies the 
campesino demands as well as its contingency is important to better comprehend the 
struggles and potential for a non-capitalist provision. This also involves a concrete 
examination of the intersection of class formation and the participation in social movements 
and the intersection of class, race and gender (e.g., DeVault, 1994; Hall et al., 2015; 
Ormachea & Ramirez, 2013; Otero, 2004; Razavi, 2009; Rivera Ledezma, 2006).    
 
A second research concern refers to the concrete patterns of capital accumulation and their 
socio-ecological contradictions. This thesis has conceptualised food as a special connecter of 
the socio-ecological dimension. It has suggested that the expansion and occupation of 
territories by capital has different expressions depending on the socio-ecological context. The 
perseverance of the campesino is strongly linked to communities and specific territories, 
particularly in presence of ethnic minorities. As asserted, from an epistemological and 
ontological perspective, capital accumulation in the food system tends to take place at 
expense of traditional knowledge and other world views on food provision. One expression 
of this is capital’s specialisation on a small number of food items. This is illustrated by an 
accumulating loss of food crops and cooking practices. Despite knowledge of over 50,000 
edible plants, 60% of the world’s intake is comprised of only rice, maize and wheat. The 
specific food strategies that campesino communities use to address food insecurity and 
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ecological destruction, and how it connects to ‘non-commodified’ food crops, are important 
to complement this dissertation. Latin America is still home to specific food crops such as 
cassava, quinoa, different types of potatoes, maize and beans. However, they have come 
under increasing pressure, due to the penetration of capital which also involves the expansive 
control over the entire food system from seeds to food habits.  
 
Thirdly, in this dissertation, capital has been taken mostly as impersonal transnational 
corporations with a focus on the food system in terms of the provision of food goods. 
However, it would be useful to explore: 1) more concretely how power and wealth is exerted 
for capital accumulation depending on the national origin of corporations and; 2) the impact 
of the increasing role of finance. Regarding the first point, in recent years, Latin America has 
been witnessing a rise in corporations headquartered in the region, termed ‘translatinas’. 
Some research has been done in this respect regarding land grabbing (Borras Jr et al., 2012; 
FAO, 2012a), but the question is wider and needs to also consider more specific impacts in 
terms of changes in concrete working conditions and the role of the state. It would also be 
worth studying the increasing mergers and takeovers lead by capital from Latin America. 
One notable case is JBS, a Brazilian meat processing company, now the largest meat 
company in the world. It recently bought subsidiaries of the US based Tyson Foods company. 
Secondly, the 2007/08 food crisis unveiled the increasing financialisation of the food system. 
However, most of research on the subject has been undertaken for the Global North and for 
food speculation on the stock market, which suggest limits for its wider relevance. In this 
regard, greater research should focus on: to what extent financialisation has altered the 
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characteristics of capitalist food provision; how this process has unfolded in relation to the 
campesino economy; and the relationship between food corporations and the finance sector.  
 
Fourthly, as a social relation that mediates all socio-ecological spheres, the state plays a 
central role in the food system. In this dissertation, its analysis was greatly limited to the 
historical rise of the capitalist mode of production and the response by the state in the face of 
the hunger crisis. Nevertheless, a more exhaustive analysis of the role of the state in the food 
system in the different countries in Latin America is required. Not just in terms of the mostly 
limited, albeit at moments important, direct state food provisioning, but fundamentally to 
unveil how and to what extent the state facilitates or constrains capital accumulation and the 
campesino economy. It hereby would add to our understanding of food provision given that 
it also involves the transformation and definition of the public, the collective and the 
commons. This includes different analyses, among others on coercion, economic policies and 
the institutionalisation of rights. Hence, further research on the role of the state in food 
provision in terms of its relation with campesino movements, labour, capital and nature 
would contribute to a better comprehension of the food system in Latin America. This 
understanding should also extent to an analysis of the institutionalisation of the food system 
(e.g., nutritional composition of food and marketing requirements, food safety, labelling, the 
right to food, communal property), the organisation of knowledge (e.g., patents, traditional 
knowledge), and the constitution of identities (e.g., through territories). 
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To conclude, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, the existing structural tensions, 
expressed in the persistence of hunger in midst overall food abundance and the destruction 
of nature, cannot be solved by the expansion of capital domination. Capital-driven ‘free 
trade’, potential productivity increases or bio-technological innovations will not solve these 
contradictions. Confronting these issues requires political and social changes towards a non-
capitalist provision of food. This process needs to underscore the epistemologies and 
potential of ‘ontological politics’, as Moore (2015a) called it, of the campesino and local 
communities. Based on the re-affirmation of the collective over the individual, it would re-
orient struggles, experiences and knowledge towards a food provision that defends life in all 
its diversity. Underlying this process is the need to reduce space for capital’s control in the 
food system, at the national and international level. Yet, the domain of capital cannot be 
challenged without the transformation of the relation of forces between social classes that 
includes the state through democratisation of collective decisions. This also would have to 
include, as shown in the previous chapter, changes in line with land reforms, agroecological 
production systems, shorter circuits and more conscious consumption patterns with the 
perspective of collective property forms, and management of sources of wealth.   
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10. Appendix  
Table 10.1: Contribution of family agriculture to national food production (figures in %) 
Argentina(a) Cattle (26) Sheep (25) Goat (82) Pork (64) Milk (33)    
Bolivia(b) Rice (70) Vegetables 
(45) 
Corn (70) Potatoes 
(almost 100) 
Yuca 
(almost 100) 
Milk (40)   
Brazil(c) Rice (34) Coffee (38) Beans (70) Corn (46) Yuca (87) Pork (59) Milk (58)  
Chile(d) Annual 
crops (44) 
Fruits (23) Vegetables 
(54) 
Vineyards 
(29) 
Cattle (54) Sheep (42) Goats (94) Pork (12) 
Colombia(b)  Annual 
crops (30) 
       
Ecuador(b) Onion (85) Corn (70) Potatoes 
(64)  
Sheep (83)     
Paraguay(a) Banana (93) Sugar cane 
(53) 
Beans (94) Tomato (97) Yuca (94) Pork (80) Milk (55)  
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Table 10.1: Contribution of family agriculture to national food production (figures in %) (cont.) 
Uruguay(a) Fruit (38)  Vegetables 
(80) 
Vineyards 
(27) 
Livestock 
(25) 
Milk (27)    
Costa Rica(e) Rice (22) Beans (75) Fruits (10) Vegetables 
(9) 
Corn (97) Meat (2)   
El 
Salvador(e) 
Rice (84) Beans (42) Fruits (32) Vegetables 
(64) 
Corn (44) Meat (9)   
Guatemala(e) Rice (73) Beans (13) Fruits (3) Vegetables 
(3) 
Corn (30) Meat (21)   
Honduras(e) Rice (78) Beans (14) Fruits (12) Vegetables 
(8) 
Corn (40) Meat (10)   
Nicaragua(e) Rice (21) Beans (2) Fruits (8) Vegetables 
(66) 
Corn (23) Meat (2)   
Panama(e) Rice (16) Beans (52) Fruits (6) Vegetables 
(9) 
Corn (81) Meat (6)   
Source: CEPAL et al. (2013). Data drawn from: (a) REAF (2010); (b) Schejtman (2008); (c) IBGE (2009); (d) INDAP-Qualitas Agroconsultores (2009); (e) from 
2013 FAOSTAT and COMTRADE 
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Figure 10.1: The trade dependency of food supply, 1965 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from Porkka et al. (2013) 
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Figure 10.2: The trade dependency of food supply, 2005 
  
Source: Own elaboration using data from Porkka et al. (2013)  
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